Problem of Divine Freedom

[MindForgedManacle]

There was a thread about the Problem of Heaven in the Christianity section, so I'd thought I'd bring up a related counter-apologetic here: The Problem of Divine Freedom.

1) For an agent to be morally good, that agent must possess libertarian free will and thus the capacity to do evil. [Plantinga's Free Will Defense]

2) God is an agent, yet cannot do evil. [Common theological position/Divine Command Theory]

3) Therefore God does not have libertarian free will or moral goodness.

Now one response I anticipate is the claim that God could do evil, but he simply chooses not to do it. Despite being in contradiction with Divine Command theory, this makes it mysterious as to why God created beings who had the ability to do evil, and whom inevitably do so. After all, it's logically possible for God to have actualized the possible world where agents with libertarian free will never do evil.

[CapnAwesome]

Who cares. This argument only applies to an omni-benevolent god, which is only believed in by a fairly small minority of the theists that have ever existed. I don't believe in any God not just an omni-benevolent on. So why make such a shallow argument. The problem of evil (and this fairly uncreative variation) is the weakest argument that atheists have because of this and I wish it would stop being beaten into the ground.

[bennyboy]

I think you're trying to conflate definitions and the entities they define. God's will is supposed to be the definition of goodness, so to say he doesn't HAVE the property of goodness doesn't really make sense. Free will is the ability to choose between following God's (intrinsically good) will or not to. Saying God has to be able to go against His own will might be a fun party game, but it's not a sensible argument.

[MindForgedManacle]

Who cares. This argument only applies to an omni-benevolent god, which is only believed in by a fairly small minority of the theists that have ever existed. I don't believe in any God not just an omni-benevolent on.

This is targeted at a specific god, which happens to be the deity worshipped by most theists today and for the past couple of millennium, so complaining that it doesn't target all gods ever conceived (which no argument I've ever come across does) is akin to complaining about evolution not tackling the problem of life's origins: that's not what it's intended to do.

So why make such a shallow argument. The problem of evil (and this fairly uncreative variation) is the weakest argument that atheists have because of this and I wish it would stop being beaten into the ground.

Firstly, if being relevant to the deity most theists today and of the last millennium (or thereabouts) makes an argument shallow, it's hard to imagine any argument that could possibly be made (even in principle) that could meet that criteria. In fact, I would go as far as to say that no such argument is possible, because the scope of relevant deities and their differences voids any such possibility. And why would one care about refuting gods that almost no actually believes in anymore? The absurdity of that should be as evident as that of a chemist going out of their way to refute the phlogiston hypothesis.


Hell, even religious apologists tend to agree it's the strongest argument from the atheists side, precisely because it hits something obvious about the world in conjunction with the idea of a perfect being.

Secondly, - and most importantly - this isn't a variation of the problem of evil. This is just drawing out a contradiction between various theological positions, namely that free will is supposed to be necessary for moral goodness and God's incapacity for doing evil. It's not about saying the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of God, simply that one cannot use the possession of free will as a means to rebutt such an argument.

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I think you're trying to conflate definitions and the entities they define. God's will is supposed to be the definition of goodness, so to say he doesn't HAVE the property of goodness doesn't really make sense. Free will is the ability to choose between following God's (intrinsically good) will or not to. Saying God has to be able to go against His own will might be a fun party game, but it's not a sensible argument.

Do you listen to religious apologists at all? They don't define God's will as good, they define his essential nature as what they mean by good, and to be moral to do abide by the commandments which issue from that will, i.e Divine Command Theory. And yes, God is, as William Craig says, "the Good itself". This is where Christianity displays its influence from Plato his form of the Good. God is supposed to be the only thing that is actually good.

Further, libertarian free will (as used in Plantinga's Free Will Defense and pretty much anywhere else in philosophy) is defined as "the ability to have done otherwise than you in fact did", it has nothing to do with following God's commands. Nor does this argument have anything to do with God "going against his own will". Rather (as the argument states), it shows that one cannot both believe that the possession of Libertarian free will (and thus the capacity for doing evil) is a prerequisite for moral goodness if one also believes that God cannot do evil.

[Senshi]

There was a thread about the Problem of Heaven in the Christianity section, so I'd thought I'd bring up a related counter-apologetic here: The Problem of Divine Freedom.

1) For an agent to be morally good, that agent must possess libertarian free will and thus the capacity to do evil. [Plantinga's Free Will Defense]

2) God is an agent, yet cannot do evil. [Common theological position/Divine Command Theory]

3) Therefore God does not have libertarian free will or moral goodness.

Now one response I anticipate is the claim that God could do evil, but he simply chooses not to do it. Despite being in contradiction with Divine Command theory, this makes it mysterious as to why God created beings who had the ability to do evil, and whom inevitably do so. After all, it's logically possible for God to have actualized the possible world where agents with libertarian free will never do evil.

'God cannot do evil' is wrong, as we all know. God did evil things.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

I suspect it all hinges on whether the instigator of an action is as culpable as the actors.

For example, suppose I obtain the security information for a large cash depository (if this were in any Forum besides philosophy, I would have said 'bank'). I provide this information to nefarious individuals who use it to commit a robbery. Mind you, I did not take part in the robbery, nor did I profit from it. I simply create the conditions whereby the theft could occur. Further, suppose that without my facilitating it, the robbery could not have happened. Am I guilty of robbery?

It is much the same with the God of Abraham. Even if God never, ever commits an evil action in his own person, he created evil (Isaiah 45:7 - 'I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things.'). If God hadn't created evil, then evil acts simply could not take place. Since evil acts do occur, and God admits to having created evil, does God share culpability when human beings do evil things?

If God is in some fashion guilty of evil acts due to creating evil, then premise #2 of the OP becomes non-valid. If God is somehow excused from the shared blame, then premise #1 is invalid.

Boru

[fr0d0]

1) For an agent to be morally good, that agent must possess libertarian free will and thus the capacity to do evil. [Plantinga's Free Will Defense]

2) God is an agent, yet cannot do evil. [Common theological position/Divine Command Theory]

3) Therefore God does not have libertarian free will or moral goodness.

Now one response I anticipate is the claim that God could do evil, but he simply chooses not to do it. Despite being in contradiction with Divine Command theory, this makes it mysterious as to why God created beings who had the ability to do evil, and whom inevitably do so. After all, it's logically possible for God to have actualized the possible world where agents with libertarian free will never do evil.

God can't do evil, because he is good. Good is his most basic property. If a positive ion couldn't change into a negative ion, then God would be the positive ion. The negative ion exists as a natural counterpart, but is never the positive ion.

1. For an agent to be morally good it must be free to act.

2. God is an agent for good

3. God is free to act as his nature dictates

Morality isn't applicable where there is no choice to do evil.

[FreeTony]

God can't do evil, because he is good. Good is his most basic property.

How can you demonstrate that God is good?

[fr0d0]

How can you demonstrate that God is good?

It's a logical prerequisite. To create necessitates a positive force.

[FreeTony]

How can you demonstrate that God is good?

It's a logical prerequisite. To create necessitates a positive force.

Why?

Would you say that about the creator of the landmine, or any sort of torture device?