Chad, I was a bit hesitant to reply to your questions because you've left the thread and would thus not get to respond to my responses. On further consideration, I decided to go ahead on the premise that you can respond to my answers elsewhere (such as in the "God's God" thread) or at some other point in time. That way, your questions don't get ignored.
I find your proposed "formal cause"--the shape of the house--to be quite dubious. I don't see how "the shape of the house" could cause the house, unless you're proposing Plato's World of Forms. If so, I'm not sure how that matters to this discussion (see below).
Your second statement is closer, but the phrase "convenient fiction" carries baggage that I do not accept. I would say something along the lines of "Calculus is a mathematical tool that models the behavior of certain aspects of reality with a high degree of--but not total--accuracy. To put it another way: "The map is not the territory." Or in Zen terms: "The finger that points at the Moon is not the Moon." Concrete example: Newton's equations model the movement of the planets under the influence of gravity to a high degree of accuracy. However, the precession of Mercury's orbit did not quite match what Newton's equations predicted. This problem was solved by the discovery of relativity, which explains the difference. It turns out that strong gravity "dilates" space and time, noticeably affecting Mercury's orbit due to its proximity to the Sun. The equations of relativity are a more precise model (thus asymptotically approaching full accuracy), but if you want to launch a probe to Mars, Newton's equations are still valid and sufficient to the task.
I don't really see how either understanding--calculus exists ontologically, perhaps in a Pythagorean/Platonic sense, vs. calculus being more like a human-drawn map (modeling tool) that does not have independent existence on another plane of being--significantly affects either of our positions. If there is an ontologically-existent Realm of Number and Form, that neither validates nor refutes the belief in an Abrahamic personal deity. Likewise, if there isn't such a "place."
I don't think there is such a thing as a floating Category of Red-ness existing in an abstract Realm down the hall and three doors to the right from the Number Four, if that's the sort of thing you're getting at. On the other hand, certain wavelengths of electromagnetic energy ("light"), the rods and cones of our retinas, optic nerves, the optical cortices of our brains etc. all exist, together producing the emergent property of our sensation of "red," and all of that exists in my concept of Universe.
Again, I don't really think that either view materially effects the debate at hand. If there is an ontologically-existent realm where things like Number, Calculus, and Triangles have some kind of reality independent of energy/matter/spacetime, this has no bearing on the concept of conscious beings existing apart from energy/matter/spacetime. A "triangle" can be described in purely abstract terms as three lines joined by angles that sum to 180 degrees (in a Euclidean space). Such a "Triangle" has no necessary relationship to other things. Its lines have no compressive or tensile strength, no relationship to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle or "angels" or anything else. Nor is this sort of Triangle (assuming it has ontological existence) the sort of thing a person could invent. "I was gonna make the Triangle with 4.268 sides, but I decided to go with three instead."
Conscious beings, on the other hand, especially beings conscious of the Cosmos, are inherently relational. To be conscious is to be conscious of. In the same way that it makes no sense to speak of Automobile as a purely non-energy/matter/spacetime abstraction with ontological existence (What is its top speed? Gas mileage? Drag coefficient? How many people does it seat? Etc.), it makes no sense to speak of conscious persons as floating abstractions.
On the other hand, we can't rule out a priori the possibility of invisible, incorporeal personal entities. According to our current understanding of physics, most of the "matter" in our Cosmos is invisible and incorporeal (but gravitating) "dark matter." I think "transparent matter" is a better descriptor, since if it was "dark" it would be visible when it got between us and something bright. From a procedural standpoint, it is most parsimonious to start on the premise that there is only a single type ("particle") of DM, at least until we have reason to think there is more than one type.
From a historical perspective though, the discovery of sub-atomic particles (the proton, neutron, and electron) did not lead toward parsimony. Instead, continued explorations of the quantum realm yielded a "particle zoo" of dozens of different types of interacting particles. If DM is at least as diverse in nature, it would be possible at least in principle for it to form "life, Jim, but not as we know it." Sapient DM-life forms, assuming they could perceive and interact with baryonic matter, would arguably have at least some of the attributes of "spirit-beings." They would be invisible and intangible, interacting only with gravity. If they could concentrate enough of their mass in a single place at will (while also opposing Earth's gravity somehow, so they don't get pulled down to Earth's center), they could use their gravity to move objects without touching them in any apparent way ("telekinesis").
Nutshell: Neither the ontological separate existence of things like "Number" "Shape" and "Calculus" nor their non-existence ontologically would do much for either of our viewpoints, IMO. Thus, a discussion of Platonic/Pythagorean metaphysics would most likely represent a rabbit-trail not worth going down, one that would not do much for either side of the Kalam debate.
(April 11, 2013 at 5:08 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: I am making the distinction between various types of cause. The shape of the house is the formal cause. The carpenter’s work is the efficient cause. The materials from which the house is made is the material cause. Which types of cause do you consider invalid and why?
