Trying to simplify my Consciousness hypothesis

[bennyboy]

If the universe is nothing but materials, their processes, and their physical transformations, then where does subjective agency fit into all this? 

Apparently, it fits into brains.  ...........?

Fine. Pull out your Qualiometer 3000, and demonstrate that a brain, or ANY other physical system, has qualia.

Most of the universe very much appears to be this way already.

The question is why you don't believe ALL the universe is this way.

The difference in physical function would be qualia.....

Great! Show me some qualia, and we'll look at it under a microscope, and it's a done deal.

So to insist that the universe is nothing but physical function is to introduce a ghost into the equation.

I'm not sure why you would think so, it doesn't follow from anything above.

That's because everything you just said begs the question.

[DLJ]

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 So to insist that the universe is nothing but physical function is to introduce a ghost into the equation.

Indeed. And that ghost is called "qualia"

This reminds of the Vitalist's adherence to the notion of élan vital.

[The Grand Nudger]

Fine.  Pull out your Qualiometer 3000, and demonstrate that a brain, or ANY other physical system, has qualia.

I was under the impression that you didn't have much of an issue with the notion that our ability to experience has something to do with our brains.  Whatever else it might have to do with, that thing is happening in our brains as well, eh?  In any case, are you now doubting the existence of qualia?  I thought that was accepted by both of us?  

The question is why you don't believe ALL the universe is this way.

Seems like a silly question to me.  I experience, you experience. Our experience is the thing we both discuss in regards to explanations, not some thing neither of us thinks exists or is lacking in evidence for...right?

Great!  Show me some qualia, and we'll look at it under a microscope, and it's a done deal.

Didn't Jorg once have some very clear and concise comments on this subject, with regards to how we measure electricity, and the inanity of claiming, then, that we do not or cannot measure qualia?  Perhaps you don't accept those measurements, for whatever reason...or you suddenly become a qualia skeptic, but meh.  

That's because everything you just said begs the question.

What question?  You set the scenario.  You clearly wanted it to yield some ghost, but fucked it up.  That's your problem, not mine. It wouldn;t matter if I -had- begged some question....you, still, fucked, it, up. Work on your inferences.

[bennyboy]

Fine.  Pull out your Qualiometer 3000, and demonstrate that a brain, or ANY other physical system, has qualia.

I was under the impression that you didn't have much of an issue with the notion that our ability to experience has something to do with our brains.  Whatever else it might have to do with, that thing is happening in our brains as well, eh?  In any case, are you now doubting the existence of qualia?  I thought that was accepted by both of us?  

Yeah, I was probably responding to where I think you're going than to the thing you just quoted. My bad.

There's always doubt for me, at all levels of analysis. But let's say that for us, the brain is real (though we may not agree on what underlies it or any material thing), and that the nature of our experiences is clearly affected by brain function, and that observing brain function can tell us something about what somebody might be experiencing. I can't experience what it's like to view a mouse with sonar, for example, because I'm not a bat, and we can look at differences in bat an human brains to see what that processing might look like.

But with regard to psychogony, I wouldn't say the brain allows for mind, exactly. Does an ocean cause waves, because it has waves on it? No: tidal motions, winds and so on create the waves. And even the capacity of waves has nothing to do specifically with the ocean, but with properties of water-- not even water, but of the QM particles which do their little dance with energy. So saying we only see waves on oceans doesn't really mean much. Waves are really something intrinsic to the universe-- how energy transmits through materials. Wave-ogony is not explained by oceans, or anything oceans do.

[The Grand Nudger]

Yeah, I was probably responding to where I think you're going than to the thing you just quoted.  My bad.

There's always doubt for me, at all levels of analysis.  But let's say that for us, the brain is real (though we may not agree on what underlies it or any material thing), and that the nature of our experiences is clearly affected by brain function, and that observing brain function can tell us something about what somebody might be experiencing.  I can't experience what it's like to view a mouse with sonar, for example, because I'm not a bat, and we can look at differences in bat an human brains to see what that processing might look like.

You -don't-, we have no idea whether or not we can't.  If there is a language to cognition or experience, there is, conceivably, a means of translation.  If there's some intrinsic common element to experience..then that's one less hurdle to overcome in translation. The only way that we could legitimately claim that we simply -couldn;t- experience what it was like to be a bat is if the hardware (or the intrinsic element in either subjects experiential mechanism, as it were) were completely disparate and therefore incompatible. That's certainly -not- the case with the bats brain, relative to ours....so there's only one place such a troubling incompatibility could lie........the intrinsic x you propose, that I do not. That isn;t going to work for you, though, considering your description of it as intrinsic to the universe itself. So, maybe, lay off the can'ts?

