The Ethics of Belief

[Pyrrho]

+1 rep for best-defined OP ever.

Thank you.

It seems to me, however, that at least SOME beliefs will reliably support moral actions or at least cannot possibly be the root for immoral actions, despite having insufficient evidence.  Therefore, while they may be poorly founded, they are at least not immoral.

Let's say I hold the belief that whenever I see a brown dog, I have to act extra kindly toward people, or I will have bad luck.  The truth is that this belief is probably false, and could therefore never be corroborated with sufficient evidence.  But the anecdotal evidence stemming from my own random interactions with the world has led to a belief which will, at least sometimes, cause me to act more kindly than I would otherwise.  I do not see that this is an immoral belief.

I would say that superstitious beliefs, at least sometimes, are relatively moral-neutral.  For example, if I have a lucky tie that I like to wear on dates, it may cause me to act more confidently, as my belief in that tie's "powers" will cause me to feel more positive and confident.  I cannot see making an argument that causing myself to behave more postively and confidently would be immoral.

I answer that in part in my response to Dystopia; but I will repeat a bit here:

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Clifford addresses that concern:

       Nor is it that truly a belief at all which has not some influence upon the actions of him who holds it.  He who truly believes that which prompts him to an action has looked upon the action to lust after it, he has committed it already in his heart.  If a belief is not realized immediately in open deeds, it is stored up for the guidance of the future.  It goes to make a part of that aggregate of beliefs which is the link between sensation and action at every moment of all our lives, and which is so organized and compacted together that no part of it can be isolated from the rest, but every new addition modifies the structure of the whole.  No real belief, however trifling and fragmentary it may seem, is ever truly insignificant; it prepares us to receive more of its like, confirms those which resembled it before, and weakens others; and so gradually it lays a stealthy train in our inmost thoughts, which may some day explode into overt action, and leave its stamp upon our character for ever.

When one believes one thing, it affects the other beliefs one has.  Both in terms of what other things fit with it, and in terms of the way one acquires one's beliefs.  In your specific example of deism, it is likely to impact one's examination of the origins of the universe, as well as make one more receptive to other god related beliefs.  And those affected beliefs may affect other beliefs, rather like a pebble being tossed into a still pond, causing a ripple across the surface.

To put this another way, beliefs are not all held in isolation from each other.  So one belief will affect the aggregate of beliefs one has.  And, as already mentioned, if one is willing to accept one thing on insufficient evidence, one is more likely to accept another thing on insufficient evidence.  After all, if such 'reasoning' is okay in one case, why not another?  As Clifford puts it:

We all suffer severely enough from the maintenance and support of false beliefs and the fatally wrong actions which they lead to, and the evil born when one such belief is entertained is great and wide.  But a greater and wider evil arises when the credulous character is maintained and supported, when a habit of believing for unworthy reasons is fostered and made permanent.

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As for a particular instance working out well, Clifford addresses that with what immediately follows the last quote (in the hidden part above):

If I steal money from any person, there may be no harm done by the mere transfer of possession; he may not feel the loss, or it may prevent him from using the money badly.  But I cannot help doing this great wrong towards Man, that I make myself dishonest.  What hurts society is not that it should lose its property, but that it should become a den of thieves; for then it must cease to be society.

That a particular instance of something turns out well does not entail that the practice is a good one, as Clifford's example of theft illustrates.

It may be that a particular action is good that is caused by a belief lacking sufficient evidence.  But that does not justify the practice of believing things without sufficient evidence.  To give a wild example, but a possible one, if I fire a gun into a crowded room, and I happen to accidentally kill a murderer who was going to kill again, would that justify firing guns into crowded rooms?

Being reckless is dangerous, even if it does not involve anyone actually getting harmed.  If I drive home after drinking heavily at a party, and manage to make it home safely, that does not mean that it is okay for me to drive in such a state.  I have a duty to be careful, and that is not fulfilling that duty, even though in my hypothetical example no one got hurt.

In like manner, one should be careful about one's beliefs, because beliefs can be very dangerous, and can have a very significant effect on others.

[Pyrrho]

To sum up:  it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.




Mr. Clifford has obviously not met many true believers.  They are fully impressed by the flimsiest of "evidence" even if it isn't evidence at all in the case of fools like our resident theists.

When a theist is told that his bullshit is true there is no such thing as "insufficient."

Mr. Clifford is effectively saying that many [or perhaps all] religious people are immoral for believing what they believe.  They ought to be careful about their beliefs, rather than accepting beliefs on shoddy 'evidence.'  Your study of history should enable you to give us many examples of people killing each other over beliefs that were not properly supported by evidence, as in various religious wars.  So their carelessness not only affects themselves, but is of great importance to others.

