Free will & the Conservation Laws

[Alex K]

Agreed; I don't know how some get "free will" from indeterminism.

Free will is the unfettered ability to act according to one's nature in a given circumstance.

That is one possible definition (the "compatibilist" one?) which however, imho, does not capture the moral and metaphysical ideas that are usually at stake when people talk of "free will". Free will is often thought to be some kind of magic sauce which is supposed to render our minds autonomous and independent of worldly influences.

[I_am_not_mafia]

The brain is irreducibly complex in that it is much more than 0s & 1s; after all, has anyone simulated a human or mammalian brain?  The answer, of course, is, "Yes," but such have all been very poor to poor simulations.  So far, consciousness exists only in brains and not in computers, and in my opinion, computers will never have consciousness.  For one, most of the human brain is fat, or myelin, which acts as an insulator but also as a messenger, but, I am not expert.  So, whatever makes up consciousness is likely to be found in wetware and not inorganic materials, which make-up computers.

That's not what is meant by irreducibly complex. The term is only used by theists as part of a fallacious argument that if you take any part of it away then it ceases to function. This is not the case with the brain. Surgeons can remove parts of the brain and it will still function albeit at reduced performance. You could argue that this is because the brain is made up of many different functions, but even a very simple three layer biologically plausible neural network is still not irreducibly complex. I once spent weeks removing all the different mechanisms to try and stop it working and it continued functioning but at a reduced level of performance.

There are no 0s & 1s in the brain. At most there are stereotypical spikes but even these are complex phenomena. And when combined they also make up firing rates. We have no reason to suspect that consciousness cannot exist in a computer. There is nothing special about a real brain to suggest that only it can have consciousness. If you think otherwise then the burden of proof is on you to make the case. After all, functionally speaking, what is consciousness? At its minimum it is using the internal state as another input that can be adapted to.

I don't see why you are bringing up the subject of myelin sheathing. It performs a function that can also be replicated on the computer. But you need to be aware that real brains are built from different materials and therefore have different constraints. The purpose of myelin sheathing is to allow faster signals to be carried along nerves. This is not required in a computer.

Free will is an illusion but for entirely different reasons to the one suggested by your original post.

[I_am_not_mafia]

Using the concepts of free will, spirit and consciousness as a way to explain intelligence is a form of the fallacious homunculus argument. It's like the equally fallacious god of the gaps argument. Basically it's just pushing the problem away to a smaller part and refusing to explain it. It still doesn't attempt to answer the question of how consciousness and free will actually work.

A great test on whether you have the correct explanation is whether it allows you to create your own version of the phenomenon. Saying that there is some kind of spirit doesn't in anyway help in creating artificial intelligence.

[Alex K]

I really need to finally finish Dennett's book. I'm only a third of the way through...

[I_am_not_mafia]

It's also worth pointing out that conscious isn't irreducible either. Some people are more conscious about why they act than others for example.

[Alex K]

It's also worth pointing out that conscious isn't irreducible either. Some people are more conscious about why they act than others for example.

After I down two or three bottles of wine, I am definitely less conscious than I'd ordinarily be.

[robvalue]

The weird thing about consciousness, is that I only have evidence that it turns into an "experience" in one case; me. I can never possibly know if the same really happens to anyone else. Sure, you all say it does, but that's consistent and expected.

I'm not trying to be difficult, it really does seem like a barrier I can't get across without simply assuming it is true. As far as I know, this could be a "glitch" and there are not meant to be any experiences. Or if it's not a glitch, I don't see why computers, or rocks, or anything, can't also have an experience of some sort if viewed through the correct filter.

[Alex K]

The weird thing about consciousness, is that I only have evidence that it turns into an "experience" in one case; me. I can never possibly know if the same really happens to anyone else. Sure, you all say it does, but that's consistent and expected.

I'm not trying to be difficult, it really does seem like a barrier I can't get across without simply assuming it is true.

In my opinion you only need to abstain from solipsism as an axiom. Then, you can notice that other humans have the same rough behavior, origin and physical makeup as you do. This is sufficient evidence to put the burden of proof on the other side of the argument (that everyone else is a philosophical zombie)

[robvalue]

Well, I don't know...

Solipsism just tells me this is all real, from my perspective, and that I'm not actually "somewhere else". That could still be the case with a reality inhabited by mimics. I can't measure someone else's experience, so I must further assume they really are having them when they say they are.

It's one thing to assume solipsism false from my perspective; it's quite another to apply it to everyone else as well.

The default position should really be that it's unknown, even with solipsism false; otherwise, the default is just an assumption. Which is fine, of course. It's a very reasonable assumption.

[Alex K]

I don't understand, rob. It seems I mean something else by solipsism - the assumption that the perceived outside world is merely something going on in my mind.