"God doesn't Exist"- Claim or Conclusion

[Angrboda]

Theists dismiss the existence of other gods, leprichauns, fairies, unicorns and Santa Claus without ever troubling themselves over such questions as to whether it's rational to do so without absolute, certain evidence.   The theist treats the skepticism of the atheist in special terms.  To my mind, negative claims do not carry the same burden of proof as positive existential claims.  That's being consistent and rational.  All that I require is that there be a reasonably plausible explanation for what 'evidence' the theist is capable of presenting.  So far I have that, and so I am satisfied with the nonexistence of God in the same measure that the theist is persuaded of the non-existence of the aforementioned mythical creatures.

There seems to have always been a near universal belief in some sort of supernatural--it seems we are hardwired for it. We look for purpose and meaning. This common trait opens most up to consider various religions and their answers to such questions. This trait, generally speaking, does not open people up to consider "leprichauns, fairies, unicorns and Santa Claus" and other gods (like the greek or roman roster) so it is a category mistake to lump them into a discussion on religion.

It is not a category mistake for 'other gods'. You may want to minimize the similarity between Christian gods and Hindu gods and Roman gods and Chinese gods to neuter the comparison, the fact is they are or were worshipped in much the same fashion as your Christian God. As long as that remains true, my point about the disparity between your treatment of atheists' skepticism and the dismissal of these other gods will remain firm. And whether unicorns and gods belong in the same category logically speaking, when it comes to epistemic procedures they are treated the same, so for those purposes they belong to the same category. Category errors have to do with relevant differences, not just any old difference. If the latter were true, then everything would be in a category of one. 

While you may find "reasonably plausible explanation for what 'evidence' the theist is capable of presenting" that is subjective and is a far cry from the positive claim "there is no God".

That is only true if you are treating negative claims the same as positive existential claims. As noted, I do not and I have good reason for the disparity, as negative claims are generally impossible to prove beyond the reach of any ad hoc adjustments to the positive claim. It's a loaded game, and I feel we can have certainty in the negative claim at a far cheaper price. As noted, there is a hypocrisy in the way that many theists treat negative claims about their gods and negative claims about other gods. Whenever a Christian is asked why they don't believe in Hindu gods, the reply is usually not an iron clad argument against the existence of those gods. Why should I feel obliged to provide what the theist is himself unwilling to provide to justify his skepticism? If my stance on relative burdens of proof is irrational, then so is the theists' stance on other gods. That can't be brushed aside by calling it a category mistake.

Furthermore, burden of proof is about what it takes, subjectively, to convince another that a proposition is true. I hold no great hopes that my discourses on the logic of disbelief will persuade many theists to abandon their belief. So the burden of proof is relevant only to what I find subjectively convincing. As noted, I've met that burden of proof for the claim that there is no god or gods. If my mind is to be changed it will have to come from substantial evidence for the proposition that there is a god. And so far, with people holding out things like the supposed historicity of the bible as evidence, I'm not overly concerned.