Euthyphro dilemma asked for evolution.

[The Grand Nudger]

-I'm just running with your earlier requirements for what morality would be (who it would apply to and why), you made provisions for the slitznarpians/human scenario, and so that would excuse the lions as well. Doesn't have much to do with anything that I understand, only what you have stated.

-It's not irrelevant, stop claiming that any possibility other than the one you have presented in support of your notions of objective morality are irrelevant. You keep repeating that argument that we are no longer engaging in heuristics because we can communicate but this is not the case, and I've explained why. I'll try again. A heuristic program is developed that solves the equation 1+1= ? for a desktop pc. We save that heuristic and transfer it to another pc. It remains a heuristic. To take this further, we keep creating heuristics programs that solve 1+1=? and transferring them from one pc to another. They all remain heuristics, they all solve the problem, and we have a bunch to choose from. It's not difficult to see the similarities between this process and our notions of morality. I'm not claiming that this is definitely how it's done, but I am presenting the possibility, and it isn't just theorycraft. This would have severe implications for your claims of what morality -is- to say the least, but it would be even more destructive to the idea of humans as moral agents (as you have defined it). You have insisted that this morality would be grounded in facts about the nature of a moral agent, and when presented with two potential moral agents you made provisions for morality based upon the particular circumstances of that agent. Well....heuristics do seem to be in our nature, they do seem to be at play in morality. Hence the "should" i'm arguing for as opposed to all of the "is's" I see.

-I'll try to find you a working link. The asian disease problem was an experiment that was run (and most definitely does have to do with morality, as it was an explicitly moral question) and the results that the researchers got implied that a heuristic was being used to make moral decisions at least in that case. This was a tiny fraction of their overall focus, of course, the larger bits having to do with the massive amount of heuristics we seem to employ under the guise of "reasoning". So we do work that way Genk, a hell of alot of the time, if these folks are correct, and even in the arena of "morality".

If morality is not the thing you claim it to be, that would be relevant. If you are going to claim that morality -is- this or that you would have to eliminate other possibilities, I'm not asking you to eliminate every possibility, just this one, that is grounded in an experiment. You don't feel that this is a reasonable request, and you also don't feel that the qualifier "should be" is applicable, I'm asking you why.

If our nature is not that of a moral agent (as you have defined it) and if morality must be based on facts about a moral agent (and specific to the agent in question, which your letting the slitznarpians off the hook on our morality would seem to imply) then that would be relevant. If I'm mistaken here in some particular I'd love to know why.

For my part, and I'm coming around to your way of thinking on this, I would say that morality should be a guide, and that human beings were capable of being moral agents (as defined- but perhaps requiring some pretty hefty caveats in the definition) even if it were not, strictly speaking, in our natures to be so. I would go further as to say that an objective morality based on logic, reason and demonstrable fact would be a much faster track to results than a heuristic sort of morality would be (even if the results achieved might be indistinguishable) and therefore preferable. The trouble, for me at least, is that I could not definitively show that we are capable of being moral agents, and that I am at a loss as to explain why morality should be a guide -except by reference to results-. The question I then ask myself is this, "Why should I choose any given result over another?". I mean, I could give you litany of reasons as to why I prefer one result over another, but I can't guarantee that they're all based in logic, reason, or demonstrable fact.

[The Grand Nudger]

As an interesting side conversation on the subject-

What do you think are the major stumbling blocks with regards to finding or creating this objective morality. For example, just those statements you've made on these boards would suggest to me that it wouldn't be too hard to create it, since we have that exacting a definition and a suggestion as to where to look. What are the problems with objective morality that you have found? How did you find yourself in the "it might exist/we could create it" camp whilst being simultaneously unable to offer objective morality up to us? Say we created/found objective morality, are there any obstructions on the way to universal application that jump out at you?

[genkaus]

-I'm just running with your earlier requirements for what morality would be (who it would apply to and why), you made provisions for the slitznarpians/human scenario, and so that would excuse the lions as well. Doesn't have much to do with anything that I understand, only what you have stated.

