Existence must exist at all times.

[Ignorant]

I see. I see. So there are some things about existence that are eternal and necessary (like energy). Some things are temporal and non-necessary (like particular configurations of energy and their duration).

So energy existing in a particular way and during a particular time = me. But my energy is never the same from one moment to the next. What about "me" remains me, and what about "me" changes? (If nothing about ""me" is the same from one moment to the next... then there is no "me" to speak of as changing)

[bennyboy]

I see. I see. So there are some things about existence that are eternal and necessary (like energy). Some things are temporal and non-necessary (like particular configurations of energy and their duration).

So energy existing in a particular way and during a particular time = me. But my energy is never the same from one moment to the next. What about "me" remains me, and what about "me" changes? (If nothing about ""me" is the same from one moment to the next... then there is no "me" to speak of as changing)

I enjoy your arguments.  Are you now trying to inject the idea of soul as that which is the "me," and which since it by definition takes no changing form must be eternal?

Is it not possible that "me" is really an idea, and that each moment the torch is passed to the next? If the self may be an idea, then it seems a soul would be unnecessary in the sense of providing "me-ness."

[Edwardo Piet]

@ ignorant

Your memories are what makes you you. Psychological continuity=your you-ness.

[Ignorant]

I enjoy your arguments.  Are you now trying to inject the idea of soul as that which is the "me," and which since it by definition takes no changing form must be eternal? [1]

Is it not possible that "me" is really an idea, and that each moment the torch is passed to the next? [2] If the self may be an idea, then it seems a soul would be unnecessary in the sense of providing "me-ness." [3]

I'm glad my contributions don't annoy you!

1) No. I am not trying to inject anything. I am trying to tease out how the principle of identity in objects (I-am-being-me) fits within Alasdair's view. That need not involve a soul, much less an eternal one. An eternal soul fits into my view, but that doesn't mean it will with Alasdair's. Even so... read my forthcoming response to Alasdair to see something interesting pop up.

2) That is indeed possible. But is it actual? 

Also, "idea" doesn't help you much in contradicting the concept of a soul because "idea" is synonymous with the word "form", and the human "form" is synonymous with the word "soul". If the continuous and consistent "idea" of-the-human-self is passed from one moment to the next, you have just described a certain understanding of the soul. I know that isn't what you meant, but it illustrates the difficulty in accounting for identity on the one hand, and change on the other. This is the classical meaning of the principle of identity. Just something to think about in the language you may use in the future.

3) If the self may be an idea, it does not mean that it is indeed an idea. 

Even so:

SUPPOSING that the "self" IS merely an idea which is passed from one moment from the next: What is doing the passing in the current moment, and what other thing does the receiving in the next moment?

---

@ ignorant

Your memories are what makes you you. Psychological continuity=your you-ness.

Thanks! Would someone who loses their memory or psychological continuity also lose their "self-ness"?

Do you attach any significance to the meaning of the Greek word "psyche", and its classical (not modern) usage on this topic, or is it just a coincidence?

[bennyboy]

2) That is indeed possible. But is it actual? 

Also, "idea" doesn't help you much in contradicting the concept of a soul because "idea" is synonymous with the word "form", and the human "form" is synonymous with the word "soul". If the continuous and consistent "idea" of-the-human-self is passed from one moment to the next, you have just described a certain understanding of the soul. I know that isn't what you meant, but it illustrates the difficulty in accounting for identity on the one hand, and change on the other. This is the classical meaning of the principle of identity. Just something to think about in the language you may use in the future.

Well, an idea is a template which may be made manifest, right? Let's look at the sense of self. You talked about continuity-- but what about discontinuity? It seems to me that due to brain damage, some people have almost nothing in common with their former "self." Some kinds of damage even cause changes in personality and preferences. The only thing that seems to be immalleable is that one either does, or does not, have the capacity to be aware that he exists. And since one does not have this capacity during sleep, it seems to me that the identity is a collection of linguistic or symbolic impressions: "I'm this kind of guy. I believe that kind of idea." and so on. In other words, I am the part which I play, and that part is a collection of ideas about what it is supposed to be like to be a particular person.

