Trying to simplify my Consciousness hypothesis

[bennyboy]

I'm not a big fan of this 'qualia' notion. Something that has not been adequately defined is not very useful, philosophically speaking.

It's perfectly well-defined. It's just not defined in terms that fit into a material monist view easily. Qualia: "What it's like to experience things."

Since I experience things, and I have a sense of what it's like to do so, it's a meaningful term. Since I care very much about my experiences, and very little about almost anything else, it is not an issue that can be conveniently set aside.

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I wonder what it was like to experience a blue sky the first time I experienced it.  

Probably a lot brighter, I'm guessing, since filtering sensations through a world view really means our limited imaginations are competing with nature for vividness, and that's usually a losing battle.