You also bring up another point addressed by Clifford:

No man holding a strong belief on one side of a question, or even wishing to hold a belief on one side, can investigate it with such fairness and completeness as if he were really in doubt and unbiassed; so that the existence of a belief not founded on fair inquiry unfits a man for the performance of this necessary duty. 

People are too ready to be persuaded of what they already believe, and so if they have a belief not based on sufficient evidence, they are incapable of properly judging the evidence regarding the matter.  We see this quite clearly with the ridiculous "proofs" of God's existence that many religious people put forward which they find convincing, when an unbiassed examination of the arguments reveals fallacious reasoning.

And this aspect of human psychology goes so far that even if one does not yet have the belief, but merely wishes to have it, one is apt to accept shoddy 'evidence' in order to acquire the belief.

[bennyboy]

I think you have skipped the other side of the coin: it may be that there are many beliefs which lead to immoral behavior BECAUSE someone has accurately assessed something in reality. There is sufficient evidence that humans represent a net negative for the world. It wouldn't be hard to establish the belief that the only way to save most of nature would be to start killing as many people as possible. I would argue that this is an immoral beleif, because mores are a human construct meant to sustain and better individuals and the species as a whole.

What say you? Is it immoral to act to remove people from the world, whatever kind of people they are, simply because the reality is that we cause harm?

I think I might take the position that forming beliefs based on sufficient evidence is immoral, because ultimately it will lead to self-deleterious positions on the importance of humanity. As you say, though individual beliefs might not seem deleterious, they are all connected, and we may eventually arrive at a self-negating position, with the unfortunate behaviors that could stem from that.

[Dystopia]

When one believes one thing, it affects the other beliefs one has.  Both in terms of what other things fit with it, and in terms of the way one acquires one's beliefs.  In your specific example of deism, it is likely to impact one's examination of the origins of the universe, as well as make one more receptive to other god related beliefs.  And those affected beliefs may affect other beliefs, rather like a pebble being tossed into a still pond, causing a ripple across the surface.

I can certainly see the evidence and merit to the conclusion that all our beliefs are connected at least by the mere fact all of it belongs to us (and our brains) and therefore no belief exists in isolation - That makes perfect sense and I hadn't thought about it because I didn't see it as relevant to this topic. I have some doubts regarding your example - There are deists who don't like (And even dislike or hate) organized religion and every kind of non-deistic god, and there are deists who use god as merely a word to describe the first cause of the universe as some sort of cosmic force with a poetical, metaphorical touch - I would me more inclined to say that believing in one specific religion and its core principles makes you more open and vulnerable to other additional principles. For example, someone who converts to Christianity due to belief in the Resurrection has an easier time believing in other miracles as described by the bible. I don't know many deists aside from my significant other, but I do know most of them, when they say "first cause", mean the first cause of all existence and not necessarily the first cause to the big bang or the first cause to a hypothetical universe that existed before this one - So if you mean something like denying an obvious cause to the universe I don't think a deist would deny that, specially considering they value rationality (even if you think their belief is irrational) and frequently support and cherish science as more desirable for the world than religion.

To put this another way, beliefs are not all held in isolation from each other.  So one belief will affect the aggregate of beliefs one has.  And, as already mentioned, if one is willing to accept one thing on insufficient evidence, one is more likely to accept another thing on insufficient evidence.  After all, if such 'reasoning' is okay in one case, why not another?  As Clifford puts it:

Isn't this affirming the consequent? You are inferring that because one believes one thing without evidence, they are more likely to believe more things without evidence... If I reverse your example and use atheism as some sort of model for skeptical thinking I can easily point out to atheists who, disbelieving in god, believe all sorts of crazy shit like conspiracy theories without evidence. In fact, a troubling fact about an association called Men's rights activists is the fact some surveys (to be fair it was done on reddit) reveal the majority of them are non-religious - So this means non-religious (maybe skeptics, at least some) who support an organization known for its misogyny. Wouldn't the opposite make sense? So why are some people skeptical about some claims and not about others? Wouldn't this apply to your example - Someone who believes in something without evidence may actually be skeptical towards other claims? Please notice how religionists are skeptical about all gods minus one (assuming monotheism).

There are two separate issues in those questions.  If you mean, 'can we prove that the person did the action for the reason the person claims,' much will depend on what one counts as "proof."  But if you mean to question whether the action had any connection to any belief, are you seriously going to tell us that you believe the action had no connection to any beliefs the person had?