And the moral of that story was that human morality would be different from other kinds of morality.

-It's not irrelevant, stop claiming that any possibility other than the one you have presented in support of your notions of objective morality are irrelevant. You keep repeating that argument that we are no longer engaging in heuristics because we can communicate but this is not the case, and I've explained why. I'll try again. A heuristic program is developed that solves the equation 1+1= ? for a desktop pc. We save that heuristic and transfer it to another pc. It remains a heuristic. To take this further, we keep creating heuristics programs that solve 1+1=? and transferring them from one pc to another. They all remain heuristics, they all solve the problem, and we have a bunch to choose from. It's not difficult to see the similarities between this process and our notions of morality. I'm not claiming that this is definitely how it's done, but I am presenting the possibility, and it isn't just theorycraft.

Yes, I get that you are presenting a possibility. But the fact that we discuss morality, that we figure out which concepts are applicable and which are not, that we reason why those concepts are applicable, means we have moved beyond trial and error in this case. The fact that we not only know what works, we also know why it works and when it wouldn't work means we are no longer determining morality using heuristic processes.

This would have severe implications for your claims of what morality -is- to say the least, but it would be even more destructive to the idea of humans as moral agents (as you have defined it). You have insisted that this morality would be grounded in facts about the nature of a moral agent, and when presented with two potential moral agents you made provisions for morality based upon the particular circumstances of that agent. Well....heuristics do seem to be in our nature, they do seem to be at play in morality. Hence the "should" i'm arguing for as opposed to all of the "is's" I see.

Heuristics is a tool we use - not a necessary part of our nature. If your argument was correct the yes, human morality would not be what we know it to be. But since it is what we know it to be, those implications are irrelevant.

-I'll try to find you a working link. The asian disease problem was an experiment that was run (and most definitely does have to do with morality, as it was an explicitly moral question) and the results that the researchers got implied that a heuristic was being used to make moral decisions at least in that case. This was a tiny fraction of their overall focus, of course, the larger bits having to do with the massive amount of heuristics we seem to employ under the guise of "reasoning". So we do work that way Genk, a hell of alot of the time, if these folks are correct, and even in the arena of "morality".

Actually, that experiment is not a moral question. The moral concept in play is same in both cases - save as many lives as you can. The subject in question is not being asked which option is morally correct, he is being asked which one is economically correct. Heuristics being used to make a moral decision - a decision where outcome is unclear - is not that same as heuristics determining what is morally correct or not.

If morality is not the thing you claim it to be, that would be relevant. If you are going to claim that morality -is- this or that you would have to eliminate other possibilities, I'm not asking you to eliminate every possibility, just this one, that is grounded in an experiment. You don't feel that this is a reasonable request, and you also don't feel that the qualifier "should be" is applicable, I'm asking you why.

Except, morality is what I claim it to be because that is how it is defined. I don't need to disprove any other definition which may or may not be applicable as long as mine is.

If our nature is not that of a moral agent (as you have defined it) and if morality must be based on facts about a moral agent (and specific to the agent in question, which your letting the slitznarpians off the hook on our morality would seem to imply) then that would be relevant. If I'm mistaken here in some particular I'd love to know why.

It would be relevant, but it is not because our nature is (usually) that of a moral agent.

---

As an interesting side conversation on the subject-

What do you think are the major stumbling blocks with regards to finding or creating this objective morality. For example, just those statements you've made on these boards would suggest to me that it wouldn't be too hard to create it, since we have that exacting a definition and a suggestion as to where to look. What are the problems with objective morality that you have found? How did you find yourself in the "it might exist/we could create it" camp whilst being simultaneously unable to offer objective morality up to us? Say we created/found objective morality, are there any obstructions on the way to universal application that jump out at you?

A universal goal.

Morality is a guide that should lead us to something. For example, the aim of religious morality is heaven or happier afterlife. Utilitarian morality aims at maximizing happiness and so on. Therefore, we need to find an objective goal that would not be based simply on the philosopher's choice. Something that would be an inherent part of the human nature. Something that we may point out as not only so what all humans should work towards, but we all do work for.

