3 Questions For Believers (A work in progress.)

[GrandizerII]

I observe that Rampant.A.I. is an individual who posts and makes responses to others in this forum. Every other individual I observe here (including you) confirms this observation by treating him as if he is an individual in his own right posting in this forum.

Ok, disregarding the extra questions that come with the online nature of the Internet (such as whether or not some poster here or there is actually a bot), I argue that the observation above is empirical evidence. And as such evidence has yet to be falsified, then I have established empirically that Rampant.A.I. is an individual in his own right and not a figment of your imagination.

How does that distinguish him from a sophisticated automaton that emulates consciousness, but does not possess it. See http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

Before you argue that such things do not exist, how would you determine this empirically?

Maybe you're looking at "empirically" differently.

Do you agree that determining anything empirically is a matter of observing with our senses in addition to confirming the observation repeatedly and in various ways? And making the proper inferences as a result of what has been continually observed?

Based on what I mean by "empirical", I can determine human beings experience pain when they tell me that they experience certain feelings that make them feel some suffering as a result of being struck hard by something or whatever. As it can be (and has been) observed that human beings experience these feelings, then that's the empirical evidence right there.

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Here's your problem, Rampant, and the point you are missing. You say, rightfully so, that you have no empirical evidence to suggest condition X. I don't disagree with that. What I do disagree with is the notion that you can then conclude not-X, not without justifying that empiricism is sufficient to observe all of reality. It's an assumption (and one that I operate under the assumption of), but that assertion is not in itself provable empirically - it's an *assumption of empiricism*.

Empiricism is restricted to what we can detect, directly or indirectly, with our senses. How can you possibly know that (using only empirical processes) without asserting some unprovable axiom?

Empiricism is an assumption itself, yes. I assume empiricism and go by it as a result. Why do I assume it? Because it's the only way that I find reasonable enough to gain new semantic knowledge.

[Jackalope]

How does that distinguish him from a sophisticated automaton that emulates consciousness, but does not possess it. See http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

Before you argue that such things do not exist, how would you determine this empirically?

Maybe you're looking at "empirically" differently.

Do you agree that determining anything empirically is a matter of observing with our senses in addition to confirming the observation repeatedly and in various ways? And making the proper inferences as a result of what has been continually observed?

Based on what I mean by "empirical", I can determine human beings experience pain when they tell me that they experience certain feelings that make them feel some suffering as a result of being struck hard by something or whatever. As it can be (and has been) observed that human beings experience these feelings, then that's the empirical evidence right there.

No, we are on the same page as to what empiricism is.

Regarding your example - you can determine that other people react to stimuli externally similarly to how you do. Can you do so for the underlying qualia, the subjective experience of stimuli?

I happen to agree that it's useful to assume that we do, but not that what we detect with our senses necessarily represents *all there is in reality*. I ask again, if it wasn't, if there were some phenomena not detectible by human senses, how could we possibly know, *using our senses*.

[Jackalope]

Empiricism is an assumption itself, yes. I assume empiricism and go by it as a result. Why do I assume it? Because it's the only way that I find reasonable enough to gain new semantic knowledge.

That's kind of my point.

Regarding why you find the assumption reasonable (I happen to agree), the fact that it *is* an assumption is precisely why I cannot agree with the second point of the OP. It seems likely, perhaps, but that it rests upon an assumption means that I cannot conclude reasonably that it is true. It is *useful*.

[GrandizerII]

Regarding your example - you can determine that other people react to stimuli externally similarly to how you do. Can you do so for the underlying qualia, the subjective experience of stimuli?

Yes, I can do so by analysing and comparing their subjective feelings and making some inferences based on them.

You are correct, however, in that we can't know with absolute certainty, but it's the only reasonable approach to take regarding gaining this kind of knowledge. So even if we all are just figments of your imagination or someone else's, our observations continually demonstrate otherwise.

That said, if the premise had been stated instead as follows:

2. Do you believe that our understanding of truth can only reasonably be determined by evidence and observation of facts, and not through any other means?

Would that be more reasonable to you?

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I should say "question" instead of "premise".

[Jackalope]

Regarding your example - you can determine that other people react to stimuli externally similarly to how you do. Can you do so for the underlying qualia, the subjective experience of stimuli?

Yes, I can do so by analysing and comparing their subjective feelings and making some inferences based on them.

How are you planning on examining their subjective qualia? Hint: what is it about them that makes them subjective?

You are correct, however, in that we can't know with absolute certainty, but it's the only reasonable approach to take regarding gaining this kind of knowledge. So even if we all are just figments of your imagination or someone else's, our observations continually demonstrate otherwise.

That said, if the premise had been stated instead as follows:

2. Do you believe that our understanding of truth can only reasonably be determined by evidence and observation of facts, and not through any other means?