If I take a gun and shoot someone in the head, are you going to tell me that I did not have the belief that shooting someone in the head might lead to the person's death?  That when I loaded the gun, I had no beliefs about the significance of putting bullets in it, in order to make it work?  Is not every action that one takes connected to some belief (or more likely, beliefs)?

If you mean that a person might lie about an action, obviously, that is true.  So we cannot simply accept people's claims.  But that does not mean that their actions have no connection with any beliefs.

Indeed, every action is connected to some belief unless it's a reflexive or instinctive act, etc - My question is how can we determine to what degree religious belief and specific beliefs in every denomination influence people's behavior? Anyone who says "zero" is wrong and irrational, but there are people who think religion is a sole motivating factor of evil - I disagree with that as well. Using the example of Muslim terrorists, how do we determine to what degree it is Islam or geo-politics' fault? Because both variables seem to help - Sometimes religion simply fills the void, other times it drives the main act of terrorism just by itself - But certainly it isn't a coincidence some environments create more Jihadists than others.

As you have [correctly] said, our actions are connected to our beliefs, but since we have so many beliefs and it's complicated to know precisely what everyone believes, how do we know with reasonable certainty which belief or beliefs influenced the action? In the case of crimes done in the name of religion, how do we distinguish between someone who just believes unbelievers must die because religion says so, and someone who, despite using religion and being motivated by it, already has violent tendencies and would have committed the same crime even without religion or with any other religion? Like Reza Aslan said - If religious belief determined behavior, all believers would behave similarly, but that just doesn't happen - Hence why I think the option of "evil people will be evil" regardless of belief is more accurate, because someone who is evil or violent will inevitably, in any religion or lack of thereof find excuses to hurt others.

That is a very complicated question to answer.  And to be perfectly frank, I am not going to give a complete answer, as that would be practically impossible.  However, the short answer is, different things require different kinds of things as evidence.  For example, evidence that the Pythagorean theorem is true is going to look very different from evidence that I am presently in my home.  The former is going to involve discussions of mathematical concepts, and the latter is going to involve looking in my home (or, for such a trivial thing, one might regard my testimony as adequate, as there is nothing extraordinary in being in one's home).

The nature of a particular idea determines the sort of things that would be necessary for there to be evidence in favor of it.  It is no use looking in my home and seeing me here if the object is to prove the Pythagorean theorem, but it is more than acceptable for determining that I am in my home.

No objections - But how do I deal with theists who say that because different objects require different standards, types and amount of evidence, the standards for god are low or non-existent because he exists outside of time and space, and therefore cannot be proven because we can't measure what exists outside of what our imperfect senses can perceive? [And ultimately it depends just on faith)

You will either need to repeat the story or at least provide a link for me to address your specific example regarding your love.  However, I can address the general idea of trusting someone.  I trust my wife.  Now, I do that not because I love her, but because I have known her for many years, and have gotten to know her character fairly well.  She has been honest in the past, and so I infer that she is likely to be honest in the future.  Of course, there is much more than that, as there has not been a falling out or argument recently, nor has she started being distant or otherwise altered her behavior, etc.  Regardless of the details, the evidence I have regarding such things is not the same sort of evidence one can have for the Pythagorean theorem.  That may affect the level of certainty involved, but it does not mean that there is not enough evidence for it to be reasonable for me to trust my wife.

My example was basically - I can't know if my girlfriend loves me because all the "acts of love" she does with me can easily be a method of manipulation, so I need to have some faith in it. In your example, it seems reasonable to trust your wife - However, many times when it comes to love people follow (and sometimes correctly) their "gut" feelings, or "heart" - Can I say that because we use our gut feelings to love because it can't be measured physically then the same standards can be applied to god? (I suspect not!)

I presume that if you are in love with someone, you have known the person for some time, and during that time, you have observed that person's conduct.  You can make inferences from such observations, though what inferences will depend on what observations you have made.

[/quote]
Yes, but don't forget that sometimes all of this is not enough to prevent getting emotionally hurt.

It is also worth emphasizing that Clifford specifically wrote about "sufficient evidence" and was not trying to tell you that you needed an absolute perfect certain proof before believing something.  You may, of course, complain that there is some slippage in some of what I have stated in this post, but, to bring in someone else for variety:

Yes, I'm aware of that - no one could live comfortably pursuing the need of absolute evidence for everything, hyperskepticism is a bad idea (generally). A better question would be what constitutes sufficient evidence for every case - It is easy to define it in the Pythagorean theorem, or to prove gravity exists, but what is sufficient evidence for a god claim? It is a question I still haven't fully answered, but I generally require some degree of logical consistency and a lack of logical fallacies. I do not require physical evidence for any deity at all (unless the person claims the deity exists physically), just a logically robust argument with little and preferably no flaws. 

