Kalam Cosmological Nonsense

[Neo-Scholastic]

...No, a hidden agenda (i.e. - a form of dishonesty) demonstrates at least two things; 1. that you are willing to engage in intellectual dishonesty in order to prop up a failing position, and 2. that you don't really care whether or not your beliefs are actually true. It is a clear sign that you aren't interested in rational discourse (and/or attempting to come to a better knowledge of reality). You just want to believe, what you want to believe, b/c you want to believe.

If that is what you believe about me b/c that is what you need to believe about me, then I see little point in participating. Please continue without me.

[median]

...No, a hidden agenda (i.e. - a form of dishonesty) demonstrates at least two things; 1. that you are willing to engage in intellectual dishonesty in order to prop up a failing position, and 2. that you don't really care whether or not your beliefs are actually true. It is a clear sign that you aren't interested in rational discourse (and/or attempting to come to a better knowledge of reality). You just want to believe, what you want to believe, b/c you want to believe.

If that is what you believe about me b/c that is what you need to believe about me, then I see little point in participating. Please continue without me.

LOL. Now here is the all too common 'deny everything' apologist trick. No, you demonstrated quite clearly, via your intellectual dishonesty, hidden premises, and obfuscation, that you don't care whether your beliefs are actually true and that you're willing to use logical fallacies in an attempt to support your failed position. You can't demonstrate the alleged 'Yahweh' deity you claim to believe in (hmmm, same as all the others!), and the Kalam is NOT the real reason you believe. You didn't demonstrate anything CLOSE to 'Jesus love', and you certainly didn't demonstrate what your own bible states you should be demonstrating (John 14, Mark 16). It's OK though, I anticipated your ducking out.


-Yes, none of them can take the heat. So they eventually run away. It's like the chess player who knows he's going to lose. So instead of admitting defeat he pulls the ultimate coward move and walks away from the table.

[median]

THE NONSENSE REFUTED AGAIN...


http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/j...kalam.html

A Bug in William Lane Craig's Kalam Cosmological Argument (2009)
Jeffrey T. Allen

William Lane Craig's kalam cosmological argument (henceforth KCA) has proved to be a vastly influential natural theological argument for the existence of God.[1] It is simple to state, and inquiry into whether it is sound has opened up new avenues of research in the philosophy of religion and science. In this essay I will argue that a crucial premise in defense of his KCA, that an actual infinite cannot exist, is false if God exists.[2]

The KCA consists of three basic steps:

(1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
(2) The universe began to exist.
(3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

(1) and (2) entail (3), so whether or not the KCA is a good argument hinges on its soundness, i.e., whether the premises are true or not. Craig offers the following argument to demonstrate the second premise:

(2.1) An infinite temporal regress of events would constitute an actual infinite.
(2.2) An actual infinite cannot exist.
(2.3) Therefore an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.

Judeo-Christian theology maintains that God is omniscient, that is, has knowledge of all things logically possible for Him to know. What philosophers usually have in mind is that God knows things like the age of the universe, that His Son, Jesus Christ, was crucified and revivified three days after, and so on. That is, God possesses complete irreflexive knowledge—total knowledge that is not about God Himself. God's reflexive knowledge is equally uncontroversial. There is nothing paradoxical, for instance, in the assertion that God knows He has the power to do anything he pleases (so long as it does not entail a logical contradiction). If He is omniscient[3], God presumably knows, since it entails no logical inconsistency, that the following proposition is true:

(4) Craig says that an actual infinite cannot exist.

Now consider God's knowledge of His own knowledge of something. Since there is no logical inconsistency in asserting that God knows that He knows (4) is true, it follows from his omniscience that God knows that He knows (4) is true. Given this, God must also know that He knows that He knows (4), and so on ad infinitum, so long as God's omniscience entails complete reflexive knowledge.

In short, there exist an actual infinite number of propositions that God knows to be true, namely, propositions about His own knowledge. This follows from the very definition of God, but outright conflicts with premise (2.2) of his defense of the KCA, that "An actual infinite cannot exist." Independent of the KCA and premise (2.2) of the argument defending it, it seems perfectly reasonable that an omniscient God should have complete reflexive knowledge, leading to a dilemma: either God doesn't exist (and thus the KCA loses all utility), or an actual infinite can exist (and thus the conclusion that the universe began to exist rests on a false premise, that an actual infinite cannot exist).

One apparently simple solution is to limit the domain or range of (2.2) to events occurring within the physical universe. This would exclude any nonphysical objects, such as propositions that are the objects of God's knowledge (including His reflexive knowledge). So might (2.2) might be revamped to read:

(2.2') An actual infinite consisting of physical objects cannot exist.

