Shia Islamic Argument for the existence of God
March 12, 2016 at 2:39 am
(This post was last modified: March 12, 2016 at 6:09 am by robvalue.)
Hello atheists,
I'm a Shia Muslim. The goal for this post is simply to see whether this one argument stands the test of reason. This argument, if valid, would rationalize monotheism (and maybe even pantheistic monotheism, but let's not get ahead of ourselves). To me this argument seems like a death blow to atheism.
All of the traditional arguments for God's existence have been refuted: The Ontological Arguments, The Cosmological Arguments, The Teleological Arguments (Arguments from Design), The Moral Arguments, The Arguments from Justice, The Arguments from Religious Experience, The Arguments from Miracles, The Arguments from Ignorance, The Arguments from Reward, the Arguments from Scripture, the Arguments from Consciousness, and Pascal's Wager; none of these arguments can stand the test of reason. For a brief refutation of each, see [snip] or check out The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins.
There is just this one last argument that survives (maybe because of its obscurity). I bet 99.9% of atheists haven't even heard of this argument. Heck, I bet 99.9% of Muslims haven't heard of it either. Most Muslims believe in the religion simply because their parents told them to.
This argument is named "Proof of the Veracious". I will abbreviate it to "POTV" throughout the rest of the post.
I find the POTV to be a valid and sound argument. According to Ayatollah Mahdi Hadavi Tehrani, the POTV is the strongest proof of the existence of Allah in Islam (please note that the purpose of the argument is not to prove the correctness of Islam or any particular religion; it is simply to prove monotheism correct). Ayatollah Jawadi Amuli calls it a “brilliant” argument. The POTV was introduced by Ibn Sina, who says he derived it from the Quran and hadiths. In light of this, I think refuting it would be well worth an atheist’s while (although I do not see how anyone will be able to refute it; it seems valid and sound to me). The argument is explicated on pages 181-190 (the actual syntax starts at page 184) of Ayatollah Jawadi Amuli’s book A Commentary on Theistic Arguments. The book, by the way, is an extremely satisfying read. The author shoots down almost all the traditional arguments for God's existence the way Dawkins did in his The God Delusion. Anyways, below is an excerpt from pages 184-187. I would like to warn you guys not to figure out the meanings of unfamiliar words by using context clues (I made this mistake the first time I read it) and should rather search them up and understand what they mean. The passage uses philosophical terminology (e.g. modality, extension, etc), and I would prefer if people from an educated philosophical background respond. Also, the passage below uses the term "demonstration" instead of "proof" when referring to the argument. And "Allamah Tabatabai" was a recent Shia Islamic scholar who present a more refined version of Ibn Sina'a original proof.
"The point towards which ‛Allāmah Tabātabā’ī draws attention is that the proposition “There is a reality,” and the proposition “Sophistry is void,” have eternal necessity. That is, the modality of these propositions is not attributive, conditional, or essential necessity. Acceptance of this claim, like acceptance of reality, needs mere drawing of one’s attention (tanbīh). In other words, just as the entertainment of the concept of reality is sufficient to acknowledge its truth, the conception of the notion of eternal necessity of reality is sufficient for accepting its validity. A human being cannot accept sophistry in any situation or condition, since situations and conditions are realities, which attest to the invalidity of sophistry, which is the negation of reality.
Should reality be annihilated in a specific condition—in a beginning, or an end, or in any particular supposition—then only two situations are conceivable. The first is that its annihilation is not real, and an equivocal or false claim has been made that reality is annihilated. In this case, reality is preserved and it has not been annihilated. The second is that its annihilation is true; that is, reality has really been annihilated. In this supposition, again, the affirmation of the basic reality is acknowledged, since the supposition asserts that reality has really been destroyed; therefore, as a real phenomenon, the destruction of reality reflects the real presence of reality. Therefore, the falsehood of sophistry and veridicality of reality is well secured in every perceivable supposition; and a single instance of reality’s destruction is inconceivable.
A proposition, which negates reality, is a proposition, that neither its veridicality can be related in any supposition, nor its falsehood could ever be doubted. That is, its utterance always presupposes its own falsity. On the other side of the spectrum, it is impossible to doubt the meaning of the proposition, which affirms reality, because dismissing it as meaningless or doubting its meaning entails the affirmation of reality.
If, like a finite being, reality lacked eternal necessity and its necessity were conditional, say, with the continuance of its existence (al‑dharūra al‑dhātiyya), sophism would have had veridicality in the realm of reality’s destruction. Nevertheless, the veridicality of sophistry is a reality, which has its own specific nafs al-amr.