Not every subject has the same level of precision, and so we must be content with what is possible in a given subject.

What level of precision do we need when discussing the case for god, specially considering the a priori premise that he only exists outside of time and space and is therefore unverifiable? (This is usually a premise defined on the main motion and not something to be prove, if someone wishes to discuss the existence of god then there are certain characteristics you must accept beforehand otherwise the motion is left undefined)

[Minimalist]

They ought to be careful about their beliefs, rather than accepting beliefs on shoddy 'evidence.'

But they will not accept Clifford's definition of "shoddy."  Witness Randy and his absurd "minimal facts" horseshit.

[robvalue]

Very good post! I am pretty much on board (pun intended).

I agree that each belief held for bad reasons is at the least going to make it more likely to acquire more beliefs for bad reasons. So it's never harmless in that respect.

Err, oops. After rereading your OP what I've written may not be appropriate. I'll hide it away.

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With regard to morality, as killing humans was brought up, you can only rate what is moral and immoral after deciding what you value. For sure, we generally value human life a lot, more than anything else. That's how we are. So our morality almost always places a very high value there. But equally you can look at animal life, and the harm that humans cause to it. Most people place harm towards animals at a much lower value to that towards humans. Again, this is understandable.

But there is no "right answer" in what we should value, because it's ultimately arbitrary. All we can do is discuss them, and perhaps change each other's minds. It's only once we've agreed on some sort of common ground that we can discuss whether one action is "more moral" than another.

I pondered yesterday about the morality of me killing all humans in one go, if I got the single chance to do it. I'd have to weigh the benefit to animals, against the loss of humans. That's no easy calculation for me, although my instincts come down on the side of killing all the humans. Whether I could go through with that, even if I decided it was best, is another matter. (I added some sort of fail safe where nothing like us could evolve again. It's obviously a thought experiment only.) Also, is it the same moral question, or a different one, if I can save all the humans who are due to die, given one chance to do so? Is my accountability any different?

This is different to me trying to just go around killing people, because it's ultimately going to make little difference to animals and will cause lots of hurt to humans.

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[Pyrrho]

I think you have skipped the other side of the coin: it may be that there are many beliefs which lead to immoral behavior BECAUSE someone has accurately assessed something in reality.

There are much simpler examples than what you proceed to give.  A man may rob a liquor store because he believes that there is money in the register.  

(It is worth mentioning that obviously the action proceeds not from just one belief, but an aggregate, and also involves desire [emotion].  But in my example, without the belief that there is money to be had, the robber would not rob the store.)

This would only be a problem for Clifford (and me) if it were claimed that being careless about beliefs was the only source of bad actions.  But no such claim has been made, and it would be quite absurd to make such a claim.

So, Clifford's proposal is not a panacea for all the ills of the world.  Just for some of them.

 There is sufficient evidence that humans represent a net negative for the world.  It wouldn't be hard to establish the belief that the only way to save most of nature would be to start killing as many people as possible.

I think that more humane methods of achieving the goal you have in mind would be better.  And your likelihood of success would be no better if you tried to kill everyone, as the vast majority of people will be against you.  Most likely, you would be caught before you had killed a significant number of people (that is, significant in terms of your goal).  So I would recommend trying to get people to stop having so many children, through education, access to birth control, helping to get people out of poverty, etc.  And to also get them to look at the evidence regarding damage to the environment (which is to say, get them to go along with Clifford on this matter).  You are more likely to be able to find allies in those sorts of things, and so you are more likely to make a difference.

This is not to say that your chances of success would be good in some other way, but if you tried to kill everyone, you will be very unlikely to get very far.  Even if you are one of the people in a nuclear missile silo, one nuclear missile is not going to kill all humans (not to mention the fact that, I believe, they design them such that it takes two people to fire off such a missile, in order to prevent one crazy person from causing too much damage).

 I would argue that this is an immoral beleif, because mores are a human construct meant to sustain and better individuals and the species as a whole.

What say you?  Is it immoral to act to remove people from the world, whatever kind of people they are, simply because the reality is that we cause harm?

I think it is an unreasonable belief to suppose that you have the capability to kill everyone, so Clifford and I are quite happy to condemn such an idea.  (We would both condemn it for other reasons as well, but more than this one is unnecessary for the present purposes.)

I think I might take the position that forming beliefs based on sufficient evidence is immoral, because ultimately it will lead to self-deleterious positions on the importance of humanity.  As you say, though individual beliefs might not seem deleterious, they are all connected, and we may eventually arrive at a self-negating position, with the unfortunate behaviors that could stem from that.