Common sense suggests that a "happy and fulfilling life" would fill that criteria. But that cannot be established as a fact. And there are simply too many irrational and illogical ideas out there about what constitutes a happy and fulfilling life.

[Whateverist]

A universal goal.

Morality is a guide that should lead us to something. For example, the aim of religious morality is heaven or happier afterlife. Utilitarian morality aims at maximizing happiness and so on. Therefore, we need to find an objective goal that would not be based simply on the philosopher's choice. Something that would be an inherent part of the human nature. Something that we may point out as not only so what all humans should work towards, but we all do work for.

Common sense suggests that a "happy and fulfilling life" would fill that criteria. But that cannot be established as a fact. And there are simply too many irrational and illogical ideas out there about what constitutes a happy and fulfilling life.

Agreed. However, this does make it sound as if an objective morality is a solution in search of a problem.

---

As an interesting side conversation on the subject-

What do you think are the major stumbling blocks with regards to finding or creating this objective morality. For example, just those statements you've made on these boards would suggest to me that it wouldn't be too hard to create it, since we have that exacting a definition and a suggestion as to where to look. What are the problems with objective morality that you have found? How did you find yourself in the "it might exist/we could create it" camp whilst being simultaneously unable to offer objective morality up to us? Say we created/found objective morality, are there any obstructions on the way to universal application that jump out at you?

You sir turn a mean phrase. I don't always share your concerns or objectives but you always make me interested in them. (Confession: I usually do share your concerns and objectives, as in the present one.)

[The Grand Nudger]

And the moral of that story was that human morality would be different from other kinds of morality.

Due to whatever demonstrable facts about human beings and their nature/circumstance are different, was what I took from that (and perhaps I'm mistaken). This is precisely why I cast the shadow of doubt over what our nature or circumstances might be.

Yes, I get that you are presenting a possibility. But the fact that we discuss morality, that we figure out which concepts are applicable and which are not, that we reason why those concepts are applicable, means we have moved beyond trial and error in this case. The fact that we not only know what works, we also know why it works and when it wouldn't work means we are no longer determining morality using heuristic processes.

The desktop pc's in my example were communicating heuristic solutions between each other, but that did not alter the fact that they were heuristics. Whether or not something is a heuristic has everything to do with the process involved, not whether or not the solution is communicable. Heuristics can be communicated, and in some cases directly require communication as a component of the heuristic. If we wish to invoke the results oriented argument that a heuristic is no longer a heuristic when it is applied by a given agent for a specific goal..well, we haven't actually established that it isn't a heuristsic, because heuristics are also employed by given agents for a given goal. They can also be employed with no direction on the part of the user and they will still achieve a result (this is one of the poiunts in favour of morality evolving out of a hueristic process, for example, as the environment is providing both the problem, the process, and the range of possible solutions). The process is important, and I don't think we disagree here, because you place heavy emphasis on the process of logic in establishing an objective morality. I think our disagreement lies more along the lines of how much impact heuristics or any possible moral heuristics would have on our observations of what morality is (though I would definitely concede that this is not morality as you define it-though I'm not entirely ceratin how you can divorce yourself from morality -as is- merely by definition whilst simultaneously appealing to fact, or reality, or logic, considering that morality already "exists" and may not be what you have defined it to be...). Have we moved beyond trial and error, or are we merely discusing two competing "trial and error" responses to the same question? I'm not sure the two of us will find common ground on this one.

Heuristics is a tool we use - not a necessary part of our nature. If your argument was correct the yes, human morality would not be what we know it to be. But since it is what we know it to be, those implications are irrelevant.

The "but since it is" bit would need more in the elaboration dept (for me). I wasn't aware that anyone had any definitive answer with regards to what morality was, but I may be mistaken.

Actually, that experiment is not a moral question. The moral concept in play is same in both cases - save as many lives as you can. The subject in question is not being asked which option is morally correct, he is being asked which one is economically correct. Heuristics being used to make a moral decision - a decision where outcome is unclear - is not that same as heuristics determining what is morally correct or not.

