(December 19, 2016 at 12:27 pm)Ignorant Wrote:(December 19, 2016 at 12:07 pm)SteveII Wrote: The answer to your question is in the order of God's knowledge. If we image trillions of possible worlds branching from every decision ever made where, up unit that point, all circumstances C were fully specified (including God knowing your thoughts). I think you would agree (let me know if you don't) that in considering all these timelines, God is observing libertarian free will. God surveyed all those worlds in #2--prior to creation.
He chose to actualize one of them.
God's Free Knowledge (#3) or foreknowledge stemming from #2 of what will happen does not change the fact that we are still making choices for internal reasons not causally determined from outside ourselves--therefore libertarian free will.
I think the point of Jormungandr's objection lies in God's ultimate choice to actualize one, and just one of the possible worlds. No other possible world will take place, and in that sense, god has determined exactly one set of Judas's life choices in which he betrays Jesus exactly as he does in reality. Libertarian free will holds that the human will is the single formal cause of its own choice (i.e. nothing at all but the will itself determines the will's choice). If god determines which set of Judas's choices among an infinity of various circumstances, then god has, in some sense, determined which choices the will makes. This can't line up with libertarian free will. Molinist free will is not the same as libertarian free will, even if they are very similar. At least that is my understanding, and I've been wrong before.
Why must the nature of choice always be one to the utter exclusion of the other? Could it not also be that God makes some things inevitable and others elective?
