Neo-Epicurean Life Hacks

[Mudhammam]

He wrote "Beyond Good and Evil" in 1886. It was his second published work, and long before any symptoms of mental illness.

???

He had published many books before BG&E... a few that come to mind: "The Birth of Tragedy," "The Dawn," "Human, All-Too-Human," "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," "The Gay Science."

[Lao Shizi]

He wrote "Beyond Good and Evil" in 1886. It was his second published work, and long before any symptoms of mental illness.

???

He had published many books before BG&E... a few that come to mind: "The Birth of Tragedy," "The Dawn," "Human, All-Too-Human," "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," "The Gay Science."

I stand corrected. Had my titles muddled.

[Mequa]

Your definition sounds more like Jeremy Bentham than Epicurus. I guess that's where the "Neo" comes from. It was a pretty tongue in cheek article anyway.

Bentham's hedonism was more collectivist, leading to Utilitarian maxims to act to maximise the greatest happiness of the greatest number, including being impartial when looking at one's own happiness with respect to others. The approach I offered here is more akin to an enlightened form of egoistic hedonism. It's often compared to Rand (or even Anton LaVey) more than Bentham, although the former is definitely not my political cup of blood.

Your description of Epicurean hedonism causes me suffering. What should I do?

Good, according to Epicurean epistemology (kanonikon) the pleasure-pain mechanism is an integral part of cognition. Both pleasant and painful emotions provide valid data, when said data is interpreted correctly, including in the everyday decision-making process. Which brings you on to my next point:

-How does one determine what behavior, right now, is most likely to achieve a positive hedonic state in the future? By following animal desires? If not, then what?

With Epicurus this methodology was tied into an epistemology which constituted an early form of scientific empiricism. It incorporated evidence from sense experience (aesthesis), together with a naturalistic view of cognition (an early form of cognitive science?) which combined this sense experience with the formation of concepts (prolepseis) derived from past experience (and possibly also instinct, according to Norman DeWitt). This necessarily involves an active pleasure-pain mechanism (pathos).

In Epicurean epistemology these three natural faculties - aesthesis, pathos, and prolepseis - all provide valid data when this data is correctly interpreted, only misinterpretations can produce error.

So the suggestion for creating such a methodology is a largely informal form of empiricism (also connected with naturalism and materialism), which does not ignore the data provided by emotion and also incorporates intuition and "gut" feeling into the decision-making and planning process.

As for animal desires, Epicurus attempted to demarcate which desires correspond to human needs. Said desires operate using the pleasure/pain mechanism. It is the combination of the empirical evidence, with the observations of what provides pleasure and eases pain, together with the correct use of our cognitive faculties, which determines the extent to follow which kind of desire.

--What about the greater good? If I can spend my life building schools in Africa, doing fundraising work, and saving the lives of perhaps hundreds by distributing mosquito nets, but DO NOT GET PLEASURE from doing so, should I do it? Or should I say, "Fuck those little African kids. Starbucks is waiting for me."

In this framework, there is no "greater good" than the happiness (e.g., health, flourishing, inner peace, imperturbability) of the individual. You are welcome however to help the people of Africa if this leads to personal fulfilment which outweighs the sacrifices made towards this. Due to human nature as a social animal, if this is how you are constituted: the good of the welfare of these Africans, and the virtue of helping them, thus becomes an instrumental good and instrumental virtue towards your own individual happiness.

-What about morality? If I can maintain positive social relationships while secretly back-stabbing all those around me, why shouldn't I?

Confidence in never having the betrayal uncovered is not really rational in that case according to Epicurus. Thus such social relationships cannot really be considered positive. Openness and honesty are instrumental virtues due to their utility towards individual happiness in intimate social relationships, due to such relationships satisfying basic human needs provided by nature.

Beyond that, there isn't really an honest motivation to follow "morality". What moral discourse often amounts to is what Thomas Jefferson called "hypocrisy and grimace", where people rhetorically attempt to take the moral high ground as a means to one-up each other.

-Isn't the complete obliteration and subjugation of our animal desires the most sure way to eliminate suffering? Should I not therefore consider all the suffering required to achieve such a goal an investment in the only long-lasting secessation of suffering and subsequent positive hedonic state?

Some animal desires are still necessary to sustain life, health and well-being according to Epicurus (that would include breathing, eating, excreting, obtaining shelter, among others). Such necessarily produce pain when not satisfied and pleasure when satisfied. This is an instinctual process to maintain the health of the organism.

-What about drugs?

Drugs have many legitimate medical uses. I assume you are talking about recreational uses, however.

