Philosophical zombies
March 2, 2018 at 3:22 am
(This post was last modified: March 2, 2018 at 3:25 am by robvalue.)
I often get carried away in thought experiments that are of no practical importance. If that's not of interest to you, best go read something more worthwhile
A philosophical zombie is something that is physically identical to a human in every way, yet has no conscious experience. The lights are on but no one is home. If I am actually plugged into a simulation for example, it would be reasonable to say everyone else could be such zombies, if they are simulated.
In what way is a zombie really different though? This seems to me to be a difference without a distinction. Defining what an "experience" is, seems to be hugely problematic. I have no way of telling, for example, that anyone has any experiences other than me. I ponder the idea of what it even means for me to have an experience.
Consciousness is similarly difficult to pin down, but scientifically I think it's best described as an emergent property of a functioning brain. So to say a zombie has a physical functioning brain but no consciousness seems like a contradiction. I am feeling that the best way I can describe "experiences", even my own, are as pragmatic internal illusions. It seems ridiculous to say my experience is "real" but the exact physical processes of a zombie produces a consciousness that isn't real. The word "real" is so ludicrously hard to define that I've given up formally trying to do so.
I watched the video below, as a guy tries to defeat physicalism. He does so by simply stating zombies don't exist. Other than appealing to popular opinion, I don't know how he came to that conclusion. I'm not impressed or convinced. I think that most people insist there is a difference between us and zombies because they need to feel special, but it's begging the question and appealing to dualism, as far as I can see.
A philosophical zombie is something that is physically identical to a human in every way, yet has no conscious experience. The lights are on but no one is home. If I am actually plugged into a simulation for example, it would be reasonable to say everyone else could be such zombies, if they are simulated.
In what way is a zombie really different though? This seems to me to be a difference without a distinction. Defining what an "experience" is, seems to be hugely problematic. I have no way of telling, for example, that anyone has any experiences other than me. I ponder the idea of what it even means for me to have an experience.
Consciousness is similarly difficult to pin down, but scientifically I think it's best described as an emergent property of a functioning brain. So to say a zombie has a physical functioning brain but no consciousness seems like a contradiction. I am feeling that the best way I can describe "experiences", even my own, are as pragmatic internal illusions. It seems ridiculous to say my experience is "real" but the exact physical processes of a zombie produces a consciousness that isn't real. The word "real" is so ludicrously hard to define that I've given up formally trying to do so.
I watched the video below, as a guy tries to defeat physicalism. He does so by simply stating zombies don't exist. Other than appealing to popular opinion, I don't know how he came to that conclusion. I'm not impressed or convinced. I think that most people insist there is a difference between us and zombies because they need to feel special, but it's begging the question and appealing to dualism, as far as I can see.
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