Occams Hatchet and Is Materialism "Special"

[Neo-Scholastic]

...until you can demonstrate how material functions arrive at that state-- and I mean even a PLAUSIBLE mechanism, nevermind a "fleshed out" theory, then you're really just refusing to engage in a discussion about the thing I'm talking about.

Maybe the problem isn't the lack of a mechanism but rather the assumption that all problems are mechanical.

[The Grand Nudger]

As I find myself saying to absolutely no end.  You might be right.  The brain may be different.  I'm going to start the known, however, when attempting to explain the unknown.

[The Grand Nudger]

As I find myself saying to absolutely no end.  You might be right.  The brain may be different.  I'm going to start the known, however, when attempting to explain the unknown.

[The Grand Nudger]

As I find myself saying to absolutely no end.  You might be right.  The brain may be different.  I'm going to start the known, however, when attempting to explain the unknown.

[The Grand Nudger]

LOL< that was an interesting wrinkle.

[Foxaèr]

A Wrinkle in Time.

[bennyboy]

The same way you've determined whether or not I'm capable of subjective experience.

I don't determine whether people do or don't have mind. I make a philosophical assumption because it's convenient for me. But this is not what science is or how it is supposed to work.

Yeah yeah yeah, the science isn't science.  More gap creation.

You're right. Begging the question is much tighter than "gap creation." Anyway, what's the "gap?" What do you think I'm trying to split into this gap, as a declared agnostic? My position is that we do NOT know what mind really is, or why it exists, and your position is what? That we do? Fine. . . explain how material systems, under any arrangement, have the capacity to experience qualia. *holds breath*

 
People have been talking about all manner of silly shit for thousands of years.  In their case, it's understandable.  In our case, it would be unforgivable.

If you think mind is "silly shit," then that's a bit unfortunate for this discussion. The fact is that I have subjective experiences, and I'm curious about them, and people throughout history have claimed also to have subjective experiences, and demonstrated an interest in their nature.

 
Well of course.  Cat and gato are the same thing too....wonder of wonders.

Nobody is disputing whether those two words represent the same thing. You aren't giving another word for "mind" as the word means to so many people. You are giving words for correlates of mind, and insisting they are the same thing. This is a different linguistic process, and I believe you know that.

I'd only offer the science that isn't science.  I hardly see the point.  After pages and pages across threads and years now....it's a little bit idiotic to claim that I refuse to engage you on the subject.

Answer one question, and then we can talk about how idiotic the claim is. My question: how would you determine whether a given physical system does / doesn't have the ability to experience qualia-- scientifically, I mean, since you're all about this "science of mind"?

[The Grand Nudger]

I don't determine whether people do or don't have mind.  I make a philosophical assumption because it's convenient for me.  But this is not what science is or how it is supposed to work.

Strongly disingenuous.  It only hurts because were buddies, lol. I mean, I may think you're a baddie...but I don't think your a chatbot with a voice, lol. I have strong reasons top suspect that you are, in fact, a human being like me with a subjective experience like mine.

You're right.  Begging the question is much tighter than "gap creation."  Anyway, what's the "gap?"  What do you think I'm trying to split into this gap, as a declared agnostic?

Who knows.  I've asked and asked and you don't have a clue, except that it simply cant be material. WTF does your agnosticism even have to do with this discussion, or with gap filling?

If you think mind is "silly shit," then that's a bit unfortunate for this discussion.  The fact is that I have subjective experiences, and I'm curious about them, and people throughout history have claimed also to have subjective experiences, and demonstrated an interest in their nature.

I think that people have believed alot of silly shit about minds.  Disingenuous, again.  I don;t know why anyone, today, would show deference towards the various fictions of the last thousand years.....if they wanted to explain some unknown thing. I agree, you have subjective experience.  So do I, so..obviously, we don't need to discuss candidacy.....right?  

You aren't giving another word for "mind" as the word means to so many people.  You are giving words for correlates of mind, and insisting they are the same.  This is a different process, and I believe you know that.

No, I'm not.  But why would it be relevant?  -You- gave another word for red, and it's translation to my language.   That's what -I- responded to.  I've repeatedly explained to you how computational systems work, how they manage the manipulation of information, so no, I;m not just giving you different words, for mind or it's correlates...and that would be asanine. I'm explaining how one thing we know about manages to do something we suspect to be happening in ourselves.

What's a different process..what are you talking about, what do I know?

Answer one question, and then we can talk about how idiotic the claim is.  My question: how would you determine whether a given physical system does / doesn't have the ability to experience qualia?

Asked and answered.  My answer isn't going to change........?

[Bunburryist]

I understand why you put the disclaimer in there, but again....obviously learning about nuerotransmitters, for example, tells us something about experience. 

Actually, what we know about neurotransmitters tells us absolutely nothing about experience.  There is no physically described, or describable relationship between neurons and the experience of yellow.  Is there a relationship - absolutely.  Within the context of the material worldview - and this is one of the fundamental problems with it - there is no way to bridge the gap between physically describable systems and any experience of any kind.  Not only is there not an "obvious" connection between neuronal processes in a material world (I don't think such a world exists - but that's another story), there's not one in fact.  Show me one physical connection between neuronal processes and any experience of any kind.  There is a correlation between physical models we derive from this experience and our experience as a whole.  Certainly.  But that doesn't mean it has to be the one the materialist worldview says it is.

[Bunburryist]

Can you give me link that explains Thomistic philosophy particularly well? (I'm still trying to get the hang of quoting people! Let me try it again . . .)