Addictive overconsumption would be something to avoid due to the greater pain over pleasure produced in the long run, together with the damage to both physical and mental health, and the impairment in self-control which is a cardinal (instrumental) virtue. Damaging one's health would also impair long-term pleasure and promote pain in the long run. I think Epicurus would have proscribed pleasure at the expense of health. His "hedonism" is more nuanced than most readings of it, I find.

-What if I'm a sociopath? Should I act in a way that will maximize my chances to rape, kill and mutilate young women?

If you lack a moral conscience you are going to lack the motivation to act consistently morally. It's really as simple as that. Kant's maxim "Ought implies can" applies here. You cannot expect a sociopath to be moral because they are not capable. They are like a lion, all bets are off.

Sociopaths can certainly benefit themselves by learning to behave more prudently and less impulsively. However they would likely remain a threat to everyone else, and from anyone else's perspective is best shunned (and forcibly detained if necessary) out of concern for your own well-being and that of friends and other non-sociopaths.

I have had first hand experience with sociopaths actually. All I can say is that lions in a zoo are behind bars for a good reason.

It seems to me you are going to have to make a lot of bald assertions about what is good, what constitutes pleasure, and about how these relate to change over time, in order to make any kind of a useful lifestyle out of this philosophy.

I do reject the dogmatic approach of Epicurus. I do not claim to promote a universalisable normative ethic. I restrict discussions of the good to "good for the individual" and "good to the individual", and consider discussions of "good in general" to be somewhat nonsense.

I venture though that to a free individual, that individual's own good is his or her highest good. Other forms of "higher" good are a way to subjugate the individual (a point covered by Max Stirner, who called them "spooks"). One could put this in memetic terms: They are like viruses which infect and disempower the individual. So-called "higher" values can be used for personal fulfilment (as instrumentally valued towards one's own good), however infection implies placing them beyond one's own life, health or happiness and choosing martyrdom, rooted in shame and guilt. Throwing off the shackles implies becoming an egoist or individualist.

Of course, such mental slavery is still hugely useful for society as it really exists. It may be collectively useful to reduce the worth of the individual to a utility towards the collective. However, this is still a form of slavery.

[bennyboy]

In Epicurean epistemology these three natural faculties - aesthesis, pathos, and prolepseis - all provide valid data when this data is correctly interpreted, only misinterpretations can produce error.

This statement borders on religious. If you can't cure your cancer, you weren't praying right. If you can't achieve happiness, you were "misinterpreting the data." Both ways leave intact the apparent integrity of the system of ideas, while completely disregarding the failure of the system to bring good to the person following it.

As for animal desires, Epicurus attempted to demarcate which desires correspond to human needs. Said desires operate using the pleasure/pain mechanism. It is the combination of the empirical evidence, with the observations of what provides pleasure and eases pain, together with the correct use of our cognitive faculties, which determines the extent to follow which kind of desire.

Except that we have an understanding of the goal of those desires, and we can clearly see that they may not result in long-term happiness. Reproduction, for example, is a hedonic risk: death or misfortune of the child is likely to destroy a person's attempts to seek a cessation of suffering, possibly for the rest of that person's lifetime. Not mating, and not having children, can also have a negative effect on one's psychology-- loneliness, regret, boredom, etc. So how is one to escape the suffering inevitably caused by participation in our role as continuers of genetic fitness? Clearly, it is the disengagement of the self from that hedonic feedback mechanism which is required-- not any particular action aimed at "pleasing" the pleasure centers of the brain, so to speak.

Clearly, we are emotionally rewarded by acts which serve genetic fitness. But it is not so clear that in serving the "needs" of genetic fitness, we are ensuring a future of peace and happiness. Epicurus, apparently, didn't understand the principles of evolution.

In this framework, there is no "greater good" than the happiness (e.g., health, flourishing, inner peace, imperturbability) of the individual. You are welcome however to help the people of Africa if this leads to personal fulfilment which outweighs the sacrifices made towards this. Due to human nature as a social animal, if this is how you are constituted: the good of the welfare of these Africans, and the virtue of helping them, thus becomes an instrumental good and instrumental virtue towards your own individual happiness.

What if your house is burning down? Would you be so forgiving if I decided that not running in to save your family would improve my chances of seeing my own again? Sure, sure, nobody gives a shit about little African kids-- they're hardly even people, right? But what if it's someone you think matters?

I do reject the dogmatic approach of Epicurus. I do not claim to promote a universalisable normative ethic. I restrict discussions of the good to "good for the individual" and "good to the individual", and consider discussions of "good in general" to be somewhat nonsense.

