Isn't the fine tuning argument ad hoc?

[Chas]

The 'fine-tuning problem' isn't an actual problem that needs a solution.

The question is pre-supposionist. Fine tuned for what? Fine tuned for us?

There is no reason for 'us'. We are the product of evolution - a blind algorithmic process.

[Anomalocaris]

Is pressure release a parsimonious explanation for why there is more CO2 above a glass of champagne? It involves a vast number of redundant bubbles.

At its most basic, multiverse isn't the addition of an unnecessary assumption. Rather it is the subtraction of an unsupported, albeit as yet in falsified, assumption. Unique Universe asserts for some reason what we see for which we know of no cause is the only way things can be, and there is special cobstraints, as yet unknown, that prevented physical constants from being anything else. Multiverse does not assert that our universe is the only one, or that our physical constants are as the only way they could be. The most basic version of multiverse hypothesis simply allows these two dubious constraints to be removed and see what follows.

Multiverse could be thought of as the most parsimonious interpretation of reality possible based on what is really known of how the laws of physics work at its most basic level.

Unique universe view actually requires certain assumption which follows from no known first principle, and more overarching than could feasibly be verified by observation, to be taken for granted.

Multiverse theory on the other hand, removes these assumptions.

[MindForgedManacle]

At its most basic, multiverse isn't the addition of an unnecessary assumption. Rather it is the subtraction of an unsupported, albeit as yet in falsified, assumption.

What? The multiverse is a hypothesis at best, meaning it hasn't reached the point - with respect to evidence - that it becomes un-parsimonious to not accept it. In other words, it hasn't reached the point of being near-uncontestably being assumed as true.

Unique Universe asserts for some reason what we see for which we know of no cause is the only way things can be, and there is special cobstraints, as yet unknown, that prevented physical constants from being anything else. Multiverse does not assert that our universe is the only one, or that our physical constants are as the only way they could be. The most basic version of multiverse hypothesis simply allows these two dubious constraints to be removed and see what follows.

Which makes it not as parsimonious as the intentional agent supposition for why the universe allows for life despite it (apparently) being absurdly improbable. That doesn't make it wrong or more probable, just that the objection of not being parsimonious in comparison to a God and a single universe cannot really be said to be wrong.

Multiverse could be thought of as the most parsimonious interpretation of reality possible based on what is really known of how the laws of physics work at its most basic level.

What about the operations of nature at the most basic level says that the multiverse hypothesis is parsimonious? I'm aware of the many-worlds interpretation of QM, but I don't recall that having the majority of purchase in the physics community.

Unique universe view actually requires certain assumption which follows from no known first principle, and more overarching than could feasibly be verified by observation, to be taken for granted.

I've not advocated a 'unique universe view', I've merely pointed out that the multiverse hypothesis can validly labelled as un-parsimonious in comparison to an intentional agent supposition if you're supposing the truth of the multiverse hypothesis to directly account for fine-tuning (in my view, despite being an atheist). In addition, we can't (honestly) assume more than the evidence currently supports. We know that there is a universe. Whether or not there is more is not known, which doesn't make it an assumption.

Multiverse theory on the other hand, removes these assumptions.

Aside from the fact that the Multiverse is a hypothesis at the time being, not accepting the existence of other universes, or the un-parsimonious nature of the supposition in comparison to others, is not an assumption. Rather, it's a refusal to go farther than the evidence allows and accepting valid criticism.

[Anomalocaris]

At its most basic, multiverse isn't the addition of an unnecessary assumption. Rather it is the subtraction of an unsupported, albeit as yet in falsified, assumption.

What? The multiverse is a hypothesis at best, meaning it hasn't reached the point - with respect to evidence - that it becomes un-parsimonious to not accept it. In other words, it hasn't reached the point of being near-uncontestably being assumed as true.

No, it is a conjecture, not a hypothesis.

Unique Universe asserts for some reason what we see for which we know of no cause is the only way things can be, and there is special cobstraints, as yet unknown, that prevented physical constants from being anything else. Multiverse does not assert that our universe is the only one, or that our physical constants are as the only way they could be. The most basic version of multiverse hypothesis simply allows these two dubious constraints to be removed and see what follows.

Which makes it not as parsimonious as the intentional agent supposition for why the universe allows for life despite it (apparently) being absurdly improbable. That doesn't make it wrong or more probable, just that the objection of not being parsimonious in comparison to a God and a single universe cannot really be said to be wrong.

No, "intentional agent" is a meaningless expression that says nothing about the scope, mechansim, and complexity involved, and follows from neither known first principle, nor consist with any known empirical principle. As such it contains nothing, is based on nothing, explains nothing, and is nothing. As nothing, it is certainly not the most parsimonious way to be nothing. Simply shutting up will do the same more honestly and humbly, threrfore more parsimoniously, then invoking "intelligent" or "agent".

Multiverse could be thought of as the most parsimonious interpretation of reality possible based on what is really known of how the laws of physics work at its most basic level.

What about the operations of nature at the most basic level says that the multiverse hypothesis is parsimonious? I'm aware of the many-worlds interpretation of QM, but I don't recall that having the majority of purchase in the physics community.