If you have in mind something along the lines of a person who desires to torture and murder as many people as possible, then such a person forming reasonable beliefs would likely make the person more dangerous than if he or she had unfounded beliefs (e.g., like the belief that just thinking about people dying would cause them to die, etc.).  And that is true enough, that someone who is inclined to do damage will often be more effective if he or she has beliefs that better line up with the way the world works, which is more likely if one forms beliefs based on evidence than on wishful thinking or some other non-rational way.

But, again, Clifford is not saying that his ideas are a panacea for all that is wrong with the world.  He is just focussed on one problem, the problem of 'accidents' due to carelessly forming beliefs.  Like accidentally sending out an unsafe ship, accidentally believing a false religion that leads to one torturing and murdering other people, etc.

[Pyrrho]

When one believes one thing, it affects the other beliefs one has.  Both in terms of what other things fit with it, and in terms of the way one acquires one's beliefs.  In your specific example of deism, it is likely to impact one's examination of the origins of the universe, as well as make one more receptive to other god related beliefs.  And those affected beliefs may affect other beliefs, rather like a pebble being tossed into a still pond, causing a ripple across the surface.

I can certainly see the evidence and merit to the conclusion that all our beliefs are connected at least by the mere fact all of it belongs to us (and our brains) and therefore no belief exists in isolation - That makes perfect sense and I hadn't thought about it because I didn't see it as relevant to this topic.

It is a very important part of what Clifford is saying.  For anyone who values consistency (and almost everyone does in some instances at least), if one has a particular belief about something, one will tend to reject beliefs that one sees as inconsistent with it, and to be more inclined to accept beliefs that seem to follow from it in conjunction with one's other beliefs.

If you think about a deductive system of reasoning, one false premise can really muck up quite a few conclusions.  So one little, seemingly unimportant belief can have a profound impact on the totality of beliefs one has.

That is important enough that I will repeat it for emphasis:

If you think about a deductive system of reasoning, one false premise can really muck up quite a few conclusions.  So one little, seemingly unimportant belief can have a profound impact on the totality of beliefs one has.

I have some doubts regarding your example -

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There are deists who don't like (And even dislike or hate) organized religion and every kind of non-deistic god, and there are deists who use god as merely a word to describe the first cause of the universe as some sort of cosmic force with a poetical, metaphorical touch - I would me more inclined to say that believing in one specific religion and its core principles makes you more open and vulnerable to other additional principles. For example, someone who converts to Christianity due to belief in the Resurrection has an easier time believing in other miracles as described by the bible. I don't know many deists aside from my significant other, but I do know most of them, when they say "first cause", mean the first cause of all existence and not necessarily the first cause to the big bang or the first cause to a hypothetical universe that existed before this one - So if you mean something like denying an obvious cause to the universe I don't think a deist would deny that, specially considering they value rationality (even if you think their belief is irrational) and frequently support and cherish science as more desirable for the world than religion.

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Two things.  First, and most importantly, nothing hinges on that specific example playing out as I suggested.  So I don't care about it too much.  Second, the fact that something else is more dangerous is not a reason to believe that the less dangerous thing is not also dangerous.


This reply is overlong, so I have hidden most of it.  Feel free to respond to only bits of it for a new post, if you wish to respond to any of it at all, which you obviously need not do so if you do not wish to.  You can also respond to a bit of it for one post, and another bit for another post, if you wish to keep the posts to a reasonable length.

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To put this another way, beliefs are not all held in isolation from each other.  So one belief will affect the aggregate of beliefs one has.  And, as already mentioned, if one is willing to accept one thing on insufficient evidence, one is more likely to accept another thing on insufficient evidence.  After all, if such 'reasoning' is okay in one case, why not another?  As Clifford puts it:

Isn't this affirming the consequent? You are inferring that because one believes one thing without evidence, they are more likely to believe more things without evidence...

I am saying that people are creatures of habit, that they tend to do the same sorts of things again and again.  If a person is willing to believe one thing on insufficient evidence, for what reason would one not do the same thing again with some other belief?  Obviously, the person does not believe that evidence is necessary for forming beliefs, or they would try to always seek it out.

If I reverse your example and use atheism as some sort of model for skeptical thinking

I would never say that (and neither would Clifford).  Not believing a particular thing (or believing that a particular thing does not exist) does not tell us why the person has whatever beliefs they have.  If we imagine some beings who decided what to believe based on the toss of a fair coin (again, we are imagining, not supposing such beings exists), it may be that on the god question the coin turned up heads for one and tails for the other, and so one is an atheist for no good reason, and one is a theist for no good reason.

