On naturalism and consciousness

[bennyboy]

Qualia (the experience of what things are like to a subjective experiencer) are said by you to be physical.

Yeap, chemicals interacting in my brain.

I don't think you understand what "subjective" means.

You know whats the best part of my world view, I can make accurate, testable predictions.

Not about mind.

Anyway, what makes you think that all the things we know about mind are incompatible with idealism? I've already said that in an idealistic universe, the human mind is mediated by the brain-- and that the brain and everything else is reducible only to concepts.

[Mudhammam]

The difference is that in an idealistic universe, mind is omnipresent (or, more accurately, all is mind), and all "things" reduce down only to concepts

Could you elaborate on this benny? When you say "all 'things' reduce only to concepts," it sounds to me like you're putting the wagon before the horse, concepts before pure experience, and in my judgment concepts tend to reduce into disjointed fragments of reality; in other words, experience is continuous while concepts are often cut out and separated and defined by their independence from all other concepts... while pure experience oftentimes isn't quite so cleanly divided. Am I reading too much into your statement... or reading it wrong altogether?

[Surgenator]

Yeap, chemicals interacting in my brain.

I don't think you understand what "subjective" means.

I assure you I do. It doesn't change that it's still chemicals interacting in my brain.

Anyway, what makes you think that all the things we know about mind are incompatible with idealism? I've already said that in an idealistic universe, the human mind is mediated by the brain-- and that the brain and everything else is reducible only to concepts.

I'm not saying the mind is incompatible with idealism. I'm saying idealism isn't internally inconsistent. Hense, it's wrong.

Techniqually I'm saying other things as well, but lets stick with internally inconsistent for now.

[bennyboy]

The difference is that in an idealistic universe, mind is omnipresent (or, more accurately, all is mind), and all "things" reduce down only to concepts

Could you elaborate on this benny? When you say "all 'things' reduce only to concepts," it sounds to me like you're putting the wagon before the horse, concepts before pure experience, and in my judgment concepts tend to reduce into disjointed fragments of reality; in other words, experience is continuous while concepts are often cut out and separated and defined by their independence from all other concepts... while pure experience oftentimes isn't quite so cleanly divided. Am I reading too much into your statement... or reading it wrong altogether?

When I say things reduce to concepts, I don't mean the concepts of an observing individual's mind, but rather the fundamental building blocks of an idealistic model of the universe: mathematical relationships, etc.

Getting away from that model, and into a more personal level, I agree that experience necessarily precedes concepts: you experience, and then you categorize your experiences: internal vs. external, concrete vs. abstract, etc. In this context, the physical universe is very simply categorized as a class of experience: those experiences which are sharable with others, and about which immutable truths can be inferred. To me, this is the simplest approach: all of science still works, because it is used only in the context of that class of experience in which those physical truths are valid. You can talk meaningfully about evolution, because your experience of animals, and fossils, and lab work, etc. are coherent with those of other people. Then you go and have a spiritual experience, or one which is subtle and highly abstract, and you realize you're dealing with a different class of experience about which science has little useful to say and vice versa.

But what I've been talking about in my past couple of posts is a model of the universe, GIVEN that we accept that there's an objective framework of which each individual is a part. I think that if you're in the Matrix, and you are a good enough investigator, you'll eventually come to the conclusion that nothing exists but 1s and 0s. And I think that the physical sciences must inevitably discover that at the root of reality, time and space have no meaning, physical rules don't apply, and there's nothing there beyond the ideas we've inferred. QM squirreliness, to me, represents the first scratch in that deconstruction.

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I'm not saying the mind is incompatible with idealism. I'm saying idealism isn't internally inconsistent. Hense, it's wrong.

I sense that you believe that, but I haven't seen an argument that clearly demonstrates it.

At the simplest level, we have experiences, some of which are coherent in relation to each other, and some which are not. Physics, for example, represents a complex of experiences which are coherent in relation to each other: things always fall when we drop them, objects of different masses striking each other always behave consistently, etc. But when you say physical monism is "internally consistent," what you are really saying is "ideas about a certain class of experience are consistent with each other." You build your bridges, and fire your rockets, and the results which you experience confirm your belief in that coherence.

This coherence of ideas is perfectly compatible with an idealistic view of reality. As an added bonus, SO ARE coherent moral ideas, experiences about beauty in art, spiritual experiences, etc. Physical monism fails to be useful as soon as you leave that class of experiences from which it arose and for which it is designed.