The parsimony of the multiverse comes from the fact that it assumes nothing about the nature of fundamental constants of the universe, and quantum mechanical concept of randomness, that does not follow from any postulated first principles that we have reason to suspect to be true. i.e. it dispenses with the assumption that fundamental constants has to be what we see even though we haven't the slightest idea why, that what we suspect to be true randomness in fact must only happen in the way it actually observed to happen. If we know of no reason why things can't be different, then do not assume that it can not be, and is not, different. Multiverse is a conjecture about how, if not making these assumptions is correct, reality might actually be on the true macro scale.

Unique universe view actually requires certain assumption which follows from no known first principle, and more overarching than could feasibly be verified by observation, to be taken for granted.

I've not advocated a 'unique universe view', I've merely pointed out that the multiverse hypothesis can validly labelled as un-parsimonious in comparison to an intentional agent supposition if you're supposing the truth of the multiverse hypothesis to directly account for fine-tuning (in my view, despite being an atheist). In addition, we can't (honestly) assume more than the evidence currently supports. We know that there is a universe. Whether or not there is more is not known, which doesn't make it an assumption.

Multiverse does not ACCOUNT for fine tuning. It remove the basis for saying there had been tuning. It was not conceived in response to the garbage about tunning. It followed logically and economically from our current understanding of fundamental lws of physics, which says fundmental constants has no reason for being what they are in our observation, and random event has no reason for happening only in the way we observe to eventuate. The economic answer is they can be different where we havn't yet observed.

No intentional agent is called for, we are here only because we are possible and all that can ever be possible would eventuate, and therefore we eventuates.


By the way, go back and think about the boiling pot example. The superficial complexity of the multitude of bubbles do not make boiling pot non-parsimonious. The parsiminious laws of phase change and fluid behavior, applied uniformly over a pot of water, makes the multitude of bubbles parsimonious.

The simple laws that respond to fundamental constants, and the lack of laws constraining fundamental constants, is what makes appearent complexity of multiverse simple at a more fundamental level and a rather parsimonious conjecture of how reality really is.

The conjecture of "intelligent agent" on the other hand, consists of nothing that allows its parsimony to be evaluated. In fact it consists of nothing at all. .

[Mister Agenda]

I didn't say that the multiverse hypothesis was originally proposed to explain fine-tuning, but that users here (and elsewhere) do so for that reason.

In other words, people who are aware that multiple universes are a possibility suggested by physics note that if that is the case, even if the speculation that the universal constants could have been almost anything is true, our universe is still not remarkable by virtue of the many opportunities for our universe to occur. It would be unparsimonious to make up the multiple universe hypothesis to explain the fine tuning conjecture, but it is not unparsimonious to co-opt an existing hypothesis derived from multiple cosmological models (infinite space/time, bubble universes, daughter universes, and parallel universes, off the top of my head). The reason the multiverse hypothesis exists does make a difference in whether it's a parsimonious explanation or not.

The actual option here is between an entity that we have some slight scientific evidence for (multiverse) and one we have no scientific evidence for (a creator). I agree the multiverse is weak, but throwing in a creator is weaker...and fine-tuning actually being the case is least-supported part of this equation.

I didn't say that Occam's Razor isn't applicable to God, just that the multiverse hypothesis being proposed for the explicit reason of voiding fine-tuning does so much more.

The multiverse is a far more respectable hypothesis in cosmology than fine-tuning itself is. It makes no more sense to complain about the multiverse being proposed for the explicit reason of voiding fine-tuning than it does to complain about God being proposed for the explicit reason of explaining fine-tuning.

I'd agree, but then it could still be levelled by theists (correctly, I think) that that solution is still susceptible to the razor.

It would be levelled correctly if they could provide a good reason why we should assume there's only one universe.

You lost me here. We don't assume more universes until we've solid evidence for them, we don't assume there are more because we don't have contrary evidence there aren't more.

You're half right. We also don't assume there is only a single universe until we have evidence of that as well. Unless you can explain a scientific or logical principle that requires us to hold that if we find one of something, we must assume it's the only example of its type of thing in existence. With a sample size of one, it's improper to assume it's multiple or singular. It's not improper to point out that it could be multiple or singular. And the odds (given present knowledge) that the universe is multiple are greater than the odds that all the assumptions behind the fine-tuning conjecture are true.

The problem here is that you're invoking possibilities, and I've heard some physicists like Victor Stenger say that there are problems with cyclic models. I don't think invoking possibilities here helps much.

Fine-tuning is nothing but invoking possibilities. Why do you give that side of the equation special treatment?

I don't recall asserting that there were: I'm an atheist.

You've asserted that God is a more parsimonious explanation for fine-tuning than multiple universes are. Given two options, one known to be possible and one not known to be possible, the former is more parsimonious.

My point is that it does seem to be a valid point that proposing the multiverse of an indefinite number of universes is contrary to parsimony. I repeat, that does not make it false, nor does it make God likely, it's just not parsimonious.