I find your proposed "formal cause"--the shape of the house--to be quite dubious. I don't see how "the shape of the house" could cause the house, unless you're proposing Plato's World of Forms. If so, I'm not sure how that matters to this discussion (see below).
(April 11, 2013 at 5:08 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: Which of these two statements best restates your this: Calculus has ontological status as something real, a pre-existing something waiting to be discovered. Or calculus is a convenient fiction that approximates reality.
Your second statement is closer, but the phrase "convenient fiction" carries baggage that I do not accept. I would say something along the lines of "Calculus is a mathematical tool that models the behavior of certain aspects of reality with a high degree of--but not total--accuracy. To put it another way: "The map is not the territory." Or in Zen terms: "The finger that points at the Moon is not the Moon." Concrete example: Newton's equations model the movement of the planets under the influence of gravity to a high degree of accuracy. However, the precession of Mercury's orbit did not quite match what Newton's equations predicted. This problem was solved by the discovery of relativity, which explains the difference. It turns out that strong gravity "dilates" space and time, noticeably affecting Mercury's orbit due to its proximity to the Sun. The equations of relativity are a more precise model (thus asymptotically approaching full accuracy), but if you want to launch a probe to Mars, Newton's equations are still valid and sufficient to the task.
I don't really see how either understanding--calculus exists ontologically, perhaps in a Pythagorean/Platonic sense, vs. calculus being more like a human-drawn map (modeling tool) that does not have independent existence on another plane of being--significantly affects either of our positions. If there is an ontologically-existent Realm of Number and Form, that neither validates nor refutes the belief in an Abrahamic personal deity. Likewise, if there isn't such a "place."
(April 11, 2013 at 5:08 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: Fair enough. Do you think sensations are part of Universe? Most likely we agree that visible wavelength exist? But do you think ‘red’ has ontological status? Is sensation included in your definition of Universe?
I don't think there is such a thing as a floating Category of Red-ness existing in an abstract Realm down the hall and three doors to the right from the Number Four, if that's the sort of thing you're getting at. On the other hand, certain wavelengths of electromagnetic energy ("light"), the rods and cones of our retinas, optic nerves, the optical cortices of our brains etc. all exist, together producing the emergent property of our sensation of "red," and all of that exists in my concept of Universe.
Again, I don't really think that either view materially effects the debate at hand. If there is an ontologically-existent realm where things like Number, Calculus, and Triangles have some kind of reality independent of energy/matter/spacetime, this has no bearing on the concept of conscious beings existing apart from energy/matter/spacetime. A "triangle" can be described in purely abstract terms as three lines joined by angles that sum to 180 degrees (in a Euclidean space). Such a "Triangle" has no necessary relationship to other things. Its lines have no compressive or tensile strength, no relationship to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle or "angels" or anything else. Nor is this sort of Triangle (assuming it has ontological existence) the sort of thing a person could invent. "I was gonna make the Triangle with 4.268 sides, but I decided to go with three instead."
Conscious beings, on the other hand, especially beings conscious of the Cosmos, are inherently relational. To be conscious is to be conscious of. In the same way that it makes no sense to speak of Automobile as a purely non-energy/matter/spacetime abstraction with ontological existence (What is its top speed? Gas mileage? Drag coefficient? How many people does it seat? Etc.), it makes no sense to speak of conscious persons as floating abstractions.
On the other hand, we can't rule out a priori the possibility of invisible, incorporeal personal entities. According to our current understanding of physics, most of the "matter" in our Cosmos is invisible and incorporeal (but gravitating) "dark matter." I think "transparent matter" is a better descriptor, since if it was "dark" it would be visible when it got between us and something bright. From a procedural standpoint, it is most parsimonious to start on the premise that there is only a single type ("particle") of DM, at least until we have reason to think there is more than one type.
From a historical perspective though, the discovery of sub-atomic particles (the proton, neutron, and electron) did not lead toward parsimony. Instead, continued explorations of the quantum realm yielded a "particle zoo" of dozens of different types of interacting particles. If DM is at least as diverse in nature, it would be possible at least in principle for it to form "life, Jim, but not as we know it." Sapient DM-life forms, assuming they could perceive and interact with baryonic matter, would arguably have at least some of the attributes of "spirit-beings." They would be invisible and intangible, interacting only with gravity. If they could concentrate enough of their mass in a single place at will (while also opposing Earth's gravity somehow, so they don't get pulled down to Earth's center), they could use their gravity to move objects without touching them in any apparent way ("telekinesis").
Nutshell: Neither the ontological separate existence of things like "Number" "Shape" and "Calculus" nor their non-existence ontologically would do much for either of our viewpoints, IMO. Thus, a discussion of Platonic/Pythagorean metaphysics would most likely represent a rabbit-trail not worth going down, one that would not do much for either side of the Kalam debate.