(I know you like having your mind blown - I present the above for your enjoyment)

But with regard to psychogony, I wouldn't say the brain allows for mind, exactly.  Does an ocean cause waves, because it has waves on it?  No: tidal motions, winds and so on create the waves.  And even the capacity of waves has nothing to do specifically with the ocean, but with properties of water-- not even water, but of the QM particles which do their little dance with energy.  So saying we only see waves on oceans doesn't really mean much.  Waves are really something intrinsic to the universe-- how energy transmits through materials.  Wave-ogony is not explained by oceans, or anything oceans do.

You do realize that the qm particles that make up the water, and the water that makes up the ocean...are all the same thing..right?  I don't know why we'd say that we only see waves on oceans anyway...this seems like an incredibly poor analogy to draw any inference from whatsoever. Qualia, otoh, appears to be a bit more limited than waves. While we do have evidence of wave functions in a variety of media, we -don;t have evidence of qualia in a variety of media. Ultimately, and you know I;m very sympathetic to this notion, there may be many more thing with qualia than we know about.........but do you really want to open that can of worms, lol?

A material monist might tell you that interaction is the intrinsic thing in the brain that allows for cognition and qualia.  So, ignoring any issues wih the description or comments above...I don't see any problem or incompability with your description of the intrinsic this or that of waves and a material monists explanation of brain functions. There's only the additional qualification that while interaction may be intrinsic, and necessary...it clearly isn't sufficient in and of itself. Thus, enters the specific types of interactions provided by the brain (and sure, possibly other things as well...).

[I_am_not_mafia]

What about if the computer was a 100% perfect simulation of all the neurons, dendrites, synapses and neurotransmitters in a real brain, and you then plugged it into a real body with senses?

Why wouldn't it have an equal experience of dust or blue skies?

Why would it?

Why would an organic system have an experience and an artificial system not have one? You say organic systems do have experiences. Tell me why a perfect computer simulation in a body would not.

What about instead of using a computer, you created an agent controller using cells and put that in a body? Would that then be able to experience? If so, why? Or why not?

The key requirement here is that the agent controller needs to be embodied in an environment and be able to sense and act within it.

Is that the key requirement?  If you had a non-organic system, and it could do the things you say are key, would you know that it was really experiencing, rather than just seeming to?

Let's view this as a hypothesis: "Systems with requirements X and Y have the capacity to subjectively experience what things are like (i.e. qualia)."  How would you go about proving this hypothesis?  Ask it, "Siri. . . are you conscious?"  "Yes, Dave, I am.  Super-duper, fully aware."

Well I don't believe that qualia exists. I think it's an utterly useless bullshit term. You're the one who claims that it does exist. I am trying to point out that you are making assumptions that you cannot support, that qualia exists for natural agents and cannot exist for artificial ones. You are assuming that there is something inherent about natural systems that allow them to experience qualia, even though you have no idea what the feature in natural systems would allow for this, you do not know what qualia is, how to define it, how to recognise it or what would make it appear in natural systems and not artificial ones. And the only reason you are in this position is because of your philosophy rather than any evidence.

I am claiming that the only thing inherent about the artificial system you proposed that could not feel would be that it was not embodied so cannot sense and act within an environment. All your claims of qualia come from being embodied in an environment.

Assumptions that you have to have reached a certain level of mental development in order to experience things can lead to really immoral acts. The medical profession used to only give anaesthesia to adults for this very reason. My dad for example remembers having his tonsils cut out of him without anaesthetic when he was a young boy. It's the same mentality that leads to animal or cruelty or abuse of children.

Eh?  Are you saying all of this for a reason?  I don't see the connection to anything I said.  It seems to be an attempt to support a philosophical position with an emotional appeal: "Yes, but what about the CHILDREN?" and eventually maybe, "Well. . . YOU say the bennotron 3000 isn't really alive. . . but what if you're WRONG?"

I am saying that you are falling into the same trap as the medical profession and industries who farm animals. Just because they cannot communicate that they are experiencing something that you doubt whether they actually are experiencing it.

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Apparently, it fits into brains.  ...........?

Fine.  Pull out your Qualiometer 3000, and demonstrate that a brain, or ANY other physical system, has qualia.

First tell us what qualia is, how to recognise it and give us reason to suspect that it exists.

Or stop using the word qualia. Your whole position relies upon equivocation about qualia means.

[bennyboy]

Why would an organic system have an experience and an artificial system not have one? You say organic systems do have experiences. Tell me why a perfect computer simulation in a body would not.

I do not know whether computers, perfect or otherwise, are capable of experiencing qualia.

Well I don't believe that qualia exists. I think it's an utterly useless bullshit term. You're the one who claims that it does exist. I am trying to point out that you are making assumptions that you cannot support, that qualia exists for natural agents and cannot exist for artificial ones. You are assuming that there is something inherent about natural systems that allow them to experience qualia, even though you have no idea what the feature in natural systems would allow for this, you do not know what qualia is, how to define it, how to recognise it or what would make it appear in natural systems and not artificial ones. And the only reason you are in this position is because of your philosophy rather than any evidence.

