Do you believe in free will?

[The Grand Nudger]

"Some" crystalline structures can defract light into a an "orderly" pattern visible to human beings along the very short portion of the spectrum of our ability. Still, "colors" specifically the names of those colors are an invention of human beings, and some creatures perceive wavelengths of light differently than we do (as far as we can tell from the structure of their light sensing apparatus, not being able to ask them directly). If they were to have "colors" it's not entirely unlikely that they would have both a different concept and name in mind for any given wavelength within their ability to perceive.

This effect is not limited to crystals, plants can also do this (as seen from the perspective of the human eye)-
Phototropics "percieve" all light as something analagous to the idea of "hide" to a human being, devoid of any notion of color or sight. This is how plants "follow the sun". Chloroplasts "perceive" red and blue as "go", which is why they appear to be green (the light that they don't absorb), until they are dead or dormant, at which point they appear to be brown (the larger portion of the light they are no longer absorbing and thusly visible to us in the changing of the seasons)

[NoMoreFaith]

But don't you see, you will either cool down or not and agree on the usage of terms or not, exactly as your enviro-/experiential/DNA dictates. There is no need and no possibility of deciding differently. If you'd been born with all the factors that have gone into determining Genkaus' perspective, then you'd have no choice but to argue his side. If you're right about determinism then you can't win. Reasoning is futile. Those thoughts which confirm or undermine your position are just more 'givens'. If you have no free will, you have no reason to give more credence to your thoughts than to Genkaus'. If you can see through the illusion of your apparent free will then why stop there? Why accept the thoughts and opinions that are given to you to think? Why suppose that what seems reasonable or rational to you is any more reliable than the illusion of your free will? In short, if you don't have free will, can you possibly have 'free thought'?

Apologies, I completely missed your post the first time around.

It does not follow that we do not reason if we are determined, what follows is that our reasons are causally produced and then causally acted upon.
Your argument states that reasons are NOT caused, then I would like to ask for your evidence that reason is separate from being caused.

Let me provide an example of why your reasoning is faulty by equating free will and a soul;
"The materialist claims we have no soul, but if we have no soul, then the materialist would be incapable of love, and emotion, and is dead inside. Are you dead inside? Are you incapable of emotion? Then you must have a soul."

The thing is, like the soul, things like love, and emotion can be explained by things other than a soul. Likewise our reason can be explained by things other than free will.

Criticism of something so ingrained in what we believe to be true, such as free will, will bring out the most absurd reasoning to deny it or redefine it.

However, free will is a positive claim, a claim that your reason is not caused by factors outside of control (with the exception of the compatibilists who enjoy word games).

[KichigaiNeko]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prism_(optics)

http://www.uen.org/Lessonplan/preview?LPid=2339

http://www.newton.dep.anl.gov/askasci/ph...y00388.htm

Sorry, but I have a quartz crystal the refracts the sunlight coming in from my window (rather pretty I must admit) and so I think of "Crystals" rather than man made refraction lenses you may be more familiar with

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Separates white light into it's component wavelengths very nicely

[genkaus]

The distinction that we are forced against our will in terms of a discussion on will, it seems to be a tautology. Our created will forces us to against our will to do something is nonsense.
The only logical sense is to use the word in context of being compelled to act.

But the terms of the discussion are not about will they are about free will. Any idea regarding compulsion, coercion or free-will assumes the "will" part as a given. Without there being a "will" the other concepts are meaningless. So, the usage of compulsion or coercion is to judge the conflict between will and action - not any inconsistency within will itself. If there is a conflict, then it is compulsion, if not it is free of compulsion.

True, but my arguments are clear that the person is nothing but the sum of the physiological whole reacting to stimuli internal and external.

Do you not consider the internal stimuli to be a part of the sum? I ask this because you mention it separately from the sum.

The quote is discussing choice, and it only makes sense to reify the "self" in this instance as a reference point for whom the choice refers to. It is more than clear that I do not consider the person to be separate from the natural processes. Suggestions for a better way to word it?

None. But my complaint is not regarding this formulation, but regarding the implication that you do not follow it when discussing free-will. Basically, when you say that a person is compelled to act by his natural processes, you are implying that these two things are separate.

Only if the mechanical ability to memorise does not exist. Which it clearly does.