3) If the self may be an idea, it does not mean that it is indeed an idea. 

Even so:

SUPPOSING that the "self" IS merely an idea which is passed from one moment from the next: What is doing the passing in the current moment, and what other thing does the receiving in the next moment?

Some here will certainly start gesticulating vehemently toward the brain, but I think that's not really an answer. I consider all parts of consciousness mysterious-- not so much their content, which is clearly of the brain and environment, but in their-- being rather than not being.

[Edwardo Piet]

Thanks! Would someone who loses their memory or psychological continuity also lose their "self-ness"?

If they lost it permanently, then yes.

Do you attach any significance to the meaning of the Greek word "psyche", and its classical (not modern) usage on this topic, or is it just a coincidence?

Just a coincidence.

Another way of looking at it is... self-ness is self-identificationness?





But, well, who knows, perhaps absolutely everything is made of psyche-stuff or soul-stuff? Perhaps 'energy' itself is experientiality?

Just to play Devil's Advocate:





And here's a bonus that is most definitely NOT Devil's Advocate on my part:

[bennyboy]

I've quite curious about the relationship between panpsychism and idealism/experientialism.

[Ignorant]

Thanks! Would someone who loses their memory or psychological continuity also lose their "self-ness"?

If they lost it permanently, then yes.

Just so I understand you correctly:

Suppose I lose my memory/psychological continuity permanently:

As a subject (in the context of my own experience of "me"), I would have lost my "self-ness".
As an object (in the context of your experience of "me"), you would describe "me" as a different object than the one before the memory loss, or the same object?

---

Well, an idea is a template which may be made manifest, right?  Let's look at the sense of self. [1] You talked about continuity-- but what about discontinuity?  It seems to me that due to brain damage, some people have almost nothing in common with their former "self."  Some kinds of damage even cause changes in personality and preferences. [2] The only thing that seems to be immalleable is that one either does, or does not, have the capacity to be aware that he exists.  And since one does not have this capacity during sleep, it seems to me that the identity is a collection of linguistic or symbolic impressions: "I'm this kind of guy.  I believe that kind of idea." and so on.  In other words, I am the part which I play, and that part is a collection of ideas about what it is supposed to be like to be a particular person. [3]

Some here will certainly start gesticulating vehemently toward the brain, but I think that's not really an answer. [4] I consider all parts of consciousness mysterious-- not so much their content, which is clearly of the brain and environment, but in their-- being rather than not being.

1) Happy to look at it as a subject (i.e. the sense of self). But I'd also like to consider the self as an object.

2) Yes, exactly what I'd like to consider. How do you consider such people as objects? Are they people who have suffered a personality altering trauma (the same human-being who has suffered a change) -OR- Are they people who have been cleaved into two different people due to a trauma (one human-being ends and a new human-being begins)? Can the same be said for any other object that exists, conscious or not?

If the latter is the case (discontinuity), I'm not sure I understand how anything can be continually itself from one moment to the next. Is a tree the same tree at day 3 of growth as it is at year 50, or is there no actual "tree" to speak of at any given moment? Either it is some THING that undergoes change in some aspect while remaining the same identity, or it is nothing but change.

3) See above. How does this apply to speaking about other things like this rock, or that tree or this atom?

4) I agree it's not the answer. It seems to me that there should be something in the formulation that can account for both the continuous identity of a human-being and any other sort of "being" or "existence".

[bennyboy]

1) Happy to look at it as a subject (i.e. the sense of self). But I'd also like to consider the self as an object.

If the self is then to examine itself, then what does this mean? I'd say the self is that which considers, and cannot really BE an object. The actual object being considered is ideas about the self, or at least it seems so to me.

2) Yes, exactly what I'd like to consider. How do you consider such people as objects? Are they people who have suffered a personality altering trauma (the same human-being who has suffered a change) -OR- Are they people who have been cleaved into two different people due to a trauma (one human-being ends and a new human-being begins)? Can the same be said for any other object that exists, conscious or not?

This is a problem with the physical world view. A table under physical examination turns out to be a collection of wave functions-- it's "tableness" disappears under the microscope.