You are putting too many words in my mouth. I don't have a shortage of them, so I don't think you should do that.

I am saying that you are falling into the same trap as the medical profession and industries who farm animals. Just because they cannot communicate that they are experiencing something that you doubt whether they actually are experiencing it.

Again, you are projecting onto me opinions I've neither expressed nor hold.

First tell us what qualia is, how to recognise it and give us reason to suspect that it exists.

Qualia is the subjective experience of what things are like: what it's like to drink hot chocolate, what it's like to see something red, and so on. In order to recognize your own, I recommend you open your eyes and look at something, assuming you yourself are not a philosophical zombie. As for "suspecting" that it exists, I can only comment for myself-- qualia is an accurate label for my experiences of what things are like-- it doesn't need to be proven, because the word is simply a label for that. I suspect that YOU also experience qualia, since you are likely human, and since I suspect that all humans experience qualia.

Or stop using the word qualia. Your whole position relies upon equivocation about qualia means.

Qualia has only ever meant one thing, so far as I know.

[Edwardo Piet]

No I'm not committing that fallacy at all because I am not attiributing anything of the sort. I am saying that the mental can be physical and  to say it's a contradiction is to commit the equivocation fallacy. I'm not saying objects without brains have thoughts and feelings

But you are attributing intentions to (supposedly) deterministic processes.

Yes I am attributing intentions to deterministic living being's deterministic brains.

I am NOT attributing intentions to non-living objects. I'm not saying a chair has thoughts and feelings. That's the pathetic fallacy.

Determinism has nothing to do with this. I believe we live in a deterministic causal universe. I also believe I have a physical brain containing physical neurons that thinks.

The fact you think that saying deterministic physical beings with deterministic physical brains is a logical fallacy just shows how utterly terrible at logic you are.

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What do you mean "Why would it?" Why wouldn't it? Evolution has useless side effects and by products left over all the time. There's no purpose to it it's purposeless.

An extra appendage, a malformed foot or a vestigial organ is not in the same category as the capacity to subjectively experience.  All those other things, all the ones you could possibly discuss, are philosophically neutral.  The ability to experience what things are like is a really different issue-- it's not derived from anything else, it doesn't contribute to anything else, it is not even physically detectable, and yet it is clearly the most important aspect of human existence.

Subjective human experience is impossible to study by science. But I don't see why that makes it mysterious. Of course it's impossible to study something that can only be experienced by the person experiencing it because it is by defintiion their experience itself.

I still don't see the mystery. Science can't prove it's caused by just a bunch of neurons but the likelihood that it is is very close to 100 percent because anything else is ridiculous.

Neurons in my brain working together the way they do produce the side effect of my subjective experience... science can't prove I have that experience because that's the nature of subjective experience. I don't see the big deal.

[bennyboy]

I still don't see the mystery. Science can't prove it's caused by just a bunch of neurons but the likelihood that it is is very close to 100 percent because anything else is ridiculous.

It's a mystery because we don't know how it works or why it's there.

Neurons in my brain working together the way they do produce the side effect of my subjective experience... science can't prove I have that experience because that's the nature of subjective experience. I don't see the big deal.

You are talking about the proximate cause. If we assume a bunch of organic molecules don't themselves experience qualia, and we know that a human with a brain does, it's fine to wave toward the brain and say, "It's in there somewhere." But that's not really the philosophical question that matters. What matters is the distal cause: why it is that objects may become subjectively aware at all. What is it about the universe that allows me, or anyone else, to know what it's like to see the color red, or to enjoy a nice cup of hot chocolate?

[DLJ]

...
Qualia is the subjective experience of what things are like: what it's like to drink hot chocolate, what it's like to see something red, and so on.
...

Which makes it a variable. For example, hot chocolate will be less sweet if imbibed after eating pancakes with maple syrup.

...
Qualia has only ever meant one thing, so far as I know.

In 1988, Dan Dennett attempted to pin it down by proposing that "the root concept of qualia has four conditions. Qualia are:
1) ineffable
2) intrinsic
3) private, and
4) directly apprehensible ways things seem to one.

That is to say, they are
1) somehow atomic to introspection and hence indescribable ("you had to be there");
2) not relational or dispositional or functional (the colour red may be anxiety-provoking to some people but that subjective disposition is not a quale of red);
3) "You had to be there, but you can't be, they're mine and mine alone!"; and
4) your qualia are known to you more intimately than anything else.

In Intuition Pumps he added: "This is still regarded as a good starting place in most circles, but since the point of that essay was to show that nothing could meet these four conditions, there has been ample discussion of revised or improved versions of the concept, with no emerging consensus."