For instance, a computer program is resolves an instruction to complete a task. It is an illusion the task is completed instantly (unless you use my computer), merely the byproduct of lots of little instructions to make up the whole. It is the memory which makes it possible for the computer to create small steps leading to the fulfillment of the plan.
However, our choice to "want promotion" was initially a small idea, likely based on a small choice "I want to be more comfortable", memorised, and expanded upon to reach a state of perceived more permanent comfort.

The issue is not memorization, it is the consciousness of it. You treat memory as an unconscious process, storing and retrieving data automatically, whereas the very process of learning is about conscious storage and retrieval. It is a fallacy of composition to think that because some data is stored and retrieved unconsciously, all data is stored and retrieved similarly.

Precisely. Your concept of Pie was the fleeting thought, memorised, and then minor tasks repeatedly memorised to reach the final concept. You can then act, based upon stored decisions to reach a result.

As I said, the issue is regarding the consciousness involved in memory retrieval. You argument is that all these minor tasks are decided upon automatically without any need for consciousness. But if the process of memorization and subsequent retrieval are conscious, then your argument won't be applicable.

Now in terms of Neuroscience, your wants and needs are dependent on the chemicals in your body. An interesting case study is Ann Klinestiver, a teacher whom was squeaky clean, whom was medicated with a Dopamine substitute.
She developed an intense gambling addiction brought on by the Dopamine.

I bring this up, and as a layman, I can only describe it in layman terms, but because dopamine affects your "reward prediction" centre in your brain, it has serious effects on your long range motivations.
To cut a long story short, the link between mnemonic processes and the functions of decisions is known. More to the point, it seems likely, thou I don't know of any studies on this yet, merely the brain processes that link mnemonic and decision making, that these processes predate conscious thought in their construction.

Not quite. The knowledge about relation between mnemonics and brain functions does not preclude or predate conscious thought. Especially if it is established that the mnemonics cannot be constructed without conscious thought.

However, it does seem to be a logical conclusion, that if the subconscious, which you have no control over, is making split second decisions before your conscious mind rationalises it, that your subconscious is also doing the same thing with steps related to long term goals.
In another words.. your conscious process of planning a long range goal, was constructed, and presented to your conscious to rationalise.

Except, this would imply that there has been no conscious consideration of any subsequent actions down the line from now. Given that in any long-term planning, first the series of actions is mapped out and then the decision of acting upon it is made, yours would not be the logical conclusion.

That part is theory, and unproven, but hence my point that neuroscientists would probably be surprised if long range planning was somehow separate and therefore a completely different process from small scale decisions.

I think they'd be surprised if it was the reverse. There is a critical difference between the small-scale and long-term decisions. For small scale decisions, the motivation and action are near simultaneous. They bear a one-to-one correlation with each-other, i.e. one motivation corresponds to one action. In this case, it is readily understandable that the process can take place without conscious consideration.

For a large-scale one, one motivation corresponds to a series of actions spread over a long period. It would be simply astounding if every step of the series was determined unconsciously and correctly corresponding to the motivation. To draw upon on your favorite analogy - creationism would have been much more believable if every creature in the world had had perfect design.

Asserting I am wrong, is not the same as proving it. Your point certainly doesn't succeed in that task.
My previous point about reward prediction comes into play. If the levels of dopamine in your brain are altered, your perception of reward prediction is weighted in a different way. The important point to note in relation to this point is that this is all going on to cause your conscious thoughts, not in response to a conscious thought.

Are conscious thoughts required to be causeless? Going back to the original point, in the human brain, we cannot say where the "self" begins. However, artificially altering the dopamine levels in the brain apparently alters the "self". With this alteration, it is expected that the motivations and desires of the prior "self" no longer apply. This, however, does not make the process of decision-making any more unconscious than it was for the prior self.

Any question of compulsion here comes when regarding whether the alteration itself was within the will of the original self.

Finally, the point I made was regarding how the achievement of long-term motivations requires consciously considered action series. Raising the point about how the motivation came to be in the first place does not address the point.

Can you honestly argue, that our thought processes are NOT meandering, unreliable and notoriously inefficient?

Not when consciously focused on a single purpose.

On your way to the restaurant, you will make a lot of minor mistakes, barely noticeable in the long run, occasionally larger ones, like taking the wrong route. Perception of reward for each given task referred to the memory of the destination. The small tasks are irrelevant to the whole plan, but initiated by the prediction of reward memorised.