But if it is acceptable to limit the range of premise (2.2) to avoid an undesirable conclusion for the theist (that God does not exist), it is equally acceptable to limit the range of premise (1) to avoid an undesirable conclusion for the atheist (that God exists).[4] Since the point here is epistemological, this move will not give the KCA proponent what he wants.

But there is another way to defend (2.2'): show that it is true apart from the KCA. Thought experiments such as Hilbert's Hotel[5] have putatively established independent arguments for (2.2), but (2.2) implies that God does not exist; so KCA proponents need independently justified supplementary premises that show that Hilbert's Hotel, or some other argument, establishes the stronger premise (2.2'). This has yet to be done.

The latter solution is perhaps more promising. Craig has argued that God's knowledge is not propositional; that is, God does not know any propositions are true. God's knowledge is better expressed:

as an undivided intuition of reality, which we finite knowers represent to ourselves in terms of propositions. We express propositionally what God knows non-propositionally.[6]

Construing omniscience nonpropositionally in terms of "an undivided intuition of reality" (whatever that means) entails that there are not an infinite number of propositions; rather, there are only as many propositions as human beings have cognized. Theists are thereby freed from countenancing an actual infinite. On this view, God does not know all true propositions; rather, he knows all truths, which are acquired through "an undivided intuition of reality." Craig further suggests that propositions need not play any role in defining omniscience, citing Charles Taliaferro's characterization:

[He] proposes ... that omniscience be understood in terms of maximal cognitive power, to wit, a person S is omniscient iff it is metaphysically impossible for there to be a being with greater cognitive power than S and this power is fully exercised.

This approach resonates well with Craig's idea that the modal terms in (2.2) should be understood in terms of metaphysical necessity, a stronger form of necessity than logical necessity—so long as "necessity" and "metaphysical necessity" are intelligible.[7]

Propositions may very well be "useful fictions."[8] But there is a friction between (2.2) and omniscience whether or not we countenance propositions. Let us countenance truths, then, as Craig suggests: "God knows every truth." It is still self-contradictory to suppose that (a) God knows whatever it is logically possible for Him to know and (b) an actual infinite cannot exist. For suppose that God knows (4), where (4) is taken as a truth rather than a proposition. If we replace "proposition" with "truth," it still follows that an actual infinite number of truths exist. Moreover, it is logically possible for God to simultaneously have and hold an infinite number of divided beliefs, just as we can think of human knowledge as including truths that may be individuated from each other, yet held all at once. The only apparent reason to resist this is to save the soundness of the KCA. Thus the objection that God actually knows things in virtue of an "undivided intuition of reality" is extremely weak, for it does nothing to prevent the individuation of the truths of God's knowledge as something "actual" and "infinite."

Thus whether we countenance propositions or truths when defining omniscience, if (2.2) is true, then God cannot exist. If God knows all true propositions and believes no false ones, then God must know an infinite number of propositions, as there are an infinite number of the objects of his self-knowledge. And since it is logically possible for God to know an actual infinite number of truths about Himself, if He knows all truths, then He does know an actual infinite number of truths about Himself. So Craig must either independently justify limiting the range of the tacit universal quantifier in (2.2), or else concede that either (2.2) is false or that God does not exist.[9]
Notes

[1] William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (London, UK: Macmillan & Co., 1979).

[2] I am greatly indebted to Nelson Pike for inspiring my work in the philosophy of religion, particularly on Craig's kalam cosmological argument.

[3] I am grateful to Robert Greg Cavin for suggesting this specific example. Other examples are equally suitable, such as the original one I used to derive the paradox: that God knows that he knows everything.

[4] The sort of change in range for the first premise that I have in mind would be something like the following:

(1') Whatever begins to exist that is a physical object within spacetime has a cause.

If (1') took the place of (1) in the KCA, then (2) would no longer follow from (1), since the universe is not a physical object within spacetime.

[5] For an explanation of Hilbert's Hotel, see William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith (3rd ed.) (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2008), p. 118.

[6] William Lane Craig, "Theistic Critiques of Atheism" in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed. Michael Martin (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 69-85. <http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6645>.

[7] W. V. O. Quine, "Reference and Modality" in From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, ed. W. V. O. Quine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953).

[8] Or propositions might even be useless fictions, for that matter. See W. V. O. Quine, "Propositional Objects" in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, ed. W. V. O. Quine (Columbia, NY: Columbia University Press, 1969).