I agree, in both cases it was an issue of "save as many lives as you can" that the experiment seemed to imply that a heuristic was being employed to determine which of the two options presented was the best course of action would, to me, seem to have implications as to the process being employed in how we go about applying our morality, whatever the hell it may be. I think the process is important, and I think any definitions of what morality is and whether or not we are moral agents that ignores this is merely sweeping difficult problems under the rug.

Except, morality is what I claim it to be because that is how it is defined. I don't need to disprove any other definition which may or may not be applicable as long as mine is.

You did define it as such, but I have repeatedly called into question your definition, and the only response offered thusfar is directly equivalent to "It is what it is because I have said that it is". Well, it may be, but you'd have to demonstrate that, if you want to invoke facts, observations, and reality, wouldn't you (and I think you made it explicitly clear that your objective morality would do so)? I think the best way to consider my opposition here isn't so much as a disagreement, but as a platform or invitation to elaborate upon your definition of morality and why it is the definition we should run with.

It would be relevant, but it is not because our nature is (usually) that of a moral agent.

Excellent, but you still haven't dismissed the heuristics except by definition (which I have repeatedly questioned), and to me, that's not exactly compelling, but again, we don't seem likely to find common ground on this one (because we appear to have unbelievably divergent definitions for what is or is not a heuristic to begin with).

A universal goal.

Morality is a guide that should lead us to something. For example, the aim of religious morality is heaven or happier afterlife. Utilitarian morality aims at maximizing happiness and so on. Therefore, we need to find an objective goal that would not be based simply on the philosopher's choice. Something that would be an inherent part of the human nature. Something that we may point out as not only so what all humans should work towards, but we all do work for.

Common sense suggests that a "happy and fulfilling life" would fill that criteria. But that cannot be established as a fact. And there are simply too many irrational and illogical ideas out there about what constitutes a happy and fulfilling life.

Are you in the "happy and fulfilling life" camp yourself? Personally, if I were to suggest a goal, it would be the perpetuation of human life. I'm not sure that I could demand happiness of any objective morality because happiness is one of those things that almost inevitably leads to conflict when two peoples interest collide (even if the two people in question agree on "the principles of happiness" to begin with, and as you've said, people have some strange ideas of "happiness" we would have to contend with). Then we have to start making even more difficult arguments. Morality, to me, must be practical. It can't be so difficult to employ that we have to agonize over the details every time we go about making a moral decision, or else the heuristics (as I understand them) start to look a hell of alot more worthwhile.

[genkaus]

Due to whatever demonstrable facts about human beings and their nature/circumstance are different, was what I took from that (and perhaps I'm mistaken). This is precisely why I cast the shadow of doubt over what our nature or circumstances might be.

If you have any reason to doubt that rationality is a part of human nature, then that'd be a different conversation.

The desktop pc's in my example were communicating heuristic solutions between each other, but that did not alter the fact that they were heuristics. Whether or not something is a heuristic has everything to do with the process involved, not whether or not the solution is communicable. Heuristics can be communicated, and in some cases directly require communication as a component of the heuristic. If we wish to invoke the results oriented argument that a heuristic is no longer a heuristic when it is applied by a given agent for a specific goal..well, we haven't actually established that it isn't a heuristsic, because heuristics are also employed by given agents for a given goal. They can also be employed with no direction on the part of the user and they will still achieve a result (this is one of the poiunts in favour of morality evolving out of a hueristic process, for example, as the environment is providing both the problem, the process, and the range of possible solutions). The process is important, and I don't think we disagree here, because you place heavy emphasis on the process of logic in establishing an objective morality. I think our disagreement lies more along the lines of how much impact heuristics or any possible moral heuristics would have on our observations of what morality is (though I would definitely concede that this is not morality as you define it-though I'm not entirely ceratin how you can divorce yourself from morality -as is- merely by definition whilst simultaneously appealing to fact, or reality, or logic, considering that morality already "exists" and may not be what you have defined it to be...). Have we moved beyond trial and error, or are we merely discusing two competing "trial and error" responses to the same question? I'm not sure the two of us will find common ground on this one.