Okay, here's the central point, to me. I'm still waiting for a "life hack." So far as I can see, Epicureanism is just another word for normal behavior. We ALREADY seek to minimize pain and maximize happiness. We already observe through life the things that cause pain and the things that reduce it, and change our views as we age (i.e. after sufficient observation).

What I want is advice. How should I live according to the principles that you've described? How should an Epicurean philosophy inform my views, my decisions and my actions? In short-- what is it good for?

[Mequa]

In Epicurean epistemology these three natural faculties - aesthesis, pathos, and prolepseis - all provide valid data when this data is correctly interpreted, only misinterpretations can produce error.

This statement borders on religious. If you can't cure your cancer, you weren't praying right. If you can't achieve happiness, you were "misinterpreting the data." Both ways leave intact the apparent integrity of the system of ideas, while completely disregarding the failure of the system to bring good to the person following it.

That is not quite so, as Epicurus was clear that for "achieving happiness" the analysed life is a necessary but not a sufficient condition - hedonic happiness requires the satisfaction of other needs such as companionship and freedom, which may be constrained by misfortune.

This is where a (neo-)Stoic attitude of "indifference" to outcomes outside of your control can be a useful compliment to the (neo-)Epicurean target. You can only live as skilfully as you can in attempting to aim your personal arrow at the target, so it's the skillset involved which matters. Beyond that, detach from outcomes, including how much happiness you achieve in the end provided you are doing your best.

Failure to achieve happiness also does not imply you were misinterpretating the data. It could also be a case of insufficient data on the analytical/cognitive front, in addition to meeting other conditions for happiness. Belief in false systems of morality which lead to more misery than joy in the long run can be another factor, which often lingers to childhood indoctination by parents and others.

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As for animal desires, Epicurus attempted to demarcate which desires correspond to human needs. Said desires operate using the pleasure/pain mechanism. It is the combination of the empirical evidence, with the observations of what provides pleasure and eases pain, together with the correct use of our cognitive faculties, which determines the extent to follow which kind of desire.

Except that we have an understanding of the goal of those desires, and we can clearly see that they may not result in long-term happiness. Reproduction, for example, is a hedonic risk: death or misfortune of the child is likely to destroy a person's attempts to seek a cessation of suffering, possibly for the rest of that person's lifetime. Not mating, and not having children, can also have a negative effect on one's psychology-- loneliness, regret, boredom, etc. So how is one to escape the suffering inevitably caused by participation in our role as continuers of genetic fitness? Clearly, it is the disengagement of the self from that hedonic feedback mechanism which is required-- not any particular action aimed at "pleasing" the pleasure centers of the brain, so to speak.

Clearly, we are emotionally rewarded by acts which serve genetic fitness. But it is not so clear that in serving the "needs" of genetic fitness, we are ensuring a future of peace and happiness. Epicurus, apparently, didn't understand the principles of evolution.

The issue of love and sex was covered in depth by Lucretius, prefiguring the likes of Freud. It's clear that from an Epicurean standpoint that these desires are able to result in an excess of pain over pleasure when indulged without restraint. It is also clear that they are very difficult to remove. Epicurus himself was quite ascetic here and lived like a monk. Later Epicureans were much more indulgent.

Although Epicurus advised against rearing a family, he also supported in his will the family of some disciples, showing that not all Epicureans were against reproducing - that may have been more common on the more dedicated or monastic fringe.

There is hedonic risk either way whether a human decides either to reproduce or not to reproduce. Not following the biological imperative may lead to frustration and loss of life satisfaction as you mentioned, particularly given the difficulty in eradicating the associated desires. Satisfying the biological imperative on the other hand, particularly how this is done, may lead to an excess of misery over joy. What's the individual to do? Do his or her own hedonic calculus, way up the future gains and losses.

The relevant epistemological framework to do this has already been documented, which easily incorporates modern scientific empiricism. You can draw on personal life experience, scientific happiness research, sound argument, gut feeling and other factors when making the relevant decisions. What it ultimately comes down to though is the skilful use of your own natural faculties in the decision-making process.

"[D]isengagement of the self from that hedonic feedback mechanism" is actually what Epicurus taught through favouring "static" (katastematic) pleasures (such as meditative bliss) over "active" (kinetic) pleasures (such as steak and sex). The result is not far removed from Buddhism.

[bennyboy]

Okay, so given the OP "Life Hacks," which implies a method for improving some or all of my life: HOW SHOULD I LIVE?

[Mequa]

Okay, so given the OP "Life Hacks," which implies a method for improving some or all of my life: HOW SHOULD I LIVE?