The realm of sophistry’s veridicality is not the abode of the narrator’s existence, in which case its veridicality would pertain to the reality of the narrator. Rather, its realm of truth is that very supposition, which the proposition reflects. When, in a given supposition, reality is negated, real negation of philosophy and real affirmation of sophistry is a reality that has been narrated. Thus, reality is still manifested in the context of its very negation. For this reason, reality cannot be denied in any supposition; and the primary and self-evident proposition (al-qadhiyya al-awwaliyya al-badīhiyya), which holds its truth, has eternal necessity.
Since the truth of the propositions, which relate reality of finite and conditional beings, is subject to certain conditions, and it is only within certain boundaries that they are true, beyond which they are false, finite and conditional beings cannot be the extension (misdāq) of the reality that has eternal necessity.
Given that the aggregate of finite beings is not another entity, which has something additional to its parts, it does not have any reality at all. Similarly, their universals (jāmi‛) do not have any external reality either, and they are notions that exist in the mind by the mental mode of existence (al-wujūd al-dhehnī) in such a way that if the mind did not to exist, the universals would not even have found the mental existence. Therefore, reality, the eternally necessary existence of which is axiomatic and primary, is other than the finite beings, their totality, and their universals, as the first have finite realities, the second has no reality, and the third has a limited mental reality.
Therefore, the first ontological proposition, which the human being cannot not know, is the affirmation of the basic reality, and its modality is eternal necessity. And since, as just explained, finite entities, such as the heavens, the earth, the cosmos, and so forth, cannot be the extension of this proposition, its extension is only an Absolute Reality—Who is above the restrictions of conditions, is present with all of the finite realities, and no absence or termination is perceivable with respect to Him.
The demonstration of the veracious, with this exposition, sidesteps the criticism of failure of differentiation between notion and extension. This argument is not based on the notion of reality and its necessity of predication to itself by predication as essence. The argument, in fact, proceeds from the first ontological proposition, which encompasses affirmation of the basic reality and rejection of sophistry. The affirmation of reality is not based on its notion, which is held in the mind; it is with respect to external factuality. If it were on the basis of its notion and by predication as essence (al‑haml al‑awwalī), then just as reality is reality, sophism is sophism. Therefore, the invalidation of sophism, and consequently, the truth of the basic reality, is with respect to the external world and predication as extension (al‑haml al‑shā’ye‛)."
The author says that this proof establishes the existence of an entity that is eternally necessary (i.e. it can never not exist) and that this entity is other than the finite beings, their totality, or their universals. This entity is, in his words, "absolute." The author finishes his explication on page 189 by adding that "in the light of absoluteness and infinity of the Real, His other attributes such as unity, knowledge, and the like, are traced one after the other." It would've been nicer if the author went further and elaborated the logical steps in tracing some of the mentioned attributes. Luckily for us, Ibn Sina had attempted this job centuries earlier. Although Ibn Sina may have intended to write these attribute tracings to follow his arguments from contingencies (and not necessarily as entailments from the POTV), we can still use the tracings because some of them are based on the mere necessity of a necessary existent. I found many of these tracings in chapter 9 of the book Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays, edited by Peter Anderson (Google Books link: https://books.google.com/books?id=YyggAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false). The POTV, coupled with some of the attribute tracings that I found sound, proves the existence of an entity that is necessary, eternal, self-subsisting, independent, primary, absolute/infinite, unrestricted, unique, one-and-only, omnipresent, immaterial, formless, ineffable, uncaused, doesn't have any rivals, and has all things else depending on it for their existence (the last attribute seems valid only if the principle of causality for contingents is taken as a premise).
My atheist friend asked me if I could also prove that this entity is conscious. So although the following argument is not part of the POTV or Ibn Sina's entailments, I would really like it if you guys could critique it:
"Whether or not the entity is conscious may depend on your outlook. If you think that ignorance and unconsciousness are restrictions or limits, then the entity can be considered knowledgeable and conscious (because the entity cannot have restrictions or limits).
Or you could say this:
Since the entity is absolute/infinite, nothing limits it, and it cannot have any lacks; it must possess all and every degree of existence. Consciousness is a degree/aspect of existence (a rock that is conscious has more existence than an unconscious rock), and since the entity cannot lack anything, it must possess infinite consciousness. The same can be said for knowledge."
My atheist buddy responded by saying "Does a rock that has sexual desire have more existence than a normal rock?" I responded "I see where you're going with this. You're trying to say that the entity possesses infinite sexual desire. Although that is technically true, the entity is much more than just that. It has ALL perfections and/or forms of existence." He then asked "You said that it must possess every degree of existence. So it would have to be material then." I replied "True. Its existence covers the material realm. It has EVERY "fullness" or "existence"; it is unlimited." And here is where the pantheism stuff is supposed to come in.
That's it. I know there may be more clarifications I might have to make, but let's see where this goes for now. Please respond by critiquing this argument in particular; critique its form, structure, validity, and soundness. Don't sidetrack or rant about religion or whatever other crap you guys like to enjoy spewing around. Focus.