Some mistakes occur, yes, but to the level of evolution. Currently, it is estimated that 99.9% of all species are extinct. If we applied the same success rate to our everyday actions, then we'd literally never get anything done.

As the original premise stated, the idea we control, and construct our plans MAY (not definitely, I don't assert as you do) turn out to be as illusionary as the small scale ones. We rationalise the plan after we have already decided and memorised our WANTS.

The level of unconscious effort required here would be astounding. When you consciously choose your actions and consciously commit them to memory, you have the option of weeding out the irrelevant and the useless. The unconscious has no such mechanism.

Why did you create the command to walk? Did YOU decide to walk?
My argument is that conscious is our unusual mechanism which justifies the action the subconscious has decided upon.
It suits me to call it my free will, but the reality is likely to be nothing close.

Not quite. I wanted to walk. The decision to walk wasn't finalized without conscious consideration. If it was finalized, I'd have found myself half out of the chair before I became conscious of the desire.

So, yes, I did decide to walk. The subconscious might have provided the inclination, but the final decision was up to me.

Sometimes I'm sure, but your rationalisation doesn't ALWAYS match the reasons.
I need sustenance, body go eat pie, is rationalised, as "gosh, I'm hungry, I think I'll choose to eat that pie". No problem. Your free will in choosing to eat the pie.
More to the point, you fancy an orange. There is no problem in accepting that your body recognises an orange as containing certain vitamins and sugars it particularly needs and compels you to choose that over the pie.

The reason I don't accept your "rationalization" argument, is because the number of factors considered for the decision is beyond what the subconscious is capable off. Fancying a pie or an orange does not necessitate the decision. That fancy is simply range of the moment, unconscious decision. That unconscious motivation is easily overruled by other motivations you have already become conscious of - such as that of losing weight.

It gets shadier with more complex ideas such as "I am going to marry that girl". Are you absolutely sure your reasons for being attracted to her is the result of conscious decision? I'm willing to bet that you are happy to attribute the complexity of that decision to reasons dictated by your subconscious rather than a decision formed by your conscious. Nebulous concepts such as "I love her therefore" are mostly meaningless to the true requirement of your motivation to wish to partner someone indefinitely. Too complex to comprehend, and simplified into concepts of love etc.

Actually, no. I would not allow myself to be dictated by nebulous and ill-defined concepts such as love. My attraction to the girls I meet is not simply subconscious - because the subconscious has tools of judging solely on appearances. I've consciously determined which properties I find attractive and why and upon meeting someone, I consciously look for these - irrespective of whether I subconsciously find them attractive or not. And as the list usually whittles down, I find myself growing less and less attracted to them. Probably the reason why I'm still single.

The lack of free will can be defined as the necessity of causation, and the compulsion to act. I defined free will in different ways, but by no means fallaciously equivalent. It is the difference between defining what makes you something, and being made to do something. Different concepts... different words.. BOTH restrict the possibility of free will.

The first definition precludes free-will. The second one does not.

Your point about separate entities is no more relevant than you saying that your consciousness initiates the action.

My argument is not that consciousness initiates the action, but that the action is initiated after conscious consideration.

The consciousness is not really a separate entity at all, but in order to discuss coherently, you must talk about the conscious mind and subconscious, even thou there is no real separation between the two holistically, its all one biological process. This illusion we have that we an choose is part of what makes things separate, and most importantly allows us to discuss it in a rational manner.
Separation remains a rhetorical device to explain concepts. If we used the word body instead of "mind" "conscious" "subconscious" "feeling" "emotion".. the conversation would just be nonsense, but that does not apply any reality to the separation, merely a method to talk about the issue and the description of parts that are not really separate, but feel as if they are to us.

If you consider the separation to be illusory, then you'd consider the will to be illusory as well - not just free-will. The way you talk about separate entities, it seems you consider any such separation to be not real - that is an illusion. In which case, you should regard all subsequent concepts as illusions as well, not just free will.

Because you mistakenly interpret that the rationalisation happens upon the completion of the action, rather than completion of the readiness to act.

Uh, no. This would be another important distinction. I didn't exactly assume completion of action, but I see why it'd be implied.

