Non-existence

[Ryft]

We may be a video game, an illusion, or even a bunch of vibrating single-dimensional strings. But in all of those examples, we exist. The computer in front of me, the chair beneath me, the fairy creatures in my mind; all of them can be interacted with, and thus all of them must exist in some form or another.

First, hi there, Saerules. Nice to meet you.

Second, there is a fatal flaw in your argument. The thought experiment Dagda put forward never proposed the non-existence of our world, so arguing for our existence risks the ignoratio elenchi fallacy "of presenting an argument that may in itself be valid, but does not address the issue in question" (ignoratio elenchi, Wikipedia.org). His thought experiment proposed a different sort of existence, not non-existence.

It is much more likely that [the universe is real] because: (1) If the universe is not real then we are, effectively, dead ...

Obviously you do not mean 'dead' in the biological sense because, in a universe that is not real, the biological sense is likewise not real. Consequently, your statement here must mean, "If the universe is not real then we are not real." That not only follows logically but is precisely what a simulated universe states.

Does this somehow prove that a real universe is more likely? Only if we truly are real, and by extension, our perceptions are real. But that is question-begging. What our perceptions tell us does not prove anything if we ourselves are just elements of a simulation. A real universe is "much more likely" than a simulated universe only by begging the question. If you avoid begging the question, then what is left are two scenarios that are equally likely.

It is much more likely that [the universe is real] because: (2) The complexity of a non-real universe is far more complex than the universe.

False. If the universe is just a computer simulation, then it is incoherent to say that a simulation is more complex than itself. (To elaborate, your reasoning seems to assume a real universe somehow contained within a simulation, but such an assumption is generally incoherent and specifically question-begging. In the scenario of Dagda's argument, the universe is not contained within a simulation; the universe is the simulation. Ergo, it is incoherent to say the simulation is more complex than itself.) That which is incoherent cannot prove or disprove the likelihood of anything.

It is much more likely that [the universe is real] because: (3) No one, not one of us, acts as if the world were not real ...

This is likewise question-begging. If the universe is a simulation, then every single person is part of that simulation; how we act simply is the simulation operating. As I had said in a prior post, according to the parameters (laws) of this simulation (universe), a fast-moving vehicle would critically injure a pedestrian. None of it would be real, of course, but the elements of the simulation are not cognizant of that (because they are likewise not real). That our perceptions tell us the world is real counts against the likelihood of a simulated universe only if we and our perceptions are in fact real. But that begs the question. If we do not beg the question, the likelihood of either scenario turns out to be equal.

It is much more likely that [the universe is real] because: (4) If the universe [that] I so firmly believe in is unreal, then yours is too! That means Darwin never lived, no one evolved ...

How does that count against a universe simulation? It is an empty tautology: "If the universe is unreal, then it is unreal."

It is much more likely that [the universe is real] because: (5) The universe makes sense (it appears to largely consistent and operating within a given set of rules) when there is no need for it to be so.

Since this point is fully consistent with a universe simulation, it fails to count against it. Intelligibility, uniformity, and consistency is part of a universe simulation argument (i.e., the simulation's programming is completely thorough). This is the "empirical equivalence" point being made by Dagda, myself, and others; the empirical evidence one side relies upon is the exact same evidence the other side relies upon. Empirical equivalence results in both sides being equally likely on an empirical test.

It is much more likely that [the universe is real] because: (6) A real universe is far more interesting than an unreal one, mainly because there would be no point in attempting to explain an unreal one. (For example, the laws of physics basically work. We know that. But if the universe were unreal, how would we know it? How would we trust it? How could we trust anything?)

It seems you fail to recognize that if we and the universe are a simulation, we would not know that the world we are exploring is not real. The fact that you perceive the universe as real, intricate and interesting in its nature and structure (e.g., the laws of physics) does not prove that it is so, except by assuming as true that you are real, so are your perceptions, and so is the universe you are perceiving (question-begging). You assert that the laws of physics basically work and that we know this, but only if the laws of physics are real and describe a real universe (question-begging). If this were all a simulation, we would still perceive and explore the nature and structure of the universe; we just wouldn't know that it is actually a simulation and we are part of it (i.e., we would have no idea that we're explaining an unreal one; to us it is real).

It is much more likely that [the universe is real] because: (7) If the universe is not real, then why the fuck is anyone bothered about how we behave to each other?

That is actually a question. If we unpack it, the argument behind it would amount to, "Since we bother with how we behave to one another, that proves it is much more likely the universe is real." However, the latter does not follow from the former in any clear way, so there is a vital premise or two being suppressed. In other words, in what way does our bothering with how we behave to one another prove the likelihood of the universe being real over it being a simulation? Are you suggesting that if the universe is a simulation then it follows by logical necessity that we would not bother? If so, you would have to show that logical necessity.

Here is something that I want the readers to notice about all seven of Kyuuketsuki's reasons: every single one of them was philosophical! That is a truly remarkable thing for someone who vehemently despises philosophical (and particularly metaphysical) psychobabble as mental masturbation that is beneath him. For a champion of the hard sciences who despises philosophical babble, it is exquisite irony that his seven reasons are all philosophy and zero science.

[To Saerules] So as I asked of Jon Paul, point out one thing—anything—which has been fairly conclusively established on the basis of metaphysical or philosophical reasoning alone, something that is held to be true by, let's say, the vast majority of the scientific, academic and learned theological communities.

That the universe is real, in a way that corresponds to our perception of it—the very crux of Dagda's thread!