[Neo-Scholastic]

The difference is that in an idealistic universe, mind is omnipresent (or, more accurately, all is mind), and all "things" reduce down only to concepts

Could you elaborate on this benny? When you say "all 'things' reduce only to concepts," it sounds to me like you're putting the wagon before the horse, concepts before pure experience, and in my judgment concepts tend to reduce into disjointed fragments of reality; in other words, experience is continuous while concepts are often cut out and separated and defined by their independence from all other concepts... while pure experience oftentimes isn't quite so cleanly divided. Am I reading too much into your statement... or reading it wrong altogether?

Funny, because assuming, you are both monists, my dualist position sits halfway between you both. Pick-up your critique of idealism is valid and also opens up an objection to physical monisim. Indeed, everything starts with experiece, yet what principle allows the physical monist to parcel up reality without invoking transcendent forms or categories that the intellect uses as the basis for recognizing units of being (the problem of universals), and grouping units into sets according to similarities to the forms and/or a priori relational categories?

[Surgenator]

But what I've been talking about in my past couple of posts is a model of the universe, GIVEN that we accept that there's an objective framework of which each individual is a part. I think that if you're in the Matrix, and you are a good enough investigator, you'll eventually come to the conclusion that nothing exists but 1s and 0s. And I think that the physical sciences must inevitably discover that at the root of reality, time and space have no meaning, physical rules don't apply, and there's nothing there beyond the ideas we've inferred. QM squirreliness, to me, represents the first scratch in that deconstruction.

And you still haven't shown how concepts can give a physical universe. The Matrix example that you quote doesn't work because the Matrix is still in a physical reality.

Your stating that concepts + their interactions = photon.
I'm stating that concepts + their interactions = illusion. How do I know it creates an illusion? Because I can combine contradictory concepts together without any effect to the observed reality. The contradictory example I provided is the existance and non-existance of God.

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I'm not saying the mind is incompatible with idealism. I'm saying idealism isn't internally inconsistent. Hense, it's wrong.

First off, I meant to say "I'm saying idealism is internally inconsistent." Wrote it too quickly and didn't double check it.

I sense that you believe that, but I haven't seen an argument that clearly demonstrates it.

Contradictions in your world view. The God existing and not existing.

But when you say physical monism is "internally consistent," what you are really saying is "ideas about a certain class of experience are consistent with each other."

Yes, a model has to be internal consistent to be even considered as a possible reflection of reality.

This coherence of ideas is perfectly compatible with an idealistic view of reality.

Please show it.

As an added bonus, SO ARE coherent moral ideas, experiences about beauty in art, spiritual experiences, etc. Physical monism fails to be useful as soon as you leave that class of experiences from which it arose and for which it is designed.

In physical monism, your base is physical particles and their interactions. Then you have complex interactions. After that, you can build a consciousness. Then, consciousness creates concepts. Then, we get principles. Finally, we get morals.

So what different classes are you talking about. There are different levels of complexity, but that doesn't mean their different from each other.

Also, "fails to be useful" in one area doesn't mean it's wrong. Example, math fails to be useful on an english exam.

[bennyboy]

And you still haven't shown how concepts can give a physical universe. The Matrix example that you quote doesn't work because the Matrix is still in a physical reality.

The physical universe AS WE EXPERIENCE IT is already purely conceptual. Do you really think that the desk you see is the same as what is really there?

The question is whether, if you dig really deep, anything is really there at all beyond the idea of relationships. Seen a QM particle lately? Seen a photon flipping ambiguously between particle and wave forms lately? No? Seen a wave function floating around in space anywhere? No? Seen any of the four fundamental forces in the universe? No? That's because these are ideas, with no observable boundaries in space and time. They do not exist except as ideas, at least insofar as we are capable of directly observing.

Contradictions in your world view. The God existing and not existing.

You point to problems with idealism that are direct parallels to physical monism. In physicalism God also exists-- as an idea, by which you mean a physical/chemical encoding in the brain. In idealism, God exists as an idea, but maybe not as part of that class of experience which is sharable-- i.e. the class of experience that involves observing things with the eyes, the hands, etc.

But don't let's worry about God. Let's think about a family member, say your mother (apologies in advance if she's not currently living). The mother that actually exists in spacetime is a complex ocean of QM particles vibrating in space. But this is not what you experience-- you experience shape, form, smell, and complex abstract qualities: virtue, self-sacrifice, comfort. These are idealistic representations of what your mother actually is.

The only question is whether there is anything real there at all beyond these ideas. And, maybe just as importantly, how would you know, or does it matter?