I'm a Shia Muslim. The goal for this post is simply to see whether this one argument stands the test of reason. This argument, if valid, would rationalize monotheism (and maybe even pantheistic monotheism, but let's not get ahead of ourselves). To me this argument seems like a death blow to atheism.
All of the traditional arguments for God's existence have been refuted: The Ontological Arguments, The Cosmological Arguments, The Teleological Arguments (Arguments from Design), The Moral Arguments, The Arguments from Justice, The Arguments from Religious Experience, The Arguments from Miracles, The Arguments from Ignorance, The Arguments from Reward, the Arguments from Scripture, the Arguments from Consciousness, and Pascal's Wager; none of these arguments can stand the test of reason. For a brief refutation of each, see [snip] or check out The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins.
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Link above removed by robvalue. Members should not post external links until they have 30 posts and have been here 30 days. Please see the rules. I have also deleted the duplicate of this thread that was posted.
There is just this one last argument that survives (maybe because of its obscurity). I bet 99.9% of atheists haven't even heard of this argument. Heck, I bet 99.9% of Muslims haven't heard of it either. Most Muslims believe in the religion simply because their parents told them to.
This argument is named "Proof of the Veracious". I will abbreviate it to "POTV" throughout the rest of the post.
I find the POTV to be a valid and sound argument. According to Ayatollah Mahdi Hadavi Tehrani, the POTV is the strongest proof of the existence of Allah in Islam (please note that the purpose of the argument is not to prove the correctness of Islam or any particular religion; it is simply to prove monotheism correct). Ayatollah Jawadi Amuli calls it a “brilliant” argument. The POTV was introduced by Ibn Sina, who says he derived it from the Quran and hadiths. In light of this, I think refuting it would be well worth an atheist’s while (although I do not see how anyone will be able to refute it; it seems valid and sound to me). The argument is explicated on pages 181-190 (the actual syntax starts at page 184) of Ayatollah Jawadi Amuli’s book A Commentary on Theistic Arguments. The book, by the way, is an extremely satisfying read. The author shoots down almost all the traditional arguments for God's existence the way Dawkins did in his The God Delusion. Anyways, below is an excerpt from pages 184-187. I would like to warn you guys not to figure out the meanings of unfamiliar words by using context clues (I made this mistake the first time I read it) and should rather search them up and understand what they mean. The passage uses philosophical terminology (e.g. modality, extension, etc), and I would prefer if people from an educated philosophical background respond. Also, the passage below uses the term "demonstration" instead of "proof" when referring to the argument. And "Allamah Tabatabai" was a recent Shia Islamic scholar who present a more refined version of Ibn Sina'a original proof.
"The point towards which ‛Allāmah Tabātabā’ī draws attention is that the proposition “There is a reality,” and the proposition “Sophistry is void,” have eternal necessity. That is, the modality of these propositions is not attributive, conditional, or essential necessity. Acceptance of this claim, like acceptance of reality, needs mere drawing of one’s attention (tanbīh). In other words, just as the entertainment of the concept of reality is sufficient to acknowledge its truth, the conception of the notion of eternal necessity of reality is sufficient for accepting its validity. A human being cannot accept sophistry in any situation or condition, since situations and conditions are realities, which attest to the invalidity of sophistry, which is the negation of reality.
Should reality be annihilated in a specific condition—in a beginning, or an end, or in any particular supposition—then only two situations are conceivable. The first is that its annihilation is not real, and an equivocal or false claim has been made that reality is annihilated. In this case, reality is preserved and it has not been annihilated. The second is that its annihilation is true; that is, reality has really been annihilated. In this supposition, again, the affirmation of the basic reality is acknowledged, since the supposition asserts that reality has really been destroyed; therefore, as a real phenomenon, the destruction of reality reflects the real presence of reality. Therefore, the falsehood of sophistry and veridicality of reality is well secured in every perceivable supposition; and a single instance of reality’s destruction is inconceivable.
A proposition, which negates reality, is a proposition, that neither its veridicality can be related in any supposition, nor its falsehood could ever be doubted. That is, its utterance always presupposes its own falsity. On the other side of the spectrum, it is impossible to doubt the meaning of the proposition, which affirms reality, because dismissing it as meaningless or doubting its meaning entails the affirmation of reality.
If, like a finite being, reality lacked eternal necessity and its necessity were conditional, say, with the continuance of its existence (al‑dharūra al‑dhātiyya), sophism would have had veridicality in the realm of reality’s destruction. Nevertheless, the veridicality of sophistry is a reality, which has its own specific nafs al-amr.
