Do you agree with Richard Dawkins?

[Scabby Joe]

This smacks of egotistical theistic non-sense

I would disagree. This makes perfect sense to me:

1. Killing sentient nonhuman animals is prima facie morally wrong (vegetarianism is thus morally obligatory, but can be overidden in certain cases).
2. Eating sentient nonhuman animals is ultima facie morally wrong (vegetarianism is thus morally obligatory and cannot be overidden).

There is a reason for the two positions. In certain cases, I argue that the moral obligation to not kill animals can be overidden. However, I also argue that the moral obligation to not eat animals cannot be overidden. The distinction between prima and ultima facie, and the reasons for why they apply where they do in my argument, will be explained shortly.

Look at the argument and then look at thelogic behind each premise.

Argument for the Moral Obligatoriness of Vegetarianism (AMOV):

1. Causing harm is prima facie morally wrong (assumed).
2. Killing sentient nonhuman animals causes them harm.
3. Therefore, killing sentient nonhuman animals is prima facie morally wrong.
4. Eating sentient nonhuman animals requires the killing of sentient nonhuman animals.
5. Therefore, eating sentient nonhuman animals is prima facie morally wrong.
6. The moral wrongness of eating sentient nonhuman animals cannot be overidden.
7. Therefore, eating sentient nonhuman animals is ultima facie morally wrong.
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Therefore:
1. Killing sentient nonhuman animals is prima facie morally wrong (vegetarianism is thus morally obligatory, but can be overidden in certain cases).
2. Eating sentient nonhuman animals is ultima facie morally wrong (vegetarianism is thus morally obligatory and cannot be overidden).

This argument is VALID; i.e., the conclusions follow logically from the premises. Thus, if you want your objections to be taken seriously, they should call into question the content of the premises, not the form of the argument.

I will now explain premises 1-7 in further detail.

Premise (1) is an assumed moral principle: causing harm is prima facie morally wrong, not because it violates some right or because it fails to maximize utility, but simply because it is wrong. The moral basis for this assumption is grounded in compassion, not logic. So if you deny premise (1), then the argument is not applicable to you. However, if you accept premise (1) as such, but believe that it should only apply to humans, then the argument does apply to you, in which case you should voice your objections.

Premise (1) includes the term "prima facie." By prima facie is meant that the moral wrongness of the harm caused may be overidden in certain cases. Conversely, premise (6) is "ultima facie" morally wrong because the harm caused by eating animals cannot be overidden. So why is premise (1) "prima facie" morally wrong and premise (6) "ultima facie" morally wrong? An explanation for premise (6) will be addressed at the end, but two examples will help demonstrate why premise (1) is prima facie:

1. The prick of the syringe needle during an innoculation procedure is painful (pain = harm), but the resulting immunization from disease serves as a compensatory moral good.
2. The moral wrongness of causing harm is overidden in cases of self-defense; .e.g, you're attacked by an animal (human or otherwise).
3. The moral wrongness of causing harm is overidden in cases where sentience is absent (see below).

The claim that killing animals causes them harm might seem too obvious to warrant much discussion. However, its importance is directly linked to the definition of "harm." I define harm in two ways:

1. Inflicting unnecessary pain and suffering on sentient beings.
2. Doing things which adversely affect the interests of other sentient beings, whether it be thwarting, setting back, or defeating those interests.

These "basic welfare" interests include, but are not necessarily limited to, the continuance of one's life, physical health and vigor, the integrity and normal functioning of one's body, the absence of absorbing pain and suffering, emotional stability, a tolerable social and physical environment, and a certain amount of freedom from interference and coercion. These welfare interests are the very most important interests, not only because they are definitive of basic well-being, but also because their realization is necessary before one can satisfy virtually any other interest or do much of anything with one's life. We cannot achieve our ulterior interests in a career or personal relationships or material gain if we are unhealthy, in chronic pain, emotionally unstable, living in intolerable conditions, and are constantly interfered with and coerced by others. When basic welfare interests are defeated, a very serious harm has been done to the sentient possessor of those interests, no matter what species it belongs to.

