Determinism, Free Will, and A Thought Experiment

[Mudhammam]

As I have been heavily pondering issues related to determinism, free will, and the like (I made a post about determinism and related ideas yesterday but don't worry, this one is going in a completely different direction), a thought experiment dawned on me. You will likely find my inspiration for it ironic but I will wait to reveal that after we have had some time to mull this over. I submit that this actually has more value than a mere thought experiment, as you will hopefully see (if I am onto anything). My thought experiment is broken into two parts. I will post Part I now and Part II tomorrow. The reason for doing it this way is that I would like to solicit responses to Part I before delving into the second half. I think there will be some value to approaching it this way, with regards to effectiveness; perhaps this will bear out when it concludes tomorrow. So here it is:

Part I.
At any particular instant, Robert has two theoretically possible options: to do Action A or some alternative, that is Action Not-A. Due to Robert's brain chemistry, which prevents Robert from doing Action Not-A, Robert always does Action A. As it happens, Robert's will* is always in agreement with his brain chemistry and thus Robert always wills himself to do Action A instead of Action Not-A. Is Robert exercising free will or is doing Action A forced on him (determined) by his brain chemistry, which prevents Robert from doing Action Not-A?

*or deep desire
Note: Action A and Action Not-A merely describe two mutually exclusive behaviors, not because they're logically exclusive at different split seconds but only because we cannot at this very particular instant do both (such as drink milk and drink not-milk, say soda, at the same exact time--well maybe someone can but hopefully you get the point--substitute whatever behaviors you'd like). Also, I'm trying to aim straight forward with this so don't read too deeply into any specific term and if you need clarification about anything, please say so.

Okay. Answers?

[bennyboy]

So far so good. But what's the thought experiment? You promised a thought experiment! So far you've just suggested something to think about.


As for will vs. brain chemistry, I'd say the better question is this: can Robert's will, which accords perfectly with brain chemistry, consistently produce the behavior he wills? The answer to that is clearly no-- if I tell Robert I'll give him a hundred dollars not to blink for a minute and then start throwing stuff toward his face, he will almost certainly blink.

[Mudhammam]

So far so good. But what's the thought experiment? You promised a thought experiment! So far you've just suggested something to think about.


As for will vs. brain chemistry, I'd say the better question is this: can Robert's will, which accords perfectly with brain chemistry, consistently produce the behavior he wills? The answer to that is clearly no-- if I tell Robert I'll give him a hundred dollars not to blink for a minute and then start throwing stuff toward his face, he will almost certainly blink.

It will come, and hopefully, demonstrate the futility of libertarian free will posited by theists on their own terms. As to your second point, I agree, but so do even adherents of libertarian free will--at least some behaviors are purely automated. I intend to show, granting their injection of some supernatural agent to allow for free will, this too must be automated.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

The trouble with this is that there is no possible way to determine if a given action is truly free, or just 'feels' free.

Suppose you have eggs for brekkie. You look through the fridge and the cupboards and settle on eggs. Such an action certainly feels free, but how can you possibly know? It could very well be the case, from the instantiation of the universe, that you would have eggs on this particular morning in question.

Such a quandary necessarily applies to all seeming 'choices' we make - what we like in books, whom we marry, whether we visit a park or a cinema on a given day, and so on.

Personally, I think the universe is deterministic, but I like the feeling that the illusion of free will gives me. Best of both worlds.

Boru

[pocaracas]

Correction: the opposite of "drink milk" is "not-drink milk", not "drink not-milk".
Apart from that, let's see part 2.

[Mudhammam]

Correction: the opposite of "drink milk" is "not-drink milk", not "drink not-milk".
Apart from that, let's see part 2.

Ha. Good call. Okay I'll get on my computer (as opposed to my smartphone) here soon and put it up.

[Mudhammam]

Okay, so let's go to Part II. Is Robert acting freely because he follows his will or deep desire or is his brain activity determining what that will always is by canceling out his will to do anything otherwise? Compatibilists might reply yes to both, insist there is no logical contradiction, dust off their hands and go about their day. But that doesn't seem satisfying; that just seems to kick the can further down the road, off a cliff, and into a swamp abyss. Does that really leave us with freedom?

First let me back up and tell you the inspiration for all this. I came across a quote yesterday while browsing the interwebs that stuck out at me. It was: "“You assume that freedom entails the ability to do the opposite of what one does. I’m persuaded that this is not true.”

You may be thinking, "Huh? So what? That's just compatibilist equivocation." Except that the man who said this was no compatibilist... it was, among all other people, William Lane Craig, a staunch defender of libertarian free will! Here Craig is arguing that God is both free and unable to do Evil (http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-god-ab...z2pvbV2JUl).