Would that be more reasonable to you?

Only a materialist monist would be likely agree with that statement. A monist idealist or duaist would not. That's part of the problem with the question, it's written from a materialist's point of view - and no theist is a material monist. They aren't going to agree, pretty much ever.

[GrandizerII]

Yes, I can do so by analysing and comparing their subjective feelings and making some inferences based on them.

How are you planning on examining their subjective qualia?

Go by what they describe orally or in writing. And if a select few of them can't speak and can't write, make inferences about them based on other human beings similar to them in many characteristics.

There's also fMRI scans to make use of as well.

Only a materialist monist would be likely agree with that statement. A monist idealist or duaist would not. That's part of the problem with the question, it's written from a materialist's point of view - and no theist is a material monist. They aren't going to agree, pretty much ever.

Of course they won't just simply agree, but isn't the point of the OP to get them to reconsider their position?

[Jackalope]

How are you planning on examining their subjective qualia?

Go by what they describe orally or in writing. And if a select few of them can't speak and can't write, make inferences about them based on other human beings similar to them in many characteristics.

There's also fMRI scans to make use of as well.

That's not exactly what I would call examining qualia using your senses, and as far as I'm aware fMRI isn't useful at examining qualia. I'd certainly grant that you can infer something about someone's subjective state, but experience the qualia that they experience?

Only a materialist monist would be likely agree with that statement. A monist idealist or duaist would not. That's part of the problem with the question, it's written from a materialist's point of view - and no theist is a material monist. They aren't going to agree, pretty much ever.

Of course they won't just simply agree, but isn't the point of the OP to get them to reconsider their position?

The savvy ones are going to make the same observation that I'm making: that our preference for relying only on empiricism is precisely that, a preference, and *is not itself demonstrable empirically* - and they're correct on that point: you cannot assert that empiricism is the only method for ascertaining truth when the truth if that claim is not demonstrable empirically.

I may be an empiricist (but not exclusively so), but I understand empiricism is not the only game in town. You're going to have to engage them on their own battlefield. Think about it - how successful is a monist idealist going to be convincing a materialist that materialism is false? The converse is the same.

[GrandizerII]

Go by what they describe orally or in writing. And if a select few of them can't speak and can't write, make inferences about them based on other human beings similar to them in many characteristics.

There's also fMRI scans to make use of as well.

That's not exactly what I would call examining qualia using your senses, and as far as I'm aware fMRI isn't useful at examining qualia. I'd certainly grant that you can infer something about someone's subjective state, but experience the qualia that they experience?

If, based on observations of what they tell me, I can infer that they have subjective experiences similar to my own, and other assessors continually agree upon observing themselves what they have to say, then that's an empirical approach to finding out if they are likely to have similar subjective experiences, or "qualia", to me. And especially in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.

Also, concerning brain scans, if the same brain regions light up as my own upon experiencing pain (for example), and we also compared the scans to those corresponding to individuals who report that they don't feel pain, we could come up with fairly decisive conclusion regarding this matter.

The savvy ones are going to make the same observation that I'm making: that our preference for relying only on empiricism is precisely that, a preference, and *is not itself demonstrable empirically* - and they're correct on that point: you cannot assert that empiricism is the only method for ascertaining truth when the truth if that claim is not demonstrable empirically.

And I would respond by saying that I do not assert empiricism to be true, but rather that it's the only reasonable way to gain new semantic knowledge, and then I would list examples to support my view and challenge these "savvy ones" to provide examples to back up their own view. If they can't, then how can their view be a reasonable view to make?

[Jackalope]

The savvy ones are going to make the same observation that I'm making: that our preference for relying only on empiricism is precisely that, a preference, and *is not itself demonstrable empirically* - and they're correct on that point: you cannot assert that empiricism is the only method for ascertaining truth when the truth if that claim is not demonstrable empirically.

And I would respond by saying that I do not assert empiricism to be true, but rather that it's the only reasonable way to gain new semantic knowledge, and then I would list examples to support my view and challenge these "savvy ones" to provide examples to back up their own view. If they can't, then how can their view be a reasonable view to make?
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Now you're on to a more productive approach.

[fr0d0]

There's nothing wrong with empiricism. The fault lies with thinking that it alone constitutes the only method of gaining knowledge. Empiricism breaks at that point , and becomes contradictory.

I, like anyone else, gain the majority of my knowledge from empiricism. Empiricism is our very basic interaction with our physical world, interpreted by our brains. It's the simplest thing to prove. It doesn't account for deduction, intuition and innate knowledge.

Empiricism is the opposite of rationalism.

By rationalism we know thorough knowledge. Through empiricism we know through experience.

A balanced and thorough view uses both.