Basically, I asked myself, what is the difference between a reason and a rationalization. A reason is the known cause which determines the action. If no cause is known upon the determination of the action, then what is substituted there is a rationalization. The difference between the two comes once the act is determined, i.e. the course of action is decided. Readiness to act is not the same as its determination. However, with regards to will, the only only difference between its determination and completion is that of time.

[Angrboda]

My statement does need a little rephrasing as it was inaccurate so allow me to re attempt.

This perception of phenomena, effect of noumena, desire, introspection and reasoning, all filtered through identity, and acted upon are what encompass free- will to me.

(emphasis added)

[Not sure which usage you're referring to here; if you are simply using noumena in place of say, 'mental contents', why that usage — what is your specific meaning. I responded to the more contemporary meaning, and since it's already typed, I'll simply leave it in place.]

Noumena do not have effects. If it has effects, it is phenomena. An example straddling the line might be dark energy and dark matter. Currently, afaik, they have not been able to detect such matter or energy directly, presumably because its interactions with ordinary matter are extremely weak (like neutrinos which can travel through an entire planet without collision). However, dark matter and dark energy are hypothesized to exist because, despite our inability to detect it through interaction with normal matter, it has an effect on the overall system via gravity, such that if it didn't exist, something would have to take its place, because there are gravitational sums which don't agree with observation without it. Now noumena would be something that has no effect at all, and is thus not knowable even in principle. An example is the distinction between empirical results, experience, and reality. There could be thousands of universes, all essentially existing in the same 'universe-space', but, because the laws governing the behavior of stuff in one universe don't interact with our normal universe, they are essentially invisible. Such universes would be noumenal, as we couldn't know them by any means, as they don't have effects that can be detected in our 'universe-stuff'.

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I ask that you keep the ad hominems to a minimum, s'il vous plait. Unless of course it was your intent to imply that I have no common sense, in which case I suggest that you go fuck a rake, or the nearest painfully pointed object in your vicinity.

Unless you hold that in goal-directed behavior all the constituent actions are not chosen with priori consideration with their applicability to the goal, instead automatically and rationalized afterwards - no, the implication is not applicable to you.

The question is what is meant here by "consideration". If this implies participation with conscious awareness of participation and direction, I would say that both the neuroscience (and philosophy) are not decided on this point. What has traditionally been termed the subconcious or unconscious shows abilities to "consider" and cognate that are as powerful as conscious processes. This is why I got in the big furball with Rhythm as the very concepts used — conscious, subconscious, decision, belief — many of which, when fully understood, will be unlikely to carve nature at her joints. I think you misunderstand NMF's point largely to mock him, and I got sprayed in the process. I don't know whose neuroscience you are relying on with regard to this point, but if it's as settled as you think it is, I'd like some citations of the literature so I can read about it firsthand. No offense, but I don't trust your summaries, which appear to be derived more from first principles than scientific evidence.

ETA: There's also the question of privileged observers. If your consciously introspected observations are just confabulations to achieve some end, say harmonizing memory narratives; if the "you" is unaware that the "you" that you are is just making up bollocks interpretations that some other part of you decided, which "you" has the power to detect that fact? Certainly not the "you" that is simply a puppet of the subconscious. I'm reminded of my mother who used to talk about how she had read that some depression (I have a history of depresion) was caused by "bad air". Of course, she was simply confabulating that she'd "read it somewhere" and that it made sense — there's no part of her that is "left over", a central scrutinizer who watches from the sidelines and says, aha, we're confabulating! (That leads to a vicious, infinite regress. As a psychiatric patient, throughout the last 20 years I have repeatedly had to retell my personal history. There were quite a few times when I'd be telling my story, and I'd suddenly realize, I was making shit up! Not that I created fictional events, but I would confabulate the connections between different events, weaving them into a narrative for which, the base events were constraining, but nothing else — there are a million and one ways to string together a (vague) set of items that make sense, and if the person who is supposed to be making sense of them isn't aware that it's simply fabricating the story, where does the disinterested yet truthful observer come from? [This is also a side issue with tack. Our memories are not perceptions from a different time. The memories have a different structure, the "stuff" of memories and the stuff of perception diverge considerably (ignoring gross properties, such as heirarchical nesting of the qualia properties of perception, and that memories may exhibit similar nesting, but the causes and mechanisms are completely different. Despite the popular analogy, memory is not like videotape. There is no "whole and complete record" to go back to in memory. Memory is construction — not even re-construction — it's putting pieces of knowledge derived from internal and internal percepts, and creating something entirely new.)]

