Necessity is not evidence

[Ryantology]

Not really. I mean, that can help form a predictive model replete with falsifiability, or to help you interpret the evidence, but you don't ever prove something to be objectively real by applying subjective reason to subjective experience. We're too cognitively impaired and too prone to bias to ever reach the truth using that method exclusively.

The only things that are perfect are God, and his followers' ability to correctly identify and interpret meaning in every single piece of imagery that appears in their heads. Through what can only be divine providence, these always have meanings which coincide perfectly with their preconceived notions and indoctrinated beliefs.

[Rampant.A.I.]

The latter is the subtext though, as the logical reasons they state ultimately fail, and yet are never retracted. As I've said many times, you can't logic something into existence, and if your whole position attempts to do an end run around demonstrability by just arguing why it's impossible for something to not exist, well then you're probably hiding a more personal reason for why you think this thing should exist.

Well you've shown that Chad is right in that you're applying a psychological evaluation to all believers, and unjustifiably so, I think. And I think it's hyperbole to say no believer has ever retracted theit claim that God is a necessary being.

Maybe =/= Necessity.

A lot of people historically believed Thor was a logical necessity due to the existence of lightening and thunder, but were mistaken.

The necessity involved in discussions of the supposed necessarity of God's existence are nothing like that. They involve things like saying God, by virtue of his nature, must exist in all possible worlds. And to exist in all possible worlds means that one's existence is necessary, because there is no state of affairs in which that being's existence does not obtain.

The above is nothing like your Thor comparison. At best people thought Thor existed because lightning or whatever provided otherwise inexplicable evidence for Thor.

Yes it is. It simply uses more floral descriptors, but relies on the same appeal to ignorance.

It is no more logical to confabulate an entity, then state that entity must necessarily exist by virtue of the properties of the description, than it is to confabulate an entity around some natural process, then insist that entity must exist because it explains a natural process you've included in the entity's description.

For example. Plate tectonics is true. It is necesssarily true in both the sense that there is no other competitve alternatives to explaining the evidence from geology, fauna, and flora on earth, and in that plate tectonics is necessary for earth to remain habitable to higher animal life such as yourself. Yet I bet most people don't perceive a need for it.

Plate tectonics isn't true by necessity, plate tectonics just happens to be (most likely) true, or contingently true, in other words.

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So Chad, which of these definitions do you mean when you say "necessary"?


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysical_necessity

That Wikipedia article is actually wrong here. Platinga's modal version of the ontological argument states that God must exist in all possible worlds, so Plantinga does believe God is a logically necessary being: that's the whole point of his argument. :p

That's really great; Plantinga is profoundly intellectually dishonest, especially considering his field, and his modal argument is presumptive and circular, just like the KCA.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-ne...y-being/#1

[MindForgedManacle]

Yes it is. It simply uses more floral descriptors, but relies on the same appeal to ignorance.

You really don't know what you're talking about here. They're no "floral descriptors", just an attempt at a deductive argument.

It is no more logical to confabulate an entity, then state that entity must necessarily exist by virtue of the properties of the description, than it is to confabulate an entity around some natural process, then insist that entity must exist because it explains a natural process you've included in the entity's description.

That really just depends on one's metaphysical views, and their are coherent metaphysical positions - such as modal realism - that allow for that.

That's really great; Plantinga is profoundly intellectually dishonest, especially considering his field, and his modal argument is presumptive and circular, just like the KCA.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-ne...y-being/#1

Plantinga's ontological argument is not circular unless you consider ALL deductive arguments to be circular. And I very much doubt you want to get into a debate regarding the nature of argumentation.

[Rampant.A.I.]

Yes it is. It simply uses more floral descriptors, but relies on the same appeal to ignorance.

You really don't know what you're talking about here. They're no "floral descriptors", just an attempt at a deductive argument.

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It is no more logical to confabulate an entity, then state that entity must necessarily exist by virtue of the properties of the description, than it is to confabulate an entity around some natural process, then insist that entity must exist because it explains a natural process you've included in the entity's description.

That really just depends on one's metaphysical views, and their are coherent metaphysical positions - such as modal realism - that allow for that.

That's really great; Plantinga is profoundly intellectually dishonest, especially considering his field, and his modal argument is presumptive and circular, just like the KCA.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-ne...y-being/#1

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Plantinga's ontological argument is not circular unless you consider ALL deductive arguments to be circular. And I very much doubt you want to get into a debate regarding the nature of argumentation.

I'm not sure why you've resorted to idle threats, but since you fancy yourself an expert yet still fail to understand the objection:

Although presented as a deductive argument, Plantinga's modal argument presupposes <God exists> and relies on that presupposition to "deduct" the conclusion.