The realm of sophistry’s veridicality is not the abode of the narrator’s existence, in which case its veridicality would pertain to the reality of the narrator. Rather, its realm of truth is that very supposition, which the proposition reflects. When, in a given supposition, reality is negated, real negation of philosophy and real affirmation of sophistry is a reality that has been narrated. Thus, reality is still manifested in the context of its very negation. For this reason, reality cannot be denied in any supposition; and the primary and self-evident proposition (al-qadhiyya al-awwaliyya al-badīhiyya), which holds its truth, has eternal necessity.
Since the truth of the propositions, which relate reality of finite and conditional beings, is subject to certain conditions, and it is only within certain boundaries that they are true, beyond which they are false, finite and conditional beings cannot be the extension (misdāq) of the reality that has eternal necessity.
Given that the aggregate of finite beings is not another entity, which has something additional to its parts, it does not have any reality at all. Similarly, their universals (jāmi‛) do not have any external reality either, and they are notions that exist in the mind by the mental mode of existence (al-wujūd al-dhehnī) in such a way that if the mind did not to exist, the universals would not even have found the mental existence. Therefore, reality, the eternally necessary existence of which is axiomatic and primary, is other than the finite beings, their totality, and their universals, as the first have finite realities, the second has no reality, and the third has a limited mental reality.
Therefore, the first ontological proposition, which the human being cannot not know, is the affirmation of the basic reality, and its modality is eternal necessity. And since, as just explained, finite entities, such as the heavens, the earth, the cosmos, and so forth, cannot be the extension of this proposition, its extension is only an Absolute Reality—Who is above the restrictions of conditions, is present with all of the finite realities, and no absence or termination is perceivable with respect to Him.
The demonstration of the veracious, with this exposition, sidesteps the criticism of failure of differentiation between notion and extension. This argument is not based on the notion of reality and its necessity of predication to itself by predication as essence. The argument, in fact, proceeds from the first ontological proposition, which encompasses affirmation of the basic reality and rejection of sophistry. The affirmation of reality is not based on its notion, which is held in the mind; it is with respect to external factuality. If it were on the basis of its notion and by predication as essence (al‑haml al‑awwalī), then just as reality is reality, sophism is sophism. Therefore, the invalidation of sophism, and consequently, the truth of the basic reality, is with respect to the external world and predication as extension (al‑haml al‑shā’ye‛)."
The author says that this proof establishes the existence of an entity that is eternally necessary (i.e. it can never not exist) and that this entity is other than the finite beings, their totality, or their universals. This entity is, in his words, "absolute." The author finishes his explication on page 189 by adding that "in the light of absoluteness and infinity of the Real, His other attributes such as unity, knowledge, and the like, are traced one after the other." It would've been nicer if the author went further and elaborated the logical steps in tracing some of the mentioned attributes. Luckily for us, Ibn Sina had attempted this job centuries earlier. Although Ibn Sina may have intended to write these attribute tracings to follow his arguments from contingencies (and not necessarily as entailments from the POTV), we can still use the tracings because some of them are based on the mere necessity of a necessary existent. I found many of these tracings in chapter 9 of the book Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays, edited by Peter Anderson (Google Books link: https://books.google.com/books?id=YyggAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false). The POTV, coupled with some of the attribute tracings that I found sound, proves the existence of an entity that is necessary, eternal, self-subsisting, independent, primary, absolute/infinite, unrestricted, unique, one-and-only, omnipresent, immaterial, formless, ineffable, uncaused, doesn't have any rivals, and has all things else depending on it for their existence (the last attribute seems valid only if the principle of causality for contingents is taken as a premise).
My atheist friend asked me if I could also prove that this entity is conscious. So although the following argument is not part of the POTV or Ibn Sina's entailments, I would really like it if you guys could critique it:
"Whether or not the entity is conscious may depend on your outlook. If you think that ignorance and unconsciousness are restrictions or limits, then the entity can be considered knowledgeable and conscious (because the entity cannot have restrictions or limits).
Or you could say this:
Since the entity is absolute/infinite, nothing limits it, and it cannot have any lacks; it must possess all and every degree of existence. Consciousness is a degree/aspect of existence (a rock that is conscious has more existence than an unconscious rock), and since the entity cannot lack anything, it must possess infinite consciousness. The same can be said for knowledge."
My atheist buddy responded by saying "Does a rock that has sexual desire have more existence than a normal rock?" I responded "I see where you're going with this. You're trying to say that the entity possesses infinite sexual desire. Although that is technically true, the entity is much more than just that. It has ALL perfections and/or forms of existence." He then asked "You said that it must possess every degree of existence. So it would have to be material then." I replied "True. Its existence covers the material realm. It has EVERY "fullness" or "existence"; it is unlimited." And here is where the pantheism stuff is supposed to come in.
That's it. I know there may be more clarifications I might have to make, but let's see where this goes for now. Please respond by critiquing this argument in particular; critique its form, structure, validity, and soundness. Don't sidetrack or rant about religion or whatever other crap you guys like to enjoy spewing around. Focus.