[tackattack]

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1. Both the actions of perception and cogitation do not require material reality to occur.

Yes they do.

Unless you believe we only have 5 material senses?

No, we've many more of those.

Thoughts, desires or mathematics are not a material reality. All factor in to many of my daily cogitations.

No, they are not material reality, but they cannot occur without a material medium

3a. Then please allow me to clarify. In the example person A knows objectively and reliably that they’re not acting “like themselves” (A prior). The person desires to return to A prior. Your statements indicate that there is no way for person A to move in the direction of and attain the same perspective once held by person A prior correct?

No. Firstly, don't equate A prior with "themselves". Secondly, the desire to return to A prior would be the cause and would determine the actions required for the return.

3b. In the instance I described he would have two images of self, the current and the desired.

Correct, but only the current one is his identity - not the desired one.

His desires result in an actionable change and is relevant.

But it is irrelevant to his perception of his current self.

The fact that he at one time was person A (even though it was an introduced corruption of his identity) but would hold no sway over future desires or decision by the new person. It would quintessentially be a memory of the self he didn’t want.

Ok.

J2. You never answered “Can you perceive something in any way other than the way you typically expect to perceive it?”

I did. No.

Also, just because something happened sometime that wasn’t in the now of the current timeline, doesn’t divorce it from affecting the causal chain.

Why would it? Its a part of the causal chain. Its effects are carried over down the line.

This is because the perception or cognition of something that has happened or could happen can factor into the though process. Projections, prediction, memories and conditioning even if 100% accurate and observed will still affect the physical though the causal chain.

No one is denying that. What is being denied is the atemporal nature of these projections, predictions, memories and conditioning,

4. I agree that the physical housing of memory itself is a part of current temporal reality. However the contents of that temporal reality (declarative memories) housed in physical reality (brain) when episodic are in essence illusory time travel sessions. It causes tinting of the now by what was. That to me signifies non-temporal, but we could very well be arguing semantics on this and I don’t realize it.

We are, but semantics are very important since incorrect semantics can lead to erroneous conclusions.

As you accept here, the episodic nature of these memories is illusory, i.e. the atemporal nature is not real. The fact that these happened in the past and are affecting the present is perfectly in line with the temporal nature of causation.

5. Ok so say for instance a particular fish has developed the ability to sense the electrical field produced by certain other fish through evolution. We don’t have that sense and can’t sense a fishes electrical field. It is a noumena to us. The lack of our perception of a noumena, does not negate the phenomena from occurring, just our realization of its occurrence.

The words noumenon and phenomenon are generally understood to describe the metaphysical nature of an object - referring to what cannot and can be known through the senses. In this case, the electric field is knowable through a sense (that of the fish). The absence of that sense in us does not change its nature from phenomenal to noumenal. So, no - its not noumena to us - unless you are defining noumena differently, in which case you should first specify it.

My statement does need a little rephrasing as it was inaccurate so allow me to re attempt.
This perception of phenomena, effect of noumena, desire, introspection and reasoning, all filtered through identity, and acted upon are what encompass free- will to me.

As noted, I take objection with the use of the word noumena here as I consider desire, introspection, reasoning all to be part of the phenomenal. Apart from that, you are going correctly.

6- Objectively we would see one identity, that of a schizo. However, from each of the different personalities perspectives, they would each have their own identity correct?

The keywords being "from different perspectives". Identity does not depend on perspective. For example, disregard multiple personalities. Any single person is viewed through different perspectives by different people. His identity does not depend or change according to that perspective.