[9] Craig could also argue, perhaps, that God is "omniscient" in a way which would make logically possible the existence of a more knowledgeable being than God, i.e., a being that knows everything that it is logically possible to know.

[Cato]

Median,

What the fuck is your problem? You used LOL in two consecutive posts suggesting you are hip and saving digital space. Then, we are treated to a 2000+ character cut and paste job. When the fuck did integrity become a bad word?

[John V]

Except, of course, his debate tactics are intellectually dishonest b/c (elsewhere, in other threads) he has revealed what he REALLY believes (biblical Christianity) and so this "abstract God" thing is all just a smoke screen. The hidden premise isn't hidden anymore (i.e. - his REAL reason for believing is starting to show). Why can't these guys just be honest about the real reason they came to believe this stuff? At least William Lane Craig came out and admitted that his main reason for believing is the same as every other religion (some non-demonstrable, non-falsifiable, subjective personal experience/'testimony' of "The Hold Spirit" etc). So really, all of this intellectual masturbation they go through with us is just a front, a show, and a sham to distract from the truly bad reason they continue to "have faith".

-

WTF are you talking about? The fact that a person came to belief for certain reasons does not make them intellectually dishonest for discussing other reasons that one might believe.

Likewise, a former theist can say "I lost my faith due to X," and yet discuss reasons for losing faith other than X.

You're either intellectually dishonest or just plain dumb for making the charge.

[median]

Median,

What the fuck is your problem? You used LOL in two consecutive posts suggesting you are hip and saving digital space. Then, we are treated to a 2000+ character cut and paste job. When the fuck did integrity become a bad word?

The reference is there, before the article. There is no plagiarism b/c I haven't acted as if the article is mine. I simply re-posted it with the link, in adding to the OP.

p.s. - I never claimed or suggested to be attempting to "save digital space". If you don't like the post no one is forcing anyone to read it.

---

WTF are you talking about? The fact that a person came to belief for certain reasons does not make them intellectually dishonest for discussing other reasons that one might believe.

Likewise, a former theist can say "I lost my faith due to X," and yet discuss reasons for losing faith other than X.

You're either intellectually dishonest or just plain dumb for making the charge.

Strawman, what was that charge again exactly? Having a hidden agenda is certainly dishonest (which he had no problem accepting after the "in a minute" comment was made). And instead of providing solid evidence for this alleged disembodied mind behind the universe it was just "Oh, I'll just leave now." And my rebuttals were not the only one's posted toward these assertions. Still waiting for the demonstration of the alleged supernatural...

---

All you do is call me a liar. It gets old.

And yet again, another lie - demonstrating (not just claiming) that the point is true. There have been far more things stated and rebutted here then just "calling you a liar" - including the rebuttals to your alleged God thing-behind the universe argument (by myself and others) - which you refused to respond to.

"All I do"?? NOPE.

[Lord Privy Seal]

Chad, I was a bit hesitant to reply to your questions because you've left the thread and would thus not get to respond to my responses. On further consideration, I decided to go ahead on the premise that you can respond to my answers elsewhere (such as in the "God's God" thread) or at some other point in time. That way, your questions don't get ignored.

I am making the distinction between various types of cause. The shape of the house is the formal cause. The carpenter’s work is the efficient cause. The materials from which the house is made is the material cause. Which types of cause do you consider invalid and why?

I find your proposed "formal cause"--the shape of the house--to be quite dubious. I don't see how "the shape of the house" could cause the house, unless you're proposing Plato's World of Forms. If so, I'm not sure how that matters to this discussion (see below).

Which of these two statements best restates your this: Calculus has ontological status as something real, a pre-existing something waiting to be discovered. Or calculus is a convenient fiction that approximates reality.

Your second statement is closer, but the phrase "convenient fiction" carries baggage that I do not accept. I would say something along the lines of "Calculus is a mathematical tool that models the behavior of certain aspects of reality with a high degree of--but not total--accuracy. To put it another way: "The map is not the territory." Or in Zen terms: "The finger that points at the Moon is not the Moon." Concrete example: Newton's equations model the movement of the planets under the influence of gravity to a high degree of accuracy. However, the precession of Mercury's orbit did not quite match what Newton's equations predicted. This problem was solved by the discovery of relativity, which explains the difference. It turns out that strong gravity "dilates" space and time, noticeably affecting Mercury's orbit due to its proximity to the Sun. The equations of relativity are a more precise model (thus asymptotically approaching full accuracy), but if you want to launch a probe to Mars, Newton's equations are still valid and sufficient to the task.

