Does Atheism Lead to Nihilism?

[Neo-Scholastic]

When I refer to an apple, I am referring to a particular object in reality, possessed of a set of characteristics unique to that object, that we have chosen to call an apple.

Every sensible body is in some way unique, i.e. particular. The problem arises when you group several particular bodies together and refer to them as each being an example of the same kind.

There is nothing subjective about the set of traits that an apple possesses, just the label we chose to place upon them…

In the case of apples, there are Delicious, Granny Smiths, apples with bites taken out, rotten apples, etc. Each person can have their own opinion about what necessary traits constitute an apple. Opinions are subjective.

The problem is more acute when dealing with abstractions, like triangles. Particular examples of triangles include three lines drawn in the sand, a piece of spanakopita, and three offset dots on paper. As sensible bodies they have almost no similarities. But the concept of what a triangle is is not a matter of opinion; although it is possible to debate the degree to which particular examples instantiate the kind.
If scientific knowledge is to be objectively true then people must be able to objectively classify things according to kind. What I am saying is that there is more to it than just applying a name to apparently similar objects. There must already be something essential about all sensible bodies of the same kind in order for them to be objectively considered such.

As it applies to ethics, consensus about what to name something is not sufficient grounds for a rational ethical theory. Another culture’s consensus opinion as to what constitutes a moral agent could exclude infidels, Jews, and women.

In your opinion, people have a moral responsibility to other thinking beings. And I agree. If your criterion for being part of a kind is having a set of similar traits then it is a matter of subjective opinion as which traits constitute a thinking being. What is the set of traits that constitute a thinking being? Surely we have a moral responsibility toward catatonics who are not currently thinking and the severely retarded or insane who do not think but act purely out of instinct. Infants have no developed rationality. Presumably we have moral responsibilities towards them because they have the potential to eventually become self-aware thinking beings. From my perspective, each of these examples fall within the kind of ‘thinking being’ even if any one of them only manifest it to some degree.