On the Success of Scientific Theories
March 24, 2015 at 4:59 am
(This post was last modified: March 24, 2015 at 5:01 am by FallentoReason.)
Hello all, here's a little food for thought:
One philosophical theory that attempts to explain the success of science is called the No Miracles Argument, and goes as follows:
P1) Our best scientific theories are successful. (note: a theory is successful when the predictions it makes are true).
P2) The best explanation for the success of science is that our best scientific theories are true.
C) Our best scientific theories are true.
It is called the No Miracles Argument because the thought is that it would be a miracle if our scientific theories were successful, yet entirely wrong. Thus, the need to explain why this intuitive thought is correct.
Now, in order to make the argument fly, we need to wipe out competing explanations that could replace P2. One such competing explanation is this:
*P2) The best explanation for the success of science is that our best scientific theories are empirically adequate. (that is to say, the observations are accounted for by the theory).
The problem here is that a theory can be empirically adequate (EA), yet false. An example is that we could explain the pyramids by saying aliens built them. This theory accounts for the observations, yet is not true.
Another issue is that EA is in fact a mere restatement of what it is that we're trying to prove:
"The predictions of our theories are true (i.e. scientific theories are successful) because (*P2: ) it accounts for the observations."
But this is precisely what it means for a theory to be successful, that it's predictions are true i.e. they have been observed. Therefore, it seems like we've shown *P2 isn't a good premise to have, but our worries don't end there. Our original premise, P2, in fact has the same problem; it is a restatement of what we're trying to explain:
"The predictions of our theories are true (i.e. scientific theories are successful) because (P2: ) they are true."
But what it means, in part, for a scientific theory to be true is that it's predictions are true. Therefore, truth isn't any better an explanation than empirical adequacy is. That means there doesn't seem to be a meaningful explanation that isn't simply the reiteration of what it means for scientific theories to be successful. So, why are they successful?
One philosophical theory that attempts to explain the success of science is called the No Miracles Argument, and goes as follows:
P1) Our best scientific theories are successful. (note: a theory is successful when the predictions it makes are true).
P2) The best explanation for the success of science is that our best scientific theories are true.
C) Our best scientific theories are true.
It is called the No Miracles Argument because the thought is that it would be a miracle if our scientific theories were successful, yet entirely wrong. Thus, the need to explain why this intuitive thought is correct.
Now, in order to make the argument fly, we need to wipe out competing explanations that could replace P2. One such competing explanation is this:
*P2) The best explanation for the success of science is that our best scientific theories are empirically adequate. (that is to say, the observations are accounted for by the theory).
The problem here is that a theory can be empirically adequate (EA), yet false. An example is that we could explain the pyramids by saying aliens built them. This theory accounts for the observations, yet is not true.
Another issue is that EA is in fact a mere restatement of what it is that we're trying to prove:
"The predictions of our theories are true (i.e. scientific theories are successful) because (*P2: ) it accounts for the observations."
But this is precisely what it means for a theory to be successful, that it's predictions are true i.e. they have been observed. Therefore, it seems like we've shown *P2 isn't a good premise to have, but our worries don't end there. Our original premise, P2, in fact has the same problem; it is a restatement of what we're trying to explain:
"The predictions of our theories are true (i.e. scientific theories are successful) because (P2: ) they are true."
But what it means, in part, for a scientific theory to be true is that it's predictions are true. Therefore, truth isn't any better an explanation than empirical adequacy is. That means there doesn't seem to be a meaningful explanation that isn't simply the reiteration of what it means for scientific theories to be successful. So, why are they successful?
"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it" ~ Aristotle