We have here what is needed to defend the claim that killing sentient nonhuman animals causes them serious harm by defeating their basic welfare interests (premise [2]). Why do I restrict interests to sentient animals in premise (2)? Let's define sentience.
The following two propositions are necessary and sufficient conditions for sentience:

1. The capacity to experience pain and suffering.
2. The possession of basic welfare interests.

These nececessary and sufficient conditions for sentience exclude (at the very least) plants. If the thing in question lacks sentience, it cannot have interests.

Why is sentience necessary for the possession of interests? Well, you need to have the capacity to consciously experience pain and other harms before you can really have an interest in not experiencing pain and other harms. Let's not delude ourselves: few people really think that plants are the same as sentient nonhumans. If I ate your tomato and your dog, you would not regard these as morally similar acts. As far as we know, plants are not sentient. They are not conscious and able to experience pain. Plants do not have central nervous systems, endorphins, receptors or benzodiazepines, or any other indications of sentience. Plants do not have interests, animals do. Unconvinced? Well, it is worth noting that much plant matter can be eaten without killing anything: most vegetarian fare consists of the fruits and flowers of plants which are not killed or are harvested at the end of annual life cycles.

Premise (3) follows easily enough from the acceptability of (1) and (2), so let's move on to permise (4). Note that premise 4 allows for the consumption of animals who died due to accidents, natural causes, or other sources which do not involve the deliberate actions of moral agents (humans).

We've seen how killing is a serious harm to basic welfare interests, so further explanation of premise (5) is unnecessary. The next step is to link the moral wrongness of killing nonhuman sentient animals with the wrongness of eating them. This, I hope, should be clear. If killing animals harms them, then eating them is equally harmful.

The final point to consider is premise (6). Why is eating sentient nonhuman animals "ultima facie" morally wrong (a moral principle which cannot be overidden)? Three common objections for the prima facie acceptability of meat-consumption are often given: (1) tradition-culture; 2) convenience; (3) nutrition. Let's address each of these "justifications" in turn.

1. Animal-eating is a social practice which is deeply embedded into modern culture. Slavery, the oppression of women, and institutionalized racism also once had this status; however, few if any suppose that this status is what makes these practices morally right or wrong. Animal-eating (speciesism) is wrong for the same reason slavery is wrong: it requires the persistent exploitation, coercion, and degradation of innocent people with basic welfare interests. So the fact that a practice has the weight of tradition on its side and a prominent place in a given culture is morally irrelevant.

2. The convenience of animal-eating is also one of cultural practice, but again, this says nothing about whether animal-eating is morally permissible. Vegetarianism may inconvenience the lifestyles of meat-eaters to a negligible extent, but so what? I'm sure the abolition of slavery in the antebellum South financially "inconvenienced" white plantation owners as well, but this has no relevant bearing on the question of whether we should extend the scope of our moral concerns to other races (or species).

The reasoning which employs convenience as a moral weight in denying a particular race its interest to not be enslaved is morally and logically indistinguishable from the kind of discrimination which denies the interests of other sentient species to not be systematically slaughtered and eaten.

3. With the exception of a very few people on planet Earth, human beings can live extraordinarily healthy lives as vegetarians. And for those unfortunate few who cannot, affordable supplements are readily available. Does vegetarianism seriously endanger an individuals' health and well-being? No. Nutritional case-studies are available upon request. Let's also not forget that meat-eating (especially red-meat) has been linked to serious debilitating diseases, as well as obesity and heart conditions.

I conclude that none of (1-3) serve as a sufficiently compelling reason to override the moral wrongness of harming the nonhuman sentient animals eaten. Therefore:

1. Killing sentient nonhuman animals is prima facie morally wrong (vegetarianism is thus morally obligatory, but can be overidden in certain cases).
2. Eating sentient nonhuman animals is ultima facie morally wrong (vegetarianism is thus morally obligatory and cannot be overidden).

This is not theistic dogma but a perfectly sound argument for vegetarianism and a little more thought through than some of the postings in this discussion. e.g. Bacon LOL

Anyway. This is about all I have to say. Thank you and good night.