Atheism and the existence of peanut butter

[R00tKiT]

You originally proposed that you can't give what you haven't got wrt good and evil, neither of which is a thing in the same sense that imperfection is not a thing here.  So by arguing that the can't-give rule doesn't apply to things that are not in fact things in the ontological sense of existing, you've refuted your own rule as you originally applied it to good and evil, neither of which are things in that sense either.

Good and evil are, actually, a thing, although more precise terminology may be in order. Good encompasses any good deed or character you can think of, all of which come down to some concrete act or intention of a human being, and evil is trivially the exact opposite. Imperfection, on the other hand, is a negative concept, if we say that x is imperfect, we aren't referring to any physical action or moral intent that x does or has, but merely to the fact that at least one character or aspect of x isn't maximal.  

Actually, our own history, the behavior of primitive tribes in the Amazon, and the behavior of the majority of our closest evolutionary relatives seems to indicate that our natural state is one of perpetual war and unmitigated and recurrent episodes of merciless killing.  We have developed into a species that to this day has not found a way to leave that heritage behind.

We have a name for this "heritage", it's called the survival instinct. Doing anything to survive as an individual or a society/culture/empire/country isn't exactly a defeater to benevolence. I can be highly empathetic and "benevolent" with members of my family/my tribe and, at the same time, perceive any neighboring family or tribe as a threat. Going to war with my neighboring tribe doesn't make me a malevolent family member. You are simply equivocating many levels of society in your attempted argument.

Okay, I think I understand better what you're confused about. This proposal says that time began together with the universe. But time - I assume you already know- is a dimension of the universe, of the spacetime, it's not some independent frame or some nebulous existence that accompanies the universe, it is a building block of the universe. 

With that said, we can define a time frame allowing us to define a beginning more clearly: any point in this time frame corresponds to an event. The universe's beginning is simply an event, like any other, along this time frame, if we assume, for example, that other events preceded it, then each of them correspond to different consecutive points along our time frame, etc. 

The bolded is explicitly ruled out by Hawking-Hartle.  Therefore, either you have conceded the point, or you are using 'to begin' in a different sense than you have defined here.  What is that other sense and is it consistent with the first premise of Kalam?

You completely misunderstood my point. I am defining another time frame/timeline, other than that of the universe, in which all events of existence occupy a spot, so yeah, I am using a different sense of 'to begin', evidently. The Hawking-Hartle confirms that the universe or the spacetime (which includes time) has a beginning, I frankly don't know why this so confusing for you.

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How do you get from the Hawking-Hartle hypothesis to the uncaused cause..............?

The unmoved moves.  This is what happens when you eliminate the regression of causes existing in the universe's past.  Eliminate the regression, you eliminate Kalam.
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I am not sure I follow. What do you mean by "the unmoved moves"...? 

What you are arguing are the basic rules of thought are instead conventions of language

This is probably your most ridiculous assertion so far. The laws of thought are NOT conventions, I am dead serious about this one. They are fundamental axiomatic rules upon which rational discourse is based. They have been given many algebraic representations and justifications of consitency by eminent logicians. More importantly, they have absolutely nothing to do with language or its conventions.
A microprocessor doesn't understand human sentences or any form of language, it's a large scale circuit which processes bits of information using semiconductors and an arithmetic logic unit, which performs a ridiculously big amount of arithmetic operations/bitwise logical operations. The founding principles governing these operations are these very laws of thought.

The basic rule of thought is that two mutually exclusive possibilities do not admit of a third possibility; it's not the rule of thought that is at issue, but rather what you consider possible given the analytical content of the described two possibilities.  As noted, their analytical content does not entail that they are necessary negations of each other, and so you must pursue a contradiction elsewhere.  That isn't violating a rule of thought; that's pointing out that what you thought satisfied a specific rule of thought does not necessarily satisfy that rule of thought.  The problem is not the rule, but your inability to show that it is satisfied.

Don't be ridiculous. There is nothing complicated or tricky about the "analytical content" of (the universe began to exist) and its logical negation. What you refer to as my inability is simply my inability to demonstrate an axiomatic rule of thought. And, tell you what, I am proud of such an inability. 

Something, which exists, and that didn't begin to exist, always existed. Is there something you find particularly unclear or challenging about the previous sentence?

Let's not get sidetracked by an additional topic at this point.  As to the moral order, it's not clear that there is a moral order or that a god can provide a foundation for one.  As previously remarked, in order to show that a cause is supernatural, you need to show that some entity is able to violate the nomological principles of its local reality.  There doesn't appear to be any argument grounded in knowledge of a specific reality that would entail the existence of a violation; any arguments not grounded in knowledge fail as an appeal to ignorance.  This is why I hold that only ontological arguments can provide evidence for a god -- arguments grounded explicitly in the laws of thought.  Your attempt to find a contradiction in (not (began to exist) and not (past eternal)) does not appear to be grounded in the laws of thought so much as it does in the way you choose to make use of certain words.

If you don't want to get sidetracked, why did you ask for another argument for God that doesn't involve the Kalam..?? 

I think I explained enough already why an eternal past is impossible. Again, very simply, an eternal past takes eternity, and since eternity never elapses, we never get to a present moment. This can't be simpler.

The ontological arguments are rejected by eminent theologians, including Swinburne. They all consider existence to be a predicate of an object, and then argue that the concept of God which includes existence is superior/more perfect than one that doesn't. Kant showed a while ago that this is a meaningless statement.