The question was to anyone then I guess, could you extrapolate what you mean by “the agent being a part of the cause precludes coercion”

Coercion refers to the action of causing a party to act against its own motivation. However, the action of coercion is assumed to be consistent with the will of the coercer. Now, if the coercer and the coerced are one and the same, you are essentially saying that it is the person's will to act against his will - a self-refuting position. Thus, my statement, that an agent being part of the cause precludes coercion

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Renumbered for clarity
1- Ok. I get now that you see all abstract thoughts as intangible (or not material), part of the causal chain, atemporal, illusory and not real. From your last post this is what I extrapolate. Is this correct? Given this is your position, please define real.
2- I believe what we agree on is that they’re intangible yet part of the causal chain. Assuming that let’s go to atemporal. I feel those abstracts discussed (particularly declarative memories) are independent of this current timeline, thus divorced from shared temporal reality. They are effected and degraded by the passage of time, thus they are subject to temporal influence. They can also illicit sensory input while experiencing this shared temporal reality. Do you agree with this. Episodic memories to me is what I’m calling temporal. Semantic memories, which would just be like a factual tablature would be atemporal. If it can effect the shared timeline, regardless of sequence it’s temporal which semantic memories do only after recalled into the conscious mind and filtered into the agent. While by themselves they would be atemporal . Thoughts on my reasoning?
3- To better clarify phenomena and noumena I define math, logic, objective truth, axioms, etc. as noumena and not directly observable from within the bounds of personal perspective. Sensory input (materialistically input) would be phenomena and directly observable and generally objectifiable. I apologize if my definitions are off on this. Apparently I need some brushing up on my Plato and Kant. If they are accurate enough, to which category would you place free will?
4- I believe identity does depend on perspective, predominantly because of the mechanisms of recall and introspection. How we perceive we are being perceived affects us. Guys suck in their gut when a hot girl approaches and so forth. The schizo was a valid thought experiment. While 6 people observing a schizo will only see the prevailing personality and identify that as part of the whole, the personality sees the whole as the dominant personality. Consensus of shared reality says that it’s only part of the whole and that’s deemed as real. Perspective (without rationality or external objective cues) of the personality prevents access to that shared reality but doesn’t make that personality agent seem any less real or effective.
5- I am saying that coercer and the coerced could be one and the same. While not the exclusive influence people convince themselves they are something they aren’t all the time. Let’s use anorexia as an example. You’ve gone and convinced yourself that you’re fat to the point the string bean in the mirror is visually augmented into that of a chubby buddy. Essentially I’m saying that this person's will is acting against their real sensory output and perhaps even against their own self preservation natural instincts. I believe if we can influence perception enough, it affects the will. That will is part of identity and I believe either externally or internally we can affect the agent with that will. If you want to call it self-medicating or something else fine but that is what I consider coercion.

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Here’s a question to put your theory to the test. If you and I agree on what blue looks like does the object it’s describing that make someone else seeing it as gray any less real?

Blue can be measured in wavelengths of light. It can be objectively measured and defined as the property of light at a certain wavelength. How you perceive it is irrelevant, it is still blue, no matter how your brain interprets the signal. Any confusion on the matter is a physical flaw in perception, rather than the concept of blue.

I think you assume that causal determinism is a natural law, and that we’re trying to say we’re apart from those laws. I’m not saying that. I’m saying that part of who we are is our perception and desires. Those desires and perceptions are both outputs and inputs to the causal chain and if they can be shown to be altered, shows we have the ability to not be the sum of physiologically are determined to be.

Beautifully put, and clear. My current discussion with Genkaus (once we finish sniping over definitions) is based upon the concept that our ideas, motivations, plans, originate at a level beyond our perception, which are merely then justified.
An example of which would be the decision to ask someone to marry you. The underlying reasoning for this decision is largely hidden in complexities of conditioning and biological needs, and surrounded in metaphysical, but "unreal" concepts of love.
Sadly, I am not a neuroscientist, so I am willing to accept what the studies indicate. We may not be measuring the right thing, who knows.

Studies show that those who read a document stating determinism is a proven fact show the recipients act in a far less moral manner afterwards, which is why, early on in this thread, that while I believe my views, its best to simply not think about it too much! I don't want to be this way, I simply see no evidence to the contrary beyond private conviction, which I think anyone should be hesitant to trust implicitly.

Going back to your point, since I'm wandering, I do not divorce the psychological from the physiological. XKCD has a great little cartoon about it; http://xkcd.com/435/
In take it to extremes, in the long run, if we were more holistic and a million times more cognitively able, we probably wouldn't have a distinction between psychology and mathematics.

One thing I will say, is that I hope I'm wrong. Its awfully depressing, if true.

EDIT: Judging by the conversation above, this is quickly entering an level of discussion, I'm not too proud to admit goes beyond me. I think I may have to join Norfolk on the sidelines now!!