Occam's razor recommends that among competing hypotheses, the hypothesis with the fewest assumptions should be selected. In application, we proceed toward simplicity until simpler explanations offer less explanatory power. For God to be more parsimonious than multiple universes, God would have to be a simpler explanation with equal or more explanatory power. I maintain that God does not fit this description in comparison to multiple universes.

Note that although I think there's as much reason to suppose there are multiple universe as to suppose there are not, my preferred explanation for why fine-tuning is not evidence of a fine-tuner is that it's speculative BS: I go with the more parsimonious explanation that universal constants aren't actually like independent roulette wheels with billions of settings spun when a universe forms.

Actually I'm not. Apologists like William Lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga equate God's omni- attributes with "maximality" of those characteristics not an infinity (which Craig ostensibly believes cannot exist in reality), and even make use of them (ex: Plantinga's Ontological argument uses them).

I don't think Craig and Plantinga defining God that way makes it standard. Their definition being the first one most people think of when they want to describe God would make it standard.

I have noted in several posts that regardless of if the multiverse is to contain an infinite amount of universes or just an immensely large number, it's still not a parsimonious answer to fine-tuning.

You've noted and asserted, but you have not shown. The way you show it is to provide a simpler explanation with equal or greater explanatory power.

[Neo-Scholastic]

For example, suppose you are presented a pack of cards and happen to draw an ace. The question before you is if your draw was an intentional even orchestrated by another entity or it occurred without any intelligence behind it. Here the drawing of an ace is comparable to existence of our universe.

One answer would be that you can draw many cards and that they'd be different all the time and the one you drew this time just happened to be an ace. This would be the multiverse hypothesis.

Another answer would be that the person holding the pack specifically orchestrated things so that you'd end up drawing an ace. This would be the god hypothesis.

Which one seems simpler to you?

The multiverse is not really comparable to a pack of cards. You have to have the order first before you can have an orderly result. A pack of cards already has a set number 52 or 54 if you count the Jokers, specific suites, etc. You start with system so structured that it will eventually yield an ace on the first cut.

On the other hand, the theoretical multiverse has no initial order to even determine the possible types of universes it could create. It would be more like playing a slot machine and having an ace pop out when you get three cherries. Moreover, if this universe can just pop into a viable existence, I don't see any reason why it couldn't just fall apart randomly too. Why should constants stay constant?

I opt for the card shark as being the simpler explanation for the player that keeps drawing aces.

[Anomalocaris]

What you opt for, here and everywhere else, is smarmy sophistry and bullshit characteristic to chadwooters.

[Ryantology]

I didn't say that Occam's Razor isn't applicable to God, just that the multiverse hypothesis being proposed for the explicit reason of voiding fine-tuning does so much more.

Actually, any expansion of our understanding of the outer-boundaries of reality automatically makes the idea of God all the more softer flesh for the Razor to slice through. How can we deny the parsimony of God creating a single universe yet accept it if there is an infinity of universes out there? Theists have done their best to maximize every attribute their god possesses, in order to win all those dick-measuring contests. If the multiverse theory turns out to be true, believers would waste no time in altering their beliefs the fraction necessary to think that their god created all of the infinite universes. This new version of God would, to any reasonable skeptic, inspire a commensurately higher skepticism in the likelihood of God's existence.

Multiverse theory is more accommodating to Occam simply because its truth would force theists to move the goalposts beyond this new line of understanding.

[genkaus]

The multiverse is not really comparable to a pack of cards. You have to have the order first before you can have an orderly result. A pack of cards already has a set number 52 or 54 if you count the Jokers, specific suites, etc. You start with system so structured that it will eventually yield an ace on the first cut.

On the other hand, the theoretical multiverse has no initial order to even determine the possible types of universes it could create. It would be more like playing a slot machine and having an ace pop out when you get three cherries. Moreover, if this universe can just pop into a viable existence, I don't see any reason why it couldn't just fall apart randomly too. Why should constants stay constant?

I opt for the card shark as being the simpler explanation for the player that keeps drawing aces.

You've completely misread and misunderstood the analogy. I'm not actually comparing multiverse to a pack of cards.

The basis of the fine-tuning argument - the premise one has to accept for any further discussion, is "The constants of the universe could've been otherwise, but took the known values in this universe."

I'm comparing this premise to "The card I drew from the pack could've been anything but an ace, but this time, it was an ace". I'm comparing the existence of this universe to drawing an ace and the 52/54 cards represent other possible constants' values, not alternate universes. The other hypothetical universes here are comparable to other hypothetical instances of drawing a card.

Now, all we actually know is that we drew an ace this time. We have no actual knowledge of any other instances of the draw or the potential outcomes. We assume that there are different cards in the pack (the basis of fine tuning). Given these limits of knowledge which one would be the simpler solution - that someone engineered drawing of an ace or that it was simply a function of probability and we could just as easily have gotten a different card?

[max-greece]

Glad to see others picking up on the fact that a creator would have to be more complex than the sum of universes in a multiverse.

Consider it like this. Which is actually more complex, the sum of all cars made by Henry Ford or Henry himself?