What matters is not so much what one believes, but how one acquired the beliefs.  In practice, of course, the coin tossing method would be disastrous for getting true beliefs, but even if, by chance, someone accidentally turns out to be right, they are still wrong to go about things in the wrong way.

This is analogous to me driving home after heavy drinking.  Me getting home safely and without harming anyone in a specific instance does not justify the action.

I can easily point out to atheists who, disbelieving in god, believe all sorts of crazy shit like conspiracy theories without evidence. In fact, a troubling fact about an association called Men's rights activists is the fact some surveys (to be fair it was done on reddit) reveal the majority of them are non-religious - So this means non-religious (maybe skeptics, at least some) who support an organization known for its misogyny. Wouldn't the opposite make sense? So why are some people skeptical about some claims and not about others? Wouldn't this apply to your example - Someone who believes in something without evidence may actually be skeptical towards other claims? Please notice how religionists are skeptical about all gods minus one (assuming monotheism).

Clifford and I want the same sort of skepticism to be applied to all things.  That is, no matter what the thing is, one ought not believe it unless one has sufficient evidence.  Not only that, but if one ever has reason to doubt an already obtained belief, one has a duty to investigate to make sure one did not accept that previous belief on insufficient evidence.  As Clifford puts it:

       Inquiry into the evidence of a doctrine is not to be made once for all, and then taken as finally settled.  It is never lawful to stifle a doubt; for either it can be honestly answered by means of the inquiry already made, or else it proves that the inquiry was not complete.

       “But,” says one, “I am a busy man; I have no time for the long course of study which would be necessary to make me in any degree a competent judge of certain questions, or even able to understand the nature of the arguments.”  Then he should have no time to believe.  

There are two separate issues in those questions.  If you mean, 'can we prove that the person did the action for the reason the person claims,' much will depend on what one counts as "proof."  But if you mean to question whether the action had any connection to any belief, are you seriously going to tell us that you believe the action had no connection to any beliefs the person had?

If I take a gun and shoot someone in the head, are you going to tell me that I did not have the belief that shooting someone in the head might lead to the person's death?  That when I loaded the gun, I had no beliefs about the significance of putting bullets in it, in order to make it work?  Is not every action that one takes connected to some belief (or more likely, beliefs)?

If you mean that a person might lie about an action, obviously, that is true.  So we cannot simply accept people's claims.  But that does not mean that their actions have no connection with any beliefs.

Indeed, every action is connected to some belief unless it's a reflexive or instinctive act, etc - My question is how can we determine to what degree religious belief and specific beliefs in every denomination influence people's behavior? Anyone who says "zero" is wrong and irrational, but there are people who think religion is a sole motivating factor of evil - I disagree with that as well. Using the example of Muslim terrorists, how do we determine to what degree it is Islam or geo-politics' fault? Because both variables seem to help - Sometimes religion simply fills the void, other times it drives the main act of terrorism just by itself - But certainly it isn't a coincidence some environments create more Jihadists than others.

As you have [correctly] said, our actions are connected to our beliefs, but since we have so many beliefs and it's complicated to know precisely what everyone believes, how do we know with reasonable certainty which belief or beliefs influenced the action? In the case of crimes done in the name of religion, how do we distinguish between someone who just believes unbelievers must die because religion says so, and someone who, despite using religion and being motivated by it, already has violent tendencies and would have committed the same crime even without religion or with any other religion? Like Reza Aslan said - If religious belief determined behavior, all believers would behave similarly, but that just doesn't happen - Hence why I think the option of "evil people will be evil" regardless of belief is more accurate, because someone who is evil or violent will inevitably, in any religion or lack of thereof find excuses to hurt others.

Two things.  First, it is not essential to the task at hand to be able to precisely determine, in all cases, how important each belief is for a particular action.  All that is needed is that they have some impact on actions, and consequently, one should be careful about them, for the same reason that one should be careful about one's actions.  I often (if not always) do not know what the full impact will be of my actions, either, but that is no reason to suppose I should be careless about my actions, any more than it is an argument that I should be careless about my beliefs because I do not know the precise impact they will have.

Second, the idea that bad people will do bad things anyway does not contradict the idea that otherwise good people may do bad things due to making a mistake from carelessness in forming their beliefs.