One general criticism of ontological arguments which have appeared hitherto is this: none of them is persuasive, i.e., none of them provides those who do not already accept the conclusion that God exists

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—and who are reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc.—with either a pro tanto reason or an all-things-considered reason to accept that conclusion. Any reading of any ontological argument which has been produced so far which is sufficiently clearly stated to admit of evaluation yields a result which is invalid, or possesses a set of premises which it is clear in advance that no reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc. non-theists will accept, or has a benign conclusion which has

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no religious significance, or else falls prey to more than one of the above failings.

I can only assume, as an expert, you're already aware of these failings; so it seems you're attempting to force acceptance of the premises and conclusion, when I've already stated the premises require the presupposition of to lead to the related conclusion, and as such do not reasonably follow.

Plainly enough, non-theists and necessitarian theists disagree about the layout of logical space, i.e., the space of possible worlds. The sample argument consists, in effect, of two premises: one which says that God exists in at least one possible world; and one which says that God exists in all possible worlds if God exists in any. It is perfectly obvious that no non-theist can accept this pair of premises. Of course, a non-theist can allow—if they wish—that there are possible worlds in which there are contingent Gods. However, it is quite clear that no rational, reflective, etc. non-theist will accept the pair of premises in the sample argument.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontolo...arguments/

This modal argument begins with several presupposed premises: other deductive arguments that do not begin with presupposed premises. Which is the objection I initially raised.

Plantinga himself states:

“Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm's argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion” (Plantinga 1974, 221).

That's his opinion. The only thing holding up Plantinga's modal ontological argument is an agreement that the central premise is rational, I.e. by extension the argument is in effect:
Presupposing: <it is possible God Exists>
To conclude: Therefore <God Exists>
By Plantinga's own admission.

Or, more directly stated: If we presuppose: <God Exists>
We can reasonably conclude: <God Exists>

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontolo...#PlaOntArg

[Chas]

Maybe =/= Necessity.

A lot of people historically believed Thor was a logical necessity due to the existence of lightening and thunder, but were mistaken.

That' not even in the same ballpark. You clearly do not know what you are talking about.

It is in precisely the same ballpark. It just doesn't agree with your prejudices and preconceptions.

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The latter is the subtext though, as the logical reasons they state ultimately fail, and yet are never retracted. As I've said many times, you can't logic something into existence, and if your whole position attempts to do an end run around demonstrability by just arguing why it's impossible for something to not exist, well then you're probably hiding a more personal reason for why you think this thing should exist.

But you can prove something true about existence by applying reason to experience independent of what one hopes to find.

Not without evidence.

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Yes it is. It simply uses more floral descriptors, but relies on the same appeal to ignorance.

You really don't know what you're talking about here. They're no "floral descriptors", just an attempt at a deductive argument.

It is no more logical to confabulate an entity, then state that entity must necessarily exist by virtue of the properties of the description, than it is to confabulate an entity around some natural process, then insist that entity must exist because it explains a natural process you've included in the entity's description.

That really just depends on one's metaphysical views, and their are coherent metaphysical positions - such as modal realism - that allow for that.

That's really great; Plantinga is profoundly intellectually dishonest, especially considering his field, and his modal argument is presumptive and circular, just like the KCA.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-ne...y-being/#1

Plantinga's ontological argument is not circular unless you consider ALL deductive arguments to be circular. And I very much doubt you want to get into a debate regarding the nature of argumentation.

The ontological argument is illogical, it is mere wordplay on completely baseless assumptions.

[MindForgedManacle]

Although presented as a deductive argument, Plantinga's modal argument presupposes <God exists> and relies on that presupposition to "deduct" the conclusion.

I certainly don't fancy myself an expert, nor was I making a threat. Rather, I was making the point that in making the claim that Plantinga's argument is circular, you're actually implying all deductive arguments are circular, because Plantinga's argument is no more circular than they.

One general criticism of ontological arguments which have appeared hitherto is this: none of them is persuasive, i.e., none of them provides those who do not already accept the conclusion that God exists

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—and who are reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc.—with either a pro tanto reason or an all-things-considered reason to accept that conclusion. Any reading of any ontological argument which has been produced so far which is sufficiently clearly stated to admit of evaluation yields a result which is invalid, or possesses a set of premises which it is clear in advance that no reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc. non-theists will accept, or has a benign conclusion which has

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no religious significance, or else falls prey to more than one of the above failings.

I can only assume, as an expert, you're already aware of these failings; so it seems you're attempting to force acceptance of the premises and conclusion, when I've already stated the premises require the presupposition of to lead to the related conclusion, and as such do not reasonably follow.

All that Plantinga's argument presupposes is that a) modal realism is true and b) God's existence is not metaphysically impossible, and builds an argument from that. And given it's deductively valid, it does logically follow. But I agree it's certainly not persuasive; you do realize I'm an atheist, right?