I don't really see how either understanding--calculus exists ontologically, perhaps in a Pythagorean/Platonic sense, vs. calculus being more like a human-drawn map (modeling tool) that does not have independent existence on another plane of being--significantly affects either of our positions. If there is an ontologically-existent Realm of Number and Form, that neither validates nor refutes the belief in an Abrahamic personal deity. Likewise, if there isn't such a "place."

Fair enough. Do you think sensations are part of Universe? Most likely we agree that visible wavelength exist? But do you think ‘red’ has ontological status? Is sensation included in your definition of Universe?

I don't think there is such a thing as a floating Category of Red-ness existing in an abstract Realm down the hall and three doors to the right from the Number Four, if that's the sort of thing you're getting at. On the other hand, certain wavelengths of electromagnetic energy ("light"), the rods and cones of our retinas, optic nerves, the optical cortices of our brains etc. all exist, together producing the emergent property of our sensation of "red," and all of that exists in my concept of Universe.

Again, I don't really think that either view materially effects the debate at hand. If there is an ontologically-existent realm where things like Number, Calculus, and Triangles have some kind of reality independent of energy/matter/spacetime, this has no bearing on the concept of conscious beings existing apart from energy/matter/spacetime. A "triangle" can be described in purely abstract terms as three lines joined by angles that sum to 180 degrees (in a Euclidean space). Such a "Triangle" has no necessary relationship to other things. Its lines have no compressive or tensile strength, no relationship to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle or "angels" or anything else. Nor is this sort of Triangle (assuming it has ontological existence) the sort of thing a person could invent. "I was gonna make the Triangle with 4.268 sides, but I decided to go with three instead."

Conscious beings, on the other hand, especially beings conscious of the Cosmos, are inherently relational. To be conscious is to be conscious of. In the same way that it makes no sense to speak of Automobile as a purely non-energy/matter/spacetime abstraction with ontological existence (What is its top speed? Gas mileage? Drag coefficient? How many people does it seat? Etc.), it makes no sense to speak of conscious persons as floating abstractions.

On the other hand, we can't rule out a priori the possibility of invisible, incorporeal personal entities. According to our current understanding of physics, most of the "matter" in our Cosmos is invisible and incorporeal (but gravitating) "dark matter." I think "transparent matter" is a better descriptor, since if it was "dark" it would be visible when it got between us and something bright. From a procedural standpoint, it is most parsimonious to start on the premise that there is only a single type ("particle") of DM, at least until we have reason to think there is more than one type.

From a historical perspective though, the discovery of sub-atomic particles (the proton, neutron, and electron) did not lead toward parsimony. Instead, continued explorations of the quantum realm yielded a "particle zoo" of dozens of different types of interacting particles. If DM is at least as diverse in nature, it would be possible at least in principle for it to form "life, Jim, but not as we know it." Sapient DM-life forms, assuming they could perceive and interact with baryonic matter, would arguably have at least some of the attributes of "spirit-beings." They would be invisible and intangible, interacting only with gravity. If they could concentrate enough of their mass in a single place at will (while also opposing Earth's gravity somehow, so they don't get pulled down to Earth's center), they could use their gravity to move objects without touching them in any apparent way ("telekinesis").

Nutshell: Neither the ontological separate existence of things like "Number" "Shape" and "Calculus" nor their non-existence ontologically would do much for either of our viewpoints, IMO. Thus, a discussion of Platonic/Pythagorean metaphysics would most likely represent a rabbit-trail not worth going down, one that would not do much for either side of the Kalam debate.

[median]

The Kalam relies upon the fallacious assumption that there must be some "divine mind behind" the current state of our local universe. Did the universe have a beginning? Even if one agrees that it did, it is of no effect or assistance to the assertion that a disembodied mind (whatever that might mean) is the ultimate cause of our current phenomenal space/time continuance (or that our universe could not have derived from another universe). The apologist wants us to think about "possibilities" (as if entertaining what might be merely possible makes anything more likely or probable...but it doesn't). Mere possibilities have no bearing on whether or not something is actually true. At best, it is an argument from ignorance. "In my mind, it's just impossible that our universe came about any other way. Therefore it must have been the God I already assumed."

Just because something begins to exist doesn't mean (in any way) that such a thing began to exist ex-nihilo - for one because no one has ever had an experience with "ex-nihilo" and in no way could show that nothing could come out of it, and two because all of our experiences of things "coming to exist" derive from already existent physical things being rearranged (as the second law displays that matter can neither be created nor destroyed). Thus, KCA is a miserable failure of an argument for God.

[median]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aD9MtIma5YU