This inspired Part II of my thought experiment. We are going to input four different terms for Robert, Action A, Action Not-A, and Brain Chemistry: God, Good, Evil, and Nature. Notice that the algorithm has remained the same but now we will apply it to the supernatural agent that theists believe solves our free will conundrum. Thus Part II of the thought experiment is this:

At any particular instant, God has two theoretically possible options: to do Good or some alternative, that is Evil. Due to God’s Nature, which prevents God from doing Evil, God always does Good. As it happens, God’s will is always in agreement with his Nature and thus God always wills himself to do Good instead of Evil. Is God more or less free than Robert?

A few deductions I make from this comparison, in which God’s Good will (Robert’s will to do Action A) always agrees with his Nature (Robert’s Brain Chemistry):
1. The compatibilist answers yes to both questions in Part I. This is logically possible BUT renders free will to be cheap. (You always win if you pick heads and tails!)
2. Traditional (or libertarian) free will is an illusion produced from our inability to know* our inherent Brain Chemistry/Nature at any particular instant. If we had knowledge of them, the illusion would dissolve.
3. God (our supernatural life raft) is in no better shape when it comes to free will, rendering our appeal to supernatural agency futile.
4. Theists cannot logically assert that God is free but unable to do Evil while maintaining that human Evil is only made possible by free will.

*The apparent difference between humans and other animals is their inability to know the illusion.

Today I found a response Craig gave to this criticism. (http://www.reasonablefaith.org/freedom-a...hoose-evil) How? Obfuscation of course! He conflates issues such as God's omnipotence, omniscience, moral perfection, yada-yada, and says, "Nevertheless, I think it’s dubious that God could create a creature which has the ability freely to choose only the Good. Such an ability seems to belong properly only to a nature which has the property of moral perfection, a property that belongs to God alone. A free being which possesses a nature which is characterized by less than complete moral perfection (N.B. that moral perfection differs from mere innocence!) lacks the power to choose infallibly the Good. For God to create a being which has the ability to choose infallibly the Good would be, in effect, to create another God, which is logically impossible, since God is essentially uncaused; and, of course, omnipotence does not entail the ability to bring about the logically impossible."

I don't think that solves anything because it avoids the issue. How is a finite being who is morally perfection equivalent to God? So does my "thought experiment," which is actually an argument against the coherency of libertarian free will, hold weight? Thoughts?

[Neo-Scholastic]

Your thought problem hinges on whether Rob's will actually does always match his brain activity. Is there a reason why I should accept that as a given?

[Mudhammam]

Your thought problem hinges on whether Rob's will actually does always match his brain activity. Is there a reason why I should accept that as a given?

Let me attempt to clarify, Rob's will always agrees with Rob's brain chemistry but Rob's brain chemistry does not always agree with Rob's "will," evidenced nicely by bennyboy's example of Rob blinking even though Rob really does not want to blink because he wants a $100. Our "will" is our illusion that "we're" acting "freely," according to our deepest sense of desire, whatever that is (even if it is something that doesn't seem to be in our best interest). This argument attempts to demonstrate that determinism is a posteriori true if libertarian free will is our alternative because libertarian free will appeals to an agent that is every bit as automated as Rob, considering that agent has a roughly defined nature (and don't all intelligible concepts?).

"But why is that true?" I can hear you asking.

Because a human nature, our brain activity, sets the guidelines for what we can and cannot do, prior to us actually doing it. If an agent, say God, cannot contradict his nature, and one's nature is confined to doing either A or not-A at any particular moment, you may ask, "But are we free within that limited nature?" To act within the limitations of your nature or more specifically your brain's activity at any particular instant is only to say that your brain activity is always limited to one particular arrangement of chemical reactions (even if these brain states change every fraction of a fraction of a fraction of a second, the moment you're "doing" anything it will be one specific way, even in fluidity). How could our will be independent from it? Without brain activity, humans are just corpses, with no will. Even a highly controlled brain appears less free to us, though not always to that brain. Granted, some have suggested that our entire understanding of physics must change to understand consciousness, or MAYBE our logic is fundamentally restricted and therefore possibly errant, but again, that doesn't seem to be very helpful, since then we can't really even talk about it. Am I just ranting or does any of that seem rational?

[MindForgedManacle]

Really, talking about "our logic" is a bit misleading. I mean, we created logic after all.

@Benny I don't think all biological urges are exactly relevant here. I mean, if I want to will it that I don't feel pain when hit, clearly that alone will do nothing to stop from getting hurt. xD