Ontological Arguments - A Comprehensive Refutation
March 12, 2014 at 9:05 pm
(This post was last modified: March 12, 2014 at 9:11 pm by MindForgedManacle.)
This will form the basis for my one of the first lf my future YouTube counter-apologetics videos, so sneek peek broski.
Basically, ontological arguments come down to trying to turn the proposition "God exists" into an analytic judgement, a statement whose truth is guaranteed essentially because it comes down to affirming the Law of Identity (A is A), with another example being "All batchelors are unmarried", i.e "All unmarried men are unmarried men".
Existence is not a Property
Most, if not all, ontological arguments import the assumption that existence is the property of an object, that is to say that things can "have" existence. To get a little philosophically deep, it assumes that their is some ontological substance to which properties inhere. This is self-evidently absurd. Firstly, this assumption actually assumes the non-existent things exist! They simply lack the particular property of existence is all... Lol. Secondly, a simple thought experiment. Imagine an apple and some of its properties: We'll say it's several inches wide, is green (yum) is a little sour and is fairly round. Now, subtract each of those properties in turn and what happens? The apple is gone, you've reduced it to nothing. To exist is to manifest in some way via properties, it is not a thing to be had in and of itself. If you doubt this, try to imagine an apple that doesn't have existence in your imagining.
Modal Realism and its Myriad Problems
Now, theists think they can escape this through the lulz of Plantinga's modal ontological argument; think again. Plantinga's argument makes use of the "possible worlds" concept. Basically, a possible world is a way the world might possibly have been, other possible states of affairs. For example, there is a possible world in which we lost World War II, or where I didn't make this post (:p). The actual world is the way the world happens to, actually, be; this world.
The problem here is this: What does it mean to say things exist in other possible worlds? There are 2 positions here: Modal realism - which says that other possible worlds REALLY exist and that the term "actual world" is just indexical and valid relative to each world - and Modal fictionalism - which says that possible worlds are just fictions useful in the analysis of modal propositions, not as realms with real ontic grounding.
So, aside from the INFINITELY inflated ontology one tends to get with modal realism, it actually makes a complete lulzfest of Christianity. If God really exists in other possible worlds, then so do other gods. In fact, all gods ever imagined in this world and those not yet imagined - so long as they aren't contradictory - all exist under modal realism. They are all possible, therefore any monotheist holding to modal realism and the validity of Plantinga's modal ontological argument must become polytheists.
And accepting a strong modal realism is NECESSARY for a modal ontological proof of God's existence to work, because otherwise you're stuck in modal fictionalism, which simply holds that to be in some possible world is merely to say something about an abstract principle, just a set of compossible propositions. But under modal realism, it just leaves ontological arguments (and other theistic argument-styles such as theodicies) in complete disarray. Even God's supposed trans-possible worlds persistence doesn't allow theists to negate this without being inescapbly inconsistent on their metaphysics of modality.
So, either Christians, Muslims and the like must accept modal realism, become polytheists and fundamentally change their view of God and his relation to things like evil and other gods, or they must accept modal fictionalism and admit they have a decrepit, useless argument regarding God's existence. I don't think they like those options.
There are more ("Why Axiom S5 Can't be used like This", "The Problem of Non-God Objects", etc.), but how many of you actually read this far (you bastards)? xD
Basically, ontological arguments come down to trying to turn the proposition "God exists" into an analytic judgement, a statement whose truth is guaranteed essentially because it comes down to affirming the Law of Identity (A is A), with another example being "All batchelors are unmarried", i.e "All unmarried men are unmarried men".
Existence is not a Property
Most, if not all, ontological arguments import the assumption that existence is the property of an object, that is to say that things can "have" existence. To get a little philosophically deep, it assumes that their is some ontological substance to which properties inhere. This is self-evidently absurd. Firstly, this assumption actually assumes the non-existent things exist! They simply lack the particular property of existence is all... Lol. Secondly, a simple thought experiment. Imagine an apple and some of its properties: We'll say it's several inches wide, is green (yum) is a little sour and is fairly round. Now, subtract each of those properties in turn and what happens? The apple is gone, you've reduced it to nothing. To exist is to manifest in some way via properties, it is not a thing to be had in and of itself. If you doubt this, try to imagine an apple that doesn't have existence in your imagining.
Modal Realism and its Myriad Problems
Now, theists think they can escape this through the lulz of Plantinga's modal ontological argument; think again. Plantinga's argument makes use of the "possible worlds" concept. Basically, a possible world is a way the world might possibly have been, other possible states of affairs. For example, there is a possible world in which we lost World War II, or where I didn't make this post (:p). The actual world is the way the world happens to, actually, be; this world.
The problem here is this: What does it mean to say things exist in other possible worlds? There are 2 positions here: Modal realism - which says that other possible worlds REALLY exist and that the term "actual world" is just indexical and valid relative to each world - and Modal fictionalism - which says that possible worlds are just fictions useful in the analysis of modal propositions, not as realms with real ontic grounding.
So, aside from the INFINITELY inflated ontology one tends to get with modal realism, it actually makes a complete lulzfest of Christianity. If God really exists in other possible worlds, then so do other gods. In fact, all gods ever imagined in this world and those not yet imagined - so long as they aren't contradictory - all exist under modal realism. They are all possible, therefore any monotheist holding to modal realism and the validity of Plantinga's modal ontological argument must become polytheists.
And accepting a strong modal realism is NECESSARY for a modal ontological proof of God's existence to work, because otherwise you're stuck in modal fictionalism, which simply holds that to be in some possible world is merely to say something about an abstract principle, just a set of compossible propositions. But under modal realism, it just leaves ontological arguments (and other theistic argument-styles such as theodicies) in complete disarray. Even God's supposed trans-possible worlds persistence doesn't allow theists to negate this without being inescapbly inconsistent on their metaphysics of modality.So, either Christians, Muslims and the like must accept modal realism, become polytheists and fundamentally change their view of God and his relation to things like evil and other gods, or they must accept modal fictionalism and admit they have a decrepit, useless argument regarding God's existence. I don't think they like those options.
There are more ("Why Axiom S5 Can't be used like This", "The Problem of Non-God Objects", etc.), but how many of you actually read this far (you bastards)? xD