I find it much easier to deal with humans as collections of ideas than as inviolable entities. "Mom" is a collection of various types of tissue, memories stored in the brain and so on, in a physical sense. But this is very far from what we think of when we talk about "Mom:" associations of warmth and safety (for most), a pat on the head and a look in the eye.

So in the case of brain damage, we must prune and repair our ideas about the reality of the person. "Bob" may be the same only in his rough physical attributes and his government identification numbers.

In the end, we must remember that "Bob" is a label for whatever-Bob-is, and there's no guarantee that won't change. Ideas about permanence (via the mechanism of the soul or otherwise) are really about the way we symbolize and use linguistic semantics. We don't like it when words mean different things all the time: "Bob" should be associated with "Bob-ness," and for that to mean anything, we'd like it to be as unambiguous as possible.

If the latter is the case (discontinuity), I'm not sure I understand how anything can be continually itself from one moment to the next. Is a tree the same tree at day 3 of growth as it is at year 50, or is there no actual "tree" to speak of at any given moment? Either it is some THING that undergoes change in some aspect while remaining the same identity, or it is nothing but change.

Again, the physical reality challenges us philosophically. If all the atoms in my body are recycled and replaced over time, am I still the same me that I was when I was say 20 years old?

My answer will start to sound a bit parroted now: I think the idea persists, and evolves slowly over time for the most part. "Benjamin" has a certain physical shape, my ideas about "Benjamin" slowly adjust to a little more girth or a few more white hairs. You can always find discontinuity in reality, but the narrative remains fairly coherent nonetheless.

3) See above. How does this apply to speaking about other things like this rock, or that tree or this atom?

This or that rock is known by its location and general properties as we perceive them. Whatever is happening in the rock as it disappears and reappears through moments of time, the label "this rock" still applies to the same virtual object in my world view.

That's what objects are to us-- not really things, but our virtual representations of things as symbolized ideas. I'm not so sure it really matters what lies under the hood, because it really wouldn't change how we interact with our experiences.

4) I agree it's not the answer. It seems to me that there should be something in the formulation that can account for both the continuous identity of a human-being and any other sort of "being" or "existence".

I wonder if, when I sleep, I cease to exist. Certainly, if I had to choose between being a disembodied spirit, still conscious, or an unconscious body, I'd say that in the former I still exist, and in the latter that I do not. Therefore it is by consciousness that I define being.

It seems to me that if you accept a material universe, that panpsychism might allow for that commonality you are looking for, and that would probably be compatible with pantheism.

If you do not accept a material universe, then experientialism/idealism might work, and again I think it would be reasonable enough to describe a reality made up purely of experience and ideas as a kind of Mind of God.


However, the idea of a soul really doesn't mean much to me, because I associate more with my ability to experience sights, sounds and feelings than I do with any abstract entity at my "core." If I die, and my soul may no longer enjoy life, then it doesn't matter much if "soul" is a semantic/symbolic trick or a real thing.

[Ignorant]

If the self is then to examine itself, then what does this mean? [1] I'd say the self is that which considers, and cannot really BE an object.  The actual object being considered is ideas about the self, or at least it seems so to me. [2]

This is a problem with the physical world view.  A table under physical examination turns out to be a collection of wave functions-- it's "tableness" disappears under the microscope. [3]

I find it much easier to deal with humans as collections of ideas than as inviolable entities.  "Mom" is a collection of various types of tissue, memories stored in the brain and so on, in a physical sense.  But this is very far from what we think of when we talk about "Mom:" associations of warmth and safety (for most), a pat on the head and a look in the eye.

So in the case of brain damage, we must prune and repair our ideas about the reality of the person.  "Bob" may be the same only in his rough physical attributes and his government identification numbers. 

