If free will was not real

[bennyboy]

The will is not damaged.  The ability to carry out that will, in that singular expression, is damaged.

We are using different definitions. I think you are calling "will" what I call "intent." I'm using this definition of will: the capacity to manifest intent outside the agent. So I want my leg to move, and it moves. Between my formation of the intent to move, and the actual moving, I call will.

Not that you need damage for this particular distinction to express itself.  No matter how hard I will it....I cannot fly.  The subject in your example could manifest intent as behavior, particularly the urge to move his leg and fuck a goat - all manner of ways.  My will is no more damaged by my inability to fly than the will of the goatfucker is damaged by being unable to move his leg.  I'll suggest again that this example is uninformative.  It doesn't matter which way it goes, it doesn't tell us anything or lead to any comment on free will -even as you define it-.

Okay, I've fine moving forward with your definition, but you haven't defined "will" yet, and aren't using my definition. I'd say "No matter how hard I intent it, I cannot fly, because the will is incapable of manifesting that intent."