Plainly enough, non-theists and necessitarian theists disagree about the layout of logical space, i.e., the space of possible worlds. The sample argument consists, in effect, of two premises: one which says that God exists in at least one possible world; and one which says that God exists in all possible worlds if God exists in any. It is perfectly obvious that no non-theist can accept this pair of premises. Of course, a non-theist can allow—if they wish—that there are possible worlds in which there are contingent Gods. However, it is quite clear that no rational, reflective, etc. non-theist will accept the pair of premises in the sample argument.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontolo...arguments/

Okay? I agree with that, nor does it contradict anything I've said on this matter. Given our "actual world" is but one of an infinite amount of possible worlds, it's clearly obvious atheists cannot accept that God exists in all possible worlds and still be rational.

This modal argument begins with several presupposed premises: other deductive arguments that do not begin with presupposed premises. Which is the objection I initially raised.

What? All arguments presuppose certain premises or positions. Plantinga's argument presupposes modal realism and that's just about it. The rest follows deductively if you accept modal realism and the definition of God as a Maximally Great Being.

And no, your original objection was "Maybe =/= Necessary". However, as I said, that's just misunderstanding Plantinga's argument. Under axiom S5 of modal logic, saying (as Plantinga's arg. does) something's "possibly necessary" is equivalent to saying "necessary".

Plantinga himself states:
[Plantinga Quote]

That's his opinion. The only thing holding up Plantinga's modal ontological argument is an agreement that the central premise is rational, I.e. by extension the argument is in effect:
Presupposing: <it is possible God Exists>
To conclude: Therefore <God Exists>
By Plantinga's own admission.

Or, more directly stated: If we presuppose: <God Exists>
We can reasonably conclude: <God Exists>

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontolo...#PlaOntArg

Hah, no. Part of the reason Plantinga says the central premise (God's existence is possible, i.e he exists in at least one possible world) is because of supporting arguments such as Robert Maydoyle's Modal Perfection Argument, which is also a logically valid argument. What Plantinga's argument does, to use your format, is as follows:

<Modal Realism is true>
<God's existence is not impossible, which entails that he exists in some possible world under Modal realism>
<He's a Maximally Great Being, which - drawing from Maydoyle's MPA - includes necessary existence>
<Necessary existence is synonymous with existing in all possible worlds>
<Therefore God exists>

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The ontological argument is illogical, it is mere wordplay on completely baseless assumptions.

They're not illogical (some are logically valid), but as I'm an atheist, I certainly don't accept them. :p

[Chas]

The ontological argument is illogical, it is mere wordplay on completely baseless assumptions.

They're not illogical (some are logically valid), but as I'm an atheist, I certainly don't accept them. :p

What part of "He's a Maximally Great Being, which includes necessary existence" is not illogical word play?

No, that argument is stupid in the extreme.

[Deepthought]

The latter is the subtext though, as the logical reasons they state ultimately fail, and yet are never retracted. As I've said many times, you can't logic something into existence, and if your whole position attempts to do an end run around demonstrability by just arguing why it's impossible for something to not exist, well then you're probably hiding a more personal reason for why you think this thing should exist.

But you can prove something true about existence by applying reason to experience independent of what one hopes to find.

Your psychological speculations about believers do not apply to all. I was an atheist but reluctantly accepted the reality of God when confronted with specific philosophical problems. Just because someone reaches a different conclusion than you does not always mean they must be delutional, weak, or stupid. Maybe they're merely wrong. And just maybe you are wrong.

What philosophical problems? Postulating a God causes more problems than it solves. Where did God come from? Is there more than one? What's the purpose of God? And even if there is a God, who created the universe, what makes you think God wants or need a relationship with you? What makes you think such a God gives a damn about your existence or pays any attention to what you think or do?

By the way reality is reality - so what's with the 'reluctantly' accepting the reality of God? Philosophical musings/problems do not generate a reality! I can think and imagine many things, but they do not become a reality because I think of them.

[MindForgedManacle]

They're not illogical (some are logically valid), but as I'm an atheist, I certainly don't accept them. :p

What part of "He's a Maximally Great Being, which includes necessary existence" is not illogical word play?

No, that argument is stupid in the extreme.

The part where it just follows from Robert Maydoyle'd Modal Perfection Argument that necessary existence is a great-making property. And since Maydoyle's argument - which is generally used to supplement the 1st premise of Plantinga's ontological argument - is logically valid, it's definitely not illogical.

[Chas]

What part of "He's a Maximally Great Being, which includes necessary existence" is not illogical word play?

No, that argument is stupid in the extreme.

The part where it just follows from Robert Maydoyle'd Modal Perfection Argument that necessary existence is a great-making property. And since Maydoyle's argument - which is generally used to supplement the 1st premise of Plantinga's ontological argument - is logically valid, it's definitely not illogical.

Except that it is not valid.

"Premise 3: If the MGB exists in some possible world, then the MGB exists in all possible worlds"

This is an invalid flip from 'there exists' to 'for all'. Logic fail.