In the end, we must remember that "Bob" is a label for whatever-Bob-is, and there's no guarantee that won't change. [4] Ideas about permanence (via the mechanism of the soul or otherwise) are really about the way we symbolize and use linguistic semantics.  We don't like it when words mean different things all the time: "Bob" should be associated with "Bob-ness," and for that to mean anything, we'd like it to be as unambiguous as possible. [5]

Again, the physical reality challenges us philosophically.  If all the atoms in my body are recycled and replaced over time, am I still the same me that I was when I was say 20 years old? [6]

My answer will start to sound a bit parroted now: I think the idea persists, and evolves slowly over time for the most part.  "Benjamin" has a certain physical shape, my ideas about "Benjamin" slowly adjust to a little more girth or a few more white hairs.  You can always find discontinuity in reality, but the narrative remains fairly coherent nonetheless. [7]

This or that rock is known by its location and general properties as we perceive them.  Whatever is happening in the rock as it disappears and reappears through moments of time, the label "this rock" still applies to the same virtual object in my world view.

That's what objects are to us-- not really things, but our virtual representations of things as symbolized ideas.  I'm not so sure it really matters what lies under the hood, because it really wouldn't change how we interact with our experiences. [8]

I wonder if, when I sleep, I cease to exist.  Certainly, if I had to choose between being a disembodied spirit, still conscious, or an unconscious body, I'd say that in the former I still exist, and in the latter that I do not.  Therefore it is by consciousness that I define being. [9]

It seems to me that if you accept a material universe, that panpsychism might allow for that commonality you are looking for, and that would probably be compatible with pantheism.

If you do not accept a material universe, then experientialism/idealism might work, and again I think it would be reasonable enough to describe a reality made up purely of experience and ideas as a kind of Mind of God.


However, the idea of a soul really doesn't mean much to me, because I associate more with my ability to experience sights, sounds and feelings than I do with any abstract entity at my "core." [10] If I die, and my soul may no longer enjoy life, then it doesn't matter much if "soul" is a semantic/symbolic trick or a real thing. [11]

1) You had written "sense of self", which is a consideration of the subjectivity of being a "self". I was hoping to also consider the question of identity as an object from the 3rd person perspective. In other words, the subjective, 1st person experience of being a "self"  -VS- someone else's 3rd person experience of "you" as an object.

2) When I interact with and experience you, you present as an object from my perspective. Your subjective "sense-of-self" may or may not correspond to the way in which I experience you as an object.

3) I agree. This is a difficulty for metaphysical naturalism/materialism.

4) I agree. But that is exactly my question. Is there something about Bob which remains continuous while other things change and which allows us to rationally say it is still Bob? Either Bob is a "thing" (a "whatever-he-is") that is changing, or Bob is not "a" thing at all. The latter seems a bit too absurd for me.

5) Maybe language is telling us something, because I don't have any idea how I would describe the experience a non-thing.

6) That is exactly my question. It seems clear to me that there is at least one sense in which the answer is "yes", and at least one sense in which the answer is "no". "You" have completely different atoms now, so in that sense, no you aren't the same. "You" also have a unified history of change from the beginning of "you" until now which is true independently of and includes your subjective experience. Even if "you" can be reduced to a wave function, then "you" are-being JUST THAT wave function.

It's not exactly a new question. Either Heraclitus was way ahead of his time, or he was missing something very obvious.

7) Exactly. Not only do we experience coherence and continuity, but others also observe the same sort of coherence and continuity IN US. Are we both deluded?

8) No it wouldn't, but it would contribute either to a more adequate or a less adequate account of reality.

9) Maybe just a semantics thing, but wouldn't this mean that plants are not "beings"?

10) I don't buy into the Cartesian/Enlightenment conception of the soul which is what you describe as "at the core". The first part of your sentence is, ironically, very close to the classical/platonic/aristotelian/thomistic conception of the sensitive soul which is much more like an "idea/form" than a "supernatural" pilot of the body. Maybe your reluctance to entertain the concept of a soul is colored by this more modern conception?

11) Indeed. Seems like an important question to consider, IF death is not the end, no? The question is not if you HAVE a soul. The question is "What are 'you'?" IF you are a unified and identifiable "thing", then, despite your continuous changes, 'you' continue as-that-thing. If you continue as-that-thing, then it may be important to ask, "Do I continue as-that-thing after death?" Maybe yes, maybe no. Just a thought.