I may add an additional point which I will not defend in this thread, as it is unimportant to the point of the thread, but I think it is very relevant to people's actions the sort of conditions in which they live.  When people do not have a chance for a decent life, when no choices will lead to anything good, I would expect them to be more likely to do bad things.  A man who lives in poverty, with no decent chance to climb out of poverty, is more likely to turn to crime than one who has a decent chance at a decent life.  And in some parts of the world, the vast majority of the people do not have a chance for a decent life, and so they are more likely to take desperate actions (the trite, but true old saying, desperate times call for desperate measures).  All of which is to say that there are more problems in the world than just the fact that people are careless about their beliefs.  Neither Clifford nor I ever said that carelessness about beliefs was the only problem in the world.  So the fact that you can come up with other problems is irrelevant to this thread.  I agree, there are other problems, some of which are great.  But that does not mean that carelessness about beliefs is not also a significant problem.  And if we fix the problem that Clifford and I are interested in fixing, then more people will be more likely to notice the other problems, and have reasonable ideas about what to do about them.  So this is a good first step.

That is a very complicated question to answer.  And to be perfectly frank, I am not going to give a complete answer, as that would be practically impossible.  However, the short answer is, different things require different kinds of things as evidence.  For example, evidence that the Pythagorean theorem is true is going to look very different from evidence that I am presently in my home.  The former is going to involve discussions of mathematical concepts, and the latter is going to involve looking in my home (or, for such a trivial thing, one might regard my testimony as adequate, as there is nothing extraordinary in being in one's home).

The nature of a particular idea determines the sort of things that would be necessary for there to be evidence in favor of it.  It is no use looking in my home and seeing me here if the object is to prove the Pythagorean theorem, but it is more than acceptable for determining that I am in my home.

No objections - But how do I deal with theists who say that because different objects require different standards, types and amount of evidence, the standards for god are low or non-existent because he exists outside of time and space, and therefore cannot be proven because we can't measure what exists outside of what our imperfect senses can perceive? [And ultimately it depends just on faith)

In the case of religion, pointing out the fact that other religions use the same sorts of arguments, but wind up believing their different religion, is a good approach.  Of course, this is not new with me, or anything that you have not seen countless times.

The only addition I offer in this thread is at attack on the idea that having faith (see opening post) is a good idea.  It certainly is not, and is a very dangerous approach to life.  In point of fact, believing things before one gets evidence is prejudging things before the facts are known, which is literally prejudice.  People use the word "faith" when they want to pretend that prejudice is a virtue instead of the vice that it is.

If people can be persuaded that Clifford is right on this one point, they will be apt to be a bit more careful.  This does not mean that no one will ever make a mistake, nor even that one person will never make a mistake.  But if people are not even trying to avoid mistakes of this nature, then they are going to be likely to make plenty of mistakes along these lines.

You will either need to repeat the story or at least provide a link for me to address your specific example regarding your love.  However, I can address the general idea of trusting someone.  I trust my wife.  Now, I do that not because I love her, but because I have known her for many years, and have gotten to know her character fairly well.  She has been honest in the past, and so I infer that she is likely to be honest in the future.  Of course, there is much more than that, as there has not been a falling out or argument recently, nor has she started being distant or otherwise altered her behavior, etc.  Regardless of the details, the evidence I have regarding such things is not the same sort of evidence one can have for the Pythagorean theorem.  That may affect the level of certainty involved, but it does not mean that there is not enough evidence for it to be reasonable for me to trust my wife.

My example was basically - I can't know if my girlfriend loves me because all the "acts of love" she does with me can easily be a method of manipulation, so I need to have some faith in it. In your example, it seems reasonable to trust your wife - However, many times when it comes to love people follow (and sometimes correctly) their "gut" feelings, or "heart" - Can I say that because we use our gut feelings to love because it can't be measured physically then the same standards can be applied to god? (I suspect not!)

Okay, a couple of points are in order.  First, with your girlfriend, what do you know about her?  Have you observed her being manipulative with others?  If so, that is an indication of the sort of person she is, and an indication of how likely she is to manipulate you.  Of course, it is much more complicated than just that, as it may be that she will manipulate certain kinds of people in certain kinds of situations, but not other people in other situations.  One learns about these things from observation.

So my advice to you, regarding your girlfriend, is to follow the same standards of reasoning that you would apply to anything else, and to not let your feelings for her get in the way.

Also, and this is extremely important, you are not going to be able to have an absolute proof of quite a few things in your life.  That, however, does not mean that you cannot make a reasonable judgement about something based on the facts you have.

And another thing to remember that is also important, is that you do not have to come to a conclusion about everything.  If you do not know something, then you do not know it.  Not knowing is not, in itself, evidence that your girlfriend is insincere.  So while I am suggesting that you do not let your feelings for her cloud your judgement in her favor, you also ought not let feelings of jealousy cloud your judgement and make you against her.


When talking with people in the past about such things, I have noticed that sometimes people get things exactly backwards.  I do not trust my wife because I love her; I love her, in part, because I trust her.  I first acquired evidence that she was a good person, and that led to me loving her.

