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October 30, 2014 at 2:32 am (This post was last modified: October 30, 2014 at 2:33 am by Alex K.)
JuliaL
I believe this medical statistic is extremely misleading. What was their criterion to decide that a patient died at the doctor's hands, or "from" medicine?
The fool hath said in his heart, There is a God. They are corrupt, they have done abominable works, there is none that doeth good.
October 30, 2014 at 2:39 am (This post was last modified: October 30, 2014 at 2:41 am by Mudhammam.)
(October 30, 2014 at 1:03 am)bennyboy Wrote: I'm getting a little suspicious that equivocations on the word "faith" are going to lead to some misunderstandings. It seems to me that Nietzsche's "faith" is equivalent to what we'd call pragmatic philosophical assumptions.
For example, you could argue that the believe in an obective world is "faith." You can't really know what's behind it, but you act as though you can. But you could also see this assumption as a definition of the human context: things are true which are true with our senses and way of thinking as human beings. It doesn't matter if we are in the Matrix or the Mind of God or whatever, because all the things that are true in this context still hold.
Those are fair points. I don't take Nietzsche's statements on "faith" so far as applicable to logical axioms and immediate perceptions per se, from which we can speak intelligibly about experience regardless if it's in the context of objectivity or not, though it may correctly extend that far in certain philosophical conversations, but I take him to be speaking on the underlying morality of science. Is there a moral assumption, even an implicit one--an ought, a should, an obligation--to behold science or reason as a sort of imperative; is anyone justified in the demands that they expect truth to satisfy, or is the criteria for truth simply defined by the goals and ultimately the will of each person?
He who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return - Baruch Spinoza
(October 29, 2014 at 11:31 pm)Pickup_shonuff Wrote:
(October 29, 2014 at 6:59 pm)Alex K Wrote: Interesting though, he does not seem to question the ability of science to pursue truth here but takes that - and what it means to pursue truth, as a given. His question of faith is situated at a deeper level, apparently - whether the pursuit of truth is useful and recommended in the first place. That is not what most people mean today when it is argued that science requires faith. Nietzsche doesn't seem to talk all that specifically about science, is my impressjon.
Kudos for the fact that you read German. There are so many classic works that I would love to be able to read in their original language.
To add to what you, benny, and Julia said, I take Nietzsche to be saying something to the effect that "Truth" is to science what the categorical imperatives are to religion; that is, a "thou shalt..." (fill-in-the-blank; example: "...pursue Truth by this means as opposed to that.") No matter to what extent a person would like to reject faith, especially as it relates to religious propositions, one must have faith... in something, whether it's one's own goals or a societal utopia or it's the utility of the scientific enterprise or again, fill in your own blank. To live completely without faith in anything or anyone is to be Nietzsche's "ubermensch," to be "beyond good and evil," to "live dangerously," as he liked to say. I think he's to some extent (er, to paraphrase what I believe he states elsewhere) correct that humanism is basically an adoption of the Christian ethic but without God or superstition. What I love about Nietzsche is that he's all about questioning everything, having an "intellectual conscience," and not taking yourself too seriously.
Another thing I wonder is if he's suggesting that all faiths are equally beneficial or dangerous depending on the individual. So, for example, say I don't care about whether or not science can describe the origins and demise of the Universe, or the cause for each and every human thought and behavior; say, the thing I care most about is being happy, feeling hopeful, that my life has purpose; these are natural needs and cravings that every person has, and it seems like the most rational thing I could care about. If the only thing that a person finds satisfaction in with regards to these ideals is a self-delusion, isn't it on some level perfectly reasonable to accept this delusion as my truth? Hasn't our species by and large survived on delusion anyway?
What if certain truths (or the "Truth") are dangerous in the end? Would it still be rational to pursue it, or to share it? Should some truths be ignored or suppressed? By the way, there's an excellent little philosophical narrative found in Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett's book The Mind's Eye called "The Riddle of the Universe and Its Solution" by Christopher Cherniak that deals with a similar theme. (You can read a brief synopsis of it here or the full story here).
It is a nice skill to have, but it is not worth such a big kudos if one, as in my case, is actually German
Anyways, could one not say that this primacy of truth is not only the categorical imperative for science, but, almost tautologically, for philosophy in general? Any statement denying it seems to render itself irrelevant. I wonder though how instincts and irrational desires fit into this picture. If humans have an inborn curiosity, as is hard to deny, one can ask - curiosity for what? Isn't curiosity the interest in what are the properties of the world around us, and isn't that the pursuit of truth? I can only speak for myself, but I desired to have knowledge about the world before I knew that I needed a justification for it, and I suspect it is part of the human condition.
The fool hath said in his heart, There is a God. They are corrupt, they have done abominable works, there is none that doeth good.
I believe this medical statistic is extremely misleading. What was their criterion to decide that a patient died at the doctor's hands, or "from" medicine?
Isn't "at the doctor's hands" a subset of "from medicine?" Or were you referring to drugs only and not the entire practice?
The original article is in Journal of the AMA.
JAMA, July 26,2000 Vol 284, No 4
I didn't find a full copy online with graphics and formatting. I did find an image of the first page of the JAMA article at: http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx...eid=192908
and an unformatted copy of the text of the article appears to be at: http://www.ecologos.org/ushealth.htm
From a quick scan, I didn't see how they discriminated between 'adverse reactions' which came about from erroneous drug administration and non-erroneous drug administration. The bibliography includes several references in which I think the data is hiding if you wish to probe further.
I was surprised that this article is nearly 15 years old. I remember it as being much more recent, but perhaps time is passing faster than it used to.
So how, exactly, does God know that She's NOT a brain in a vat?
(October 30, 2014 at 2:39 am)Pickup_shonuff Wrote: Is there a moral assumption, even an implicit one--an ought, a should, an obligation--to behold science or reason as a sort of imperative; is anyone justified in the demands that they expect truth to satisfy, or is the criteria for truth simply defined by the goals and ultimately the will of each person?
Anywhere the word "should" is used, outside the context defined by religious absolutism, we must always accept that there will be some arbitrary context defined-- some limits, boundaries or goals which will serve as the measuring stick for rightness or wrongness.
I agree with him. I'm reminded of a movie scene with a grandfather playing chess with his grandson. The grandfather remarks to his son that, unlike life, chess was easy. In chess you know the playing field and all the players.