Exactly what argument are you trying to make here and how does it address the argument I presented (that we've moved past heuristics).

The "but since it is" bit would need more in the elaboration dept (for me). I wasn't aware that anyone had any definitive answer with regards to what morality was, but I may be mistaken.

Morality is a guide to how person should act - what he should and should not do - that much is established. Given that we have countless philosophies trying to answer not only what we should do, but why should we do it (based on different starting premises), I'd say we no longer determine morality by trial and error.

I agree, in both cases it was an issue of "save as many lives as you can" that the experiment seemed to imply that a heuristic was being employed to determine which of the two options presented was the best course of action would, to me, seem to have implications as to the process being employed in how we go about applying our morality, whatever the hell it may be. I think the process is important, and I think any definitions of what morality is and whether or not we are moral agents that ignores this is merely sweeping difficult problems under the rug.

The process of how we apply morality would not be relevant to what morality is and whether we are moral agents. It'd would be relevant to us, but not in context of those questions. That's because the identification of morality and us being a moral agent would always come before the question of its application.

You did define it as such, but I have repeatedly called into question your definition, and the only response offered thusfar is directly equivalent to "It is what it is because I have said that it is". Well, it may be, but you'd have to demonstrate that, if you want to invoke facts, observations, and reality, wouldn't you (and I think you made it explicitly clear that your objective morality would do so)? I think the best way to consider my opposition here isn't so much as a disagreement, but as a platform or invitation to elaborate upon your definition of morality and why it is the definition we should run with.

The problem is I'm not the one who defined it as such. I accepted the definition as laid out here - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/

As to the reason I chose this definition, its because other sources often lead to circular reasoning - defining morality as difference between right and wrong and defining right and wrong as what is and is not morally acceptable.

Excellent, but you still haven't dismissed the heuristics except by definition (which I have repeatedly questioned), and to me, that's not exactly compelling, but again, we don't seem likely to find common ground on this one (because we appear to have unbelievably divergent definitions for what is or is not a heuristic to begin with).

Answering morally relevant questions using heuristics (trial and error) would be time-consuming and prone to error (since what worked once may not work again). Using rational analysis would not only lead us to what works, but also why it works, which leaves us better equipped to reason why it wouldn't work in another scenario. Which is why a heuristic based morality would not be preferable given the possibility of a reasoned one.

Now, the origin of morality may be considered heuristic in nature because at that time humans (or rather our ancestors) did not have the rational capacity for that kind of judgment. But once we had that capacity, we started using that for establishing moral concepts. And thus came long lines of philosophers and theologians telling people what they should do and why they should do it. Their differences came not from trying different things towards the same goals, but from different goals themselves.

Are you in the "happy and fulfilling life" camp yourself?

I am.

Personally, if I were to suggest a goal, it would be the perpetuation of human life.

Do you have a justification for that - as to why everyone should work towards perpetuation of human life? Rather why human life should be perpetuated at all?

I'm not sure that I could demand happiness of any objective morality because happiness is one of those things that almost inevitably leads to conflict when two peoples interest collide (even if the two people in question agree on "the principles of happiness" to begin with, and as you've said, people have some strange ideas of "happiness" we would have to contend with).

Not inevitably and within objective morality there would be provisions for such conflicts. Remember, while "happy and fulfilling life" is the goal, there still isn't a guarantee that the goal would be achieved.

Then we have to start making even more difficult arguments. Morality, to me, must be practical. It can't be so difficult to employ that we have to agonize over the details every time we go about making a moral decision, or else the heuristics (as I understand them) start to look a hell of alot more worthwhile.

This would speak to the analogy drawn in the other thread between morality and language. Morality could be complex, nuanced and detailed, but once you start practicing it, its application would become easier and easier. Consider the parallel of the English language. If you had to put down each and every you've learned about its rules, you' probably fail miserably. But that doesn't stop you from using it correctly everyday.