I'm saying since human reality is already purely experiential, and since the reality of an objective physical universe cannot be proven via experience, Occam's Razor dictates that the universe is more likely idealistic than physical monist.

In physical monism, your base is physical particles and their interactions. Then you have complex interactions. After that, you can build a consciousness. Then, consciousness creates concepts. Then, we get principles. Finally, we get morals.

The problem is that you have no workable model for HOW the complex physical interactions build a subjectively experiencing concsciousness. You don't get to just skip that step, because that's what religious folk do: "See son, God made the universe, created man from the dust of the earth, and breathed life to it. And finally, we get morals." You wouldn't accept the result as proof of your assertions about process, and you shouldn't ask anyone else to accept your narrative without actually demonstrating it to be true. Waving at the brain is not sufficient to show exactly what it is about some systems which causes consciousness to exist rather than not to.

So what different classes are you talking about. There are different levels of complexity, but that doesn't mean their different from each other.

Sure they're different. Some of my experiences involve Angelina Jolie on a magic unicorn dressed in Tomb Raider garb, riding in and out of long tunnels. You have presumably never had that exact experience, and even if you did, the experience of it would probably be substantively different than mine.

Some experiences involve holding weights, feathers and other objects at the top of the school gym roof, dropping them, and seeing what happens. The experience of dropping things and seeing what happens is sharable.

[Surgenator]

And you still haven't shown how concepts can give a physical universe. The Matrix example that you quote doesn't work because the Matrix is still in a physical reality.

The physical universe AS WE EXPERIENCE IT is already purely conceptual. Do you really think that the desk you see is the same as what is really there?

Yes the desk I see is really there, because I can test it with my other sences that are independent of each other.

You are stuck in this idea that "I can only have experience, then all is experience." That is a non sequitur. Lets say there is an unfortunate man out there that can only smell. Is he suppose to think the universe is nothing but smells. No, that would be ridiculous. Just because we're limitied to our experiences doesn't mean there isn't a grander universe out there. That grander universe can be infered from our experiences from observation and testing.

The question is whether, if you dig really deep, anything is really there at all beyond the idea of relationships. Seen a QM particle lately? Seen a photon flipping ambiguously between particle and wave forms lately? No? Seen a wave function floating around in space anywhere? No? Seen any of the four fundamental forces in the universe? No? That's because these are ideas, with no observable boundaries in space and time. They do not exist except as ideas, at least insofar as we are capable of directly observing.

You're talking about things that we infered through observations and testing about a physical reality, and then say "have you seen it." That is a straw man. I haven't seen Antartica, but I can still infer that it exist.

You are correct that ideas exist in a mind. The mind is a set of processes in our brains. A process is a set of interactions between neurons. So whats the problem?

You point to problems with idealism that are direct parallels to physical monism. In physicalism God also exists-- as an idea, by which you mean a physical/chemical encoding in the brain.

Yes, concept of God is nothing but a set of processes in the brain. And concepts have no power over physical reality in physicalism. Hence, I can hold as many contradictory concepts in my brain as I want, it won't effect physical reality.

In idealism, God exists as an idea, but maybe not as part of that class of experience which is sharable-- i.e. the class of experience that involves observing things with the eyes, the hands, etc.

But I can think of a God concept that is sharable, just ask a Christian.

But don't let's worry about God. Let's think about a family member, say your mother.

No, we are not bringing in family members. That could too easily lead to personal attacks and away from the discussion. Come up with another example.

I'm saying since human reality is already purely experiential, and since the reality of an objective physical universe cannot be proven via experience, Occam's Razor dictates that the universe is more likely idealistic than physical monist.

Sorry, but you first have to show that idealist monism is a good model before inserting it. You have not.

The problem is that you have no workable model for HOW the complex physical interactions build a subjectively experiencing concsciousness.

Being through this, ANN is a workable model. The details are still being actively researched by people way more qualified than me.

You don't get to just skip that step, because that's what religious folk do: "See son, God made the universe, created man from the dust of the earth, and breathed life to it. And finally, we get morals." You wouldn't accept the result as proof of your assertions about process, and you shouldn't ask anyone else to accept your narrative without actually demonstrating it to be true. Waving at the brain is not sufficient to show exactly what it is about some systems which causes consciousness to exist rather than not to.

Your conflating "me not knowing" with "we can never know." And you don't get to insert your ideas because I don't have all the answers.

[bennyboy]

Yes the desk I see is really there, because I can test it with my other sences that are independent of each other.