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Don’t bow out now I rarely get a chance to talk like this with my coworkers and I’m enjoying the dialogue!
6- So be objective measurability is your factor for what’s real? If thoughts are abstract and not phenomenal would math or logic ever be considered real to you. They’re certainly useful and rational and necessitate the physical medium on which they’re stored/used. My question is if a strict physical materialist considers thoughts as objectively verifiable or not? If thoughts are predictable wouldn’t they be objectifiable and measurable?
7- So let me continue that thought. Part of who we are is our perception and desires. Those desires and perceptions are both outputs and inputs to the causal chain. If they can be shown to be altered, shows we have the ability to not be the sum of what physiological elements determine to be “us” or our agent. If we can supply the input (with desires, goals and perceptions) to the causal chain we are enacting our freedom from a determined course.

Does that follow logically?

[genkaus]

The question is what is meant here by "consideration". If this implies participation with conscious awareness of participation and direction, I would say that both the neuroscience (and philosophy) are not decided on this point. What has traditionally been termed the subconcious or unconscious shows abilities to "consider" and cognate that are as powerful as conscious processes.

Consideration means mental analysis or considered thought. And yes, it does imply conscious awareness - as you yourself accept here. You say that subconscious/unconscious has the ability to consider on par with the conscious - implying that both conscious and unconscious are capable of consideration. Unless it is your position that all consideration is unconscious, i.e. the conscious has the capacity but it is never used, I'd consider the issue settled.

There's also the question of privileged observers. If your consciously introspected observations are just confabulations to achieve some end, say harmonizing memory narratives; if the "you" is unaware that the "you" that you are is just making up bollocks interpretations that some other part of you decided, which "you" has the power to detect that fact? Certainly not the "you" that is simply a puppet of the subconscious.

The confabulations are detectable. By your example of "having read it somewhere", I would say that such confabulations occur when either the commitment to memory or the retrieval from it is a part of unconscious process. If the memory narrative was consciously committed, then there is no disharmony within it, thereby ruling out the necessity of any confabulation. Further, by conscious examination of the memory, such disharmony and the bollocks put in place to cover it up can be detected.

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1- Ok. I get now that you see all abstract thoughts as intangible (or not material), part of the causal chain, atemporal, illusory and not real. From your last post this is what I extrapolate. Is this correct? Given this is your position, please define real.

Intangible - yes, though with a definite tangible parallel. Part of causal chain - yes. Atemporal - no. Illusory - no. Not real - no.

2- I believe what we agree on is that they’re intangible yet part of the causal chain. Assuming that let’s go to atemporal. I feel those abstracts discussed (particularly declarative memories) are independent of this current timeline, thus divorced from shared temporal reality. They are effected and degraded by the passage of time, thus they are subject to temporal influence. They can also illicit sensory input while experiencing this shared temporal reality. Do you agree with this. Episodic memories to me is what I’m calling temporal. Semantic memories, which would just be like a factual tablature would be atemporal. If it can effect the shared timeline, regardless of sequence it’s temporal which semantic memories do only after recalled into the conscious mind and filtered into the agent. While by themselves they would be atemporal . Thoughts on my reasoning?

The emphasized statement is incorrect. The content of a memory may be considered atemporal, but the memory itself is not and therefore it is not divorced from shared temporal reality. Further, while the content may be considered independent of passage of time, i.e. it doesn't change with time, it in no way implies that it cannot be a product of temporal reality.

3- To better clarify phenomena and noumena I define math, logic, objective truth, axioms, etc. as noumena and not directly observable from within the bounds of personal perspective. Sensory input (materialistically input) would be phenomena and directly observable and generally objectifiable. I apologize if my definitions are off on this. Apparently I need some brushing up on my Plato and Kant. If they are accurate enough, to which category would you place free will?

So, basically, concepts or abstractions are noumena. Fine. Then I'd place free-will (along with all other philosophy) into the category of noumena.

4- I believe identity does depend on perspective, predominantly because of the mechanisms of recall and introspection. How we perceive we are being perceived affects us. Guys suck in their gut when a hot girl approaches and so forth. The schizo was a valid thought experiment. While 6 people observing a schizo will only see the prevailing personality and identify that as part of the whole, the personality sees the whole as the dominant personality. Consensus of shared reality says that it’s only part of the whole and that’s deemed as real. Perspective (without rationality or external objective cues) of the personality prevents access to that shared reality but doesn’t make that personality agent seem any less real or effective.