[The Grand Nudger]

If you have any reason to doubt that rationality is a part of human nature, then that'd be a different conversation.

Oh I have reason to doubt that it's consistent or successful application is a part of our nature, lol. I would probably tip my hat to the successful bits of irrationality that we seem to keep around as well if I was going to really dive into whatever the hell our nature is. To elaborate upon this and why i think it's important to consider in deciding what morality (or a moral agent) is or should be, with an example that I don't think will be very controversial. Might makes right. As an argument, it's not compelling. As a justification for any given thing it's severely lacking. However, as a moral principle (or the justification for a moral principle or set of mandates) it does work. It doesn't work by strength of the argument itself, but by the strength of our nature as a social species with social heiarchies. If we're going to systematically decide what morality is, or what a moral agent is (with relation to ourselves, our nature, by demonstration) these things, to my mind, cannot or should not be ignored in favor of some ideal which we prefer (in your case that seems to be a completely logical sense of morality, in mine it would be a mostly logical sense of morality with room for just a little bit of teh crazy).

Exactly what argument are you trying to make here and how does it address the argument I presented (that we've moved past heuristics).

That communication or intent does not move anything past heuristics. Applying a heuristic solution does not change what it is. Communicating the speciics of a heuristic solution does not change what it is.

Morality is a guide to how person should act - what he should and should not do - that much is established. Given that we have countless philosophies trying to answer not only what we should do, but why should we do it (based on different starting premises), I'd say we no longer determine morality by trial and error.

On the other side of the coin, the countless philosophies we have with no definitive answer in sight would seem to suggest to me that we do determine morality by trial and error. Consider for a moment, as well, that the dominant morality (if such a thing could be said to exist) almost always happens to coincide with the dominant forces of history. Perhaps morality is yet another thing written by the victor.

The process of how we apply morality would not be relevant to what morality is and whether we are moral agents. It'd would be relevant to us, but not in context of those questions. That's because the identification of morality and us being a moral agent would always come before the question of its application.

Unless application was precisely what morality is, in a way that we can communicate it, ergo the nod to heuristics. I do like to think, btw, that we can reason our way into any given conclusion, that a reasonable morality could be established, but I have my doubts (obviously).

Do you have a justification for that - as to why everyone should work towards perpetuation of human life? Rather why human life should be perpetuated at all?

Meh, we're "built" for it, it's a pretty effective motivator, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to leverage it (or much in the way of academics to elaborate upon it), and a hefty dollup of self interest. The hook, of course, would be to expand peoples spheres of consideration beyond their immediate circumstances or surroundings. We already do this, it's worked well thusfar though it could obviously stand for some tweaks (if the goal could be said to be the perpetuation of life- which does seem to be the default). What those tweaks may be, meh, thats where any and all justification on my end comes to a full stop, and that's probably why I'm not in the business of morality. Obviously this idea of what the goal of morality should be is heavily influenced by my opinions of what morality is to begin with, and how we fit into that scheme. To me, it's just n elaborate set of tools for a simple purpose. I don't really look to morality for happiness (emotions aren't exactly well known for being grounded in reason btw, and lets be honest, the very word morality invokes a sort of emotional staunchness, more don'ts than do's, more suffering and toil than happiness),

[Mystic]

This was a good thread.

Spoilers from Starcraft Heart of the Swarm:

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The primal zerg it was good for them to fight one another, and evolve from defeating one another and collecting essences of one another.

That said, isn't this "take care one of another" out of "empathy", then from this view point possibly a subjective creation of evolution.  We can imagine another race having different morals in science fiction for example (the primal Zerg for example).

Going back to dilemma, is it moral because evolution gave us that perception or did evolution give us that perception because it's moral?

If it's the former, why should we really give importance to it then? Why not just over all ignore it unless it really really bothers us?

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[The Grand Nudger]

There is no dilemma.  Nothing is moral because evolution makes it so -or- because we're evolved for any specific perception of morality. Talk about raising a corpse.