You are stuck in this idea that "I can only have experience, then all is experience."

No I'm not. I'm stuck on the idea that everything I can know as a human being is based on experience, and that the source of those experiences cannot be determined.

You are correct that ideas exist in a mind. The mind is a set of processes in our brains. A process is a set of interactions between neurons. So whats the problem?

The problem is that you are asserting as reality a model which cannot explain the mind, cannot identify what physical systems do/do not have a mind, and does not include mind in any part of its calculus of mechanical interactions. The problem is you keep saying, "Mind is X," when you have no means of proving this to be the case.

No, we are not bringing in family members. That could too easily lead to personal attacks and away from the discussion. Come up with another example.

huh? I'm talking about the relationship between how you actually experience people you know well, and the physical "reality" of a human being that your model of choice actually supports. The physical model does a poor job of explaining your experience of humans and relationships between them. Pick another person you know very well, and the point still holds. So go ahead, pick a person, and describe the relationship between your experience of them and the physical description of what they "really" are.

Sorry, but you first have to show that idealist monism is a good model before inserting it. You have not.

I'm not inserting anything. The only fundamental truth is that experiences are experienced. The default position for a model of reality is that this capacity for experience is the only reality.

It is assertions about the underlying reality from which our experiences come that represent an insertion. But in the case of physical monism, too many of our experiences are disregarded and unexplained.

Being through this, ANN is a workable model. The details are still being actively researched by people way more qualified than me.

Nope. Redefining mind in physicalist terms is just begging the question. Nobody has shown that an ANN actually experiences qualia, or could. Saying "Data processing of style X, resulting in output Y, is qualia" fails to the fact that I actually experience qualia, and that word "qualia" is reserved for communicating this fact.

Your conflating "me not knowing" with "we can never know."

No I'm not. I'm conflating "We have no idea at all why or how mind would be created by matter" with "we shouldn't make positive assertions we can't prove and claim them to be proven facts."

[Surgenator]

Yes the desk I see is really there, because I can test it with my other sences that are independent of each other.

You are stuck in this idea that "I can only have experience, then all is experience."

No I'm not. I'm stuck on the idea that everything I can know as a human being is based on experience, and that the source of those experiences cannot be determined.

It can be infered! Do you not understand how you can reasons things out?

You are correct that ideas exist in a mind. The mind is a set of processes in our brains. A process is a set of interactions between neurons. So whats the problem?

The problem is that you are asserting as reality a model which cannot explain the mind, cannot identify what physical systems do/do not have a mind, and does not include mind in any part of its calculus of mechanical interactions. The problem is you keep saying, "Mind is X," when you have no means of proving this to be the case.

And I disagree. We might be using different definitions of mind. What definition are you using?

No, we are not bringing in family members. That could too easily lead to personal attacks and away from the discussion. Come up with another example.

huh? I'm talking about the relationship between how you actually experience people you know well, and the physical "reality" of a human being that your model of choice actually supports.

If you want to bring up human relationships, then just say a "human relationship like a mother and her son." I do not like using terms like "your mother" because it can lead to an emotion response rather than to a logical one.

The physical model does a poor job of explaining your experience of humans and relationships between them. Pick another person you know very well, and the point still holds. So go ahead, pick a person, and describe the relationship between your experience of them and the physical description of what they "really" are.

No, a physical model does a pretty damn good job of explaining human relationships.

The only fundamental truth is that experiences are experienced. The default position for a model of reality is that this capacity for experience is the only reality.

So solipsism is the default model of reality, right? Because you can't prove you're not hallucinating all of your experiences. How do you go from solipsism to idealist monism? Did you infer a third body from your experiences? Did you weigh the probability of a third person against the probability of a hallucination? What is stopping someone from infering the existence of an inanimated object (like a desk) from their experiences? I would really like to know.

Being through this, ANN is a workable model. The details are still being actively researched by people way more qualified than me.

Nope. Redefining mind in physicalist terms is just begging the question.

I'm not redifining the mind. I'm explaining how it can arise using physicalist terms.

Nobody has shown that an ANN actually experiences qualia,

Did you miss the part about people are working on it? Do not conflate "haven't shown" with "cannot show."

or could.

But it now seems that you're sure that it impossible to show. Please explain how this is so without a long winded tirade that boils down to: idealistic monism is true, so you are wrong. Because you haven't shown that idealistic monism is true yet.

On a seperate note, another requirement of a good model is that it has to be falsifiable. What test can be done where the results would be inconsistent with idealistic monism?