If you decide to choose something like Epicurean hedonism to implement, you can start by identifying which skills would be most expedient towards your long-range happiness, following empirical research in this area, and practically implement those skills.

Epicurus suggested practising the four cardinal virtues of Prudence, Self-Control, Fortitude, and Justice, not for their praiseworthiness but for their utility towards individual well-being and happiness. Prudence here is the root from which other virtues emerge, like branches of a tree.

So, for example, if you've identified a necessary desire of having more quality friendship, you can practice the virtues of being a good friend so that you can more effectively meet your social needs, out of prudence towards your own long-term individual well-being and happiness. This kind of hedonistic virtue ethics has large application. It ultimately comes down to identifying relevant skills and strengths based on utility (including those conventional morality categorises as virtuous), taking into account your individual needs and disposition, before developing them.

Or you could create your own philosophy. I've made the argument before that the reliance of natural faculties in Epicurus' epistemology undermines the authority of Epicurus himself, and hence of Epicurean dogma. It's ultimately about following your own lights guided by both intellect (the use of wisdom gained from experience) and natural instinct (hence towards pleasure). I find this standard a useful antidote to nihilism.

It is interesting though that you seem to desire spoon-feeding ("HOW SHOULD I LIVE?") when this methodology, used correctly, implies a hefty amount of thinking for oneself.

Consider the utility of the right kind of wisdom towards long-term personal pleasure over pain. Consider what it would take to respect your own dignity enough to live as your own end, and make that goal your personal summum bonum.

[Lao Shizi]

I"ll bet you're just a barrel of laughs at parties.

[bennyboy]

It is interesting though that you seem to desire spoon-feeding ("HOW SHOULD I LIVE?") when this methodology, used correctly, implies a hefty amount of thinking for oneself.

Consider the utility of the right kind of wisdom towards long-term personal pleasure over pain. Consider what it would take to respect your own dignity enough to live as your own end, and make that goal your personal summum bonum.

That's pretty non-specific. Basically, you are saying something like "Right thinking and right action leads to happiness, which is a sensible goal for thoughts and actions." Adding that the capacity to think and do the right things is called "wisdom" doesn't help much.

Would you say that Machiavelli and LaVey are both Epicureans? How about Ayn Rand? How about Buddha?

[Mequa]

That's pretty non-specific. Basically, you are saying something like "Right thinking and right action leads to happiness, which is a sensible goal for thoughts and actions."

More precisely, I am not defining "right" in this context in terms of traditional morality, but more as expedience towards personal well-being and happiness (defined in a rather nuanced manner).

This is rather like the premise of modern Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) which has Epicurean [as well as Stoic] influences. Albert Ellis described himself as Epicurean. The underlying philosophy has ancient roots.

Would you say that Machiavelli and LaVey are both Epicureans? How about Ayn Rand? How about Buddha?

To ask whether Machiavelli was Epicurean, in this case the Machiavellian concept of "virtu" corresponds closely here to the definition of "right" I gave above. But Machiavelli was far more concerned with political power over others than Epicurus would consider healthy. To the Epicurean, this kind of power is only of value in terms of its utility towards personal security, it is not to be pursued for its own sake which is considered rather neurotic, and from an Epicurean perspective behaving too "Machiavellian" can lead to a lot of political power over others, but few friends and many enemies. Not the ideal in terms of personal happiness given the importance of friendship towards that end.

Anton LaVey was an egoistic hedonist (and quasi-occultist), he didn't really promote the kind of self-discipline Epicurus had in mind though, and LaVeyan philosophy is perhaps more crassly selfish as well as Machiavellian (see above) than an Epicurean would consider healthy.

Ayn Rand's ethics combined Epicurean with Aristotelian and Nietzschean influences in addition to classical liberalism. It differs in practice from Epicureanism, I'm not sure the life of a billionaire entrepreneur is what Epicurus would have had in mind. LaVey (above) was strongly influenced by Ayn Rand but also more Machiavellian (considerably less committed to the non-aggression principle in terms of both force and fraud).

Epicurus had some things in common with Buddha, including aiming for the cessation of (personal) suffering, cessation of desire (nirvana), achievement of peace of mind, mindfulness in the here and now, and so forth. In terms of Indian schools though Epicurus' materialism is closer to Carvaka.

I prefer "Neoepicurean" (or "Neo-Epicurean") over "Epicurean" myself to define my personal form of individualist hedonism and eudaimonism, given I have no kind of reverence for Epicurus as any kind of guru or master, nor do I assign any particular authority to his dogmas.

Following my Christian background I find this kind of concept quite an empowering counterweight to both the crushing burden of Christian morality, and the despair of existential and moral nihilism. Others might not need anything like it.