Whatever your feelings about your girlfriend, I recommend trying to not let your emotions cloud your judgement, and try to not jump to conclusions.  Right now, since my wife is not here with me, I do not have a full and absolute proof that she is not cheating on me.  (Likewise, she does not have a full and absolute proof that I am not cheating on her at this moment instead of typing this.)  But that does not give me any reason to believe that she is unfaithful at this moment.  Indeed, from knowing her character, I have a pretty good idea that she will never cheat on me.  If she decided she did not like me anymore, she would leave me.  I am very confident of that, due to knowing her very well.

Of course, many people get these things wrong.  I think it is because they do not follow Clifford's advice, and because many people are poor judges of character.  If you are not good at judging someone's character, then it will take you longer to get to know someone well enough to make a reasonable judgement one way or the other about someone (if, indeed, you ever can).  Many people, though, ignore evidence that displeases them in this subject, just like in matters of religion.  (So thank you for bringing it up.)  Anything that people are very emotional about, they tend to have a much harder time judging accurately.  And that is one reason why so many people screw up in matters of love and matters of religion.

I presume that if you are in love with someone, you have known the person for some time, and during that time, you have observed that person's conduct.  You can make inferences from such observations, though what inferences will depend on what observations you have made.

Yes, but don't forget that sometimes all of this is not enough to prevent getting emotionally hurt.

Sure, people make mistakes.  But aren't they more likely to make mistakes when they are careless about their beliefs than when they are not careless about their beliefs?

It is also worth emphasizing that Clifford specifically wrote about "sufficient evidence" and was not trying to tell you that you needed an absolute perfect certain proof before believing something.  You may, of course, complain that there is some slippage in some of what I have stated in this post, but, to bring in someone else for variety:

Yes, I'm aware of that - no one could live comfortably pursuing the need of absolute evidence for everything, hyperskepticism is a bad idea (generally). A better question would be what constitutes sufficient evidence for every case - It is easy to define it in the Pythagorean theorem, or to prove gravity exists, but what is sufficient evidence for a god claim? It is a question I still haven't fully answered, but I generally require some degree of logical consistency and a lack of logical fallacies. I do not require physical evidence for any deity at all (unless the person claims the deity exists physically), just a logically robust argument with little and preferably no flaws. 

Not every subject has the same level of precision, and so we must be content with what is possible in a given subject.

What level of precision do we need when discussing the case for god, specially considering the a priori premise that he only exists outside of time and space and is therefore unverifiable? (This is usually a premise defined on the main motion and not something to be prove, if someone wishes to discuss the existence of god then there are certain characteristics you must accept beforehand otherwise the motion is left undefined)

You are now getting away from the subject of this thread.  I could just stop there, but I will make a small effort to answer your questions.  When people make god claims, often their claims are simply devoid of any real meaning.  What, precisely, does it mean for something to be outside of time and space?  And what difference would such a thing have for things that are in time and space?  How would it affect us in time and space if there were something outside of time and space (whatever the hell that even means)?  If it has an effect on beings in time and space, than that effect can be examined in time and space.

So what I think is going on in the particular sort of claims that you are talking about is an attempt at weaseling out of having any evidence, while forgetting the fact that pretty much every god believer believes that god does do things that affect things in time and space.  In other words, they are not keeping their story straight, and are necessary wrong no matter what the truth might be.

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[Pyrrho]

They ought to be careful about their beliefs, rather than accepting beliefs on shoddy 'evidence.'

But they will not accept Clifford's definition of "shoddy."  Witness Randy and his absurd "minimal facts" horseshit.

Yes, a lot of people are going to reason poorly, no matter what Clifford and I say.  But we are not so much attempting to describe what people do, but rather what they ought to do.

If we cannot even convince people that having evidence is important, what do you think the chances are people are going to even try to take a reasonable look at evidence?

Basically, rejecting the idea that evidence is important for forming beliefs leads to people believing all sorts of nonsense, much of which has a significant impact on others.  When people reject, on principle, the idea that evidence is important, the situation for convincing them of anything with evidence is pretty hopeless.

I find it quite disconcerting that so many people are so against the main point of Clifford's essay.  He is arguing that people should not believe things for no good reason.  And people argue against that.

[Pyrrho]

Very good post! I am pretty much on board (pun intended).

I agree that each belief held for bad reasons is at the least going to make it more likely to acquire more beliefs for bad reasons. So it's never harmless in that respect.

...

Thank you.

For the part I have omitted of your post, if you want to start another thread about that subject, go ahead and do so.  I agree with your second thought that it does not belong here, as it is too much going off topic.  Still, it could make for an interesting thread, depending, of course, on what people have to say about it.