The difference between what is deemed to be real and what is real is called the process of perception - a process which can be erroneous. Consider this thought experiment. A normal-sighted and a color-blind person look at the same apple. The former says the apple is red. The latter says the apple is not red. Both are statements about the identity of the apple. If identity is determined by perspective, then the apple is red and not red at the same time. These two are contradictory and mutually exclusive identifications. If both are true at the same time, then the term "truth" loses all meaning.

5-I am saying that coercer and the coerced could be one and the same. While not the exclusive influence people convince themselves they are something they aren’t all the time. Let’s use anorexia as an example. You’ve gone and convinced yourself that you’re fat to the point the string bean in the mirror is visually augmented into that of a chubby buddy. Essentially I’m saying that this person's will is acting against their real sensory output and perhaps even against their own self preservation natural instincts. I believe if we can influence perception enough, it affects the will. That will is part of identity and I believe either externally or internally we can affect the agent with that will. If you want to call it self-medicating or something else fine but that is what I consider coercion.

You don't understand what coercion means, do you? Simply put, coercion requires action against will. Here, the action of manipulating the perception is according to the person's will to consider himself fat. Acting (or believing) against the sensory input does not constitute coercion. Therefore, the consequent changes in the will were according to his will as well. Given this self-consistency, no coercion has taken place.

[NoMoreFaith]

6- So be objective measurability is your factor for what’s real? If thoughts are abstract and not phenomenal would math or logic ever be considered real to you. They’re certainly useful and rational and necessitate the physical medium on which they’re stored/used. My question is if a strict physical materialist considers thoughts as objectively verifiable or not? If thoughts are predictable wouldn’t they be objectifiable and measurable?

Yes. More to the point, if thought was not measurable and identifiable as a electro/bio/chemical process, you couldn't use electrodes to control things remotely, as you can now (although it hasn't filtered down to free market products yet).
The technology is (relatively) basic at the moment, but year by year we do more and more amazing things based entirely on this premise that thoughts are not only predictable, but objectifiable and measurable, so that we can use that information to influence the brain using external methods.

More to the point, if thought is something separate from the brain, why does affecting the brain through chemical, electrical or ultrasound affect what it does and how it thinks (for instance increase in seratonin makes you happy, increase in dopamine can affect your reward driven learning).

7- So let me continue that thought. Part of who we are is our perception and desires. Those desires and perceptions are both outputs and inputs to the causal chain. If they can be shown to be altered, shows we have the ability to not be the sum of what physiological elements determine to be “us” or our agent. If we can supply the input (with desires, goals and perceptions) to the causal chain we are enacting our freedom from a determined course.

Does that follow logically?

I think its best I describe my interpretation of your argument so that you can tell me if I got it all wrong.

Are you saying that there is a feedback loop between conscious and subconscious states. What the subconscious projects, the conscious perceives, and feeds back to the subconscious, changes to its "program" based upon the conscious reasoning of the perceived information from the subconscious.
Wow, that was a mouthful.

So if we can show that the conscious can input back to the subconscious to change our state, then this is a demonstration of free will.

Does that match what you were describing? Its at this point I have to start with my unproven conjecture instead of any reliance on material science.

What the power of the conscious really represents is a way of ordering information, and simplifying them into more manageable models or symbols.
In order to reason, the "self", the "I", the "Me" is a created symbol to holistically represent all the information which is related to your personal body.
What this does not indicate however, is that the ordering and reasoning is uncaused, and disconnected from the biology itself.
The feedback loop is causal in itself but the mechanism for simplifying overly complex information so that it can transmitted back into the subconscious in a more manageable form.
While a link in the causal chain of thinking, this does not imply freedom from causation any more than a fractal picture is free from the maths. Its purely symbolic in nature.

My head hurts.

[oxymoron]

So if we can show that the conscious can input back to the subconscious to change our state, then this is a demonstration of free will.

Well it's a description of a mechanism. I don't think there's anything "free" in there (in the sense that a theist would mean at any rate). We don't choose how our brains wire themselves, and we don't choose the external events in the world (they happen whether we like them or not), so there is no room for any sort of freedom in there.

[Angrboda]

Too much Gish gallop for this fraulein. Bailing in 3... 2... 1..