Non-existence

[LukeMC]

No. Solipsism does not positively state anything about where our sense-data comes from. It does not positively deny the existence of anything outside the mind either; but it exactly does not affirm it, either. It only affirms the conscious experience, the mind.

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Then what are you babbling about complexity for? From this new definition, solipsism has as much relevence to the universe as atheism does to the big bang. If solipsism only deals with the fact that we can know our minds, you cannot claim it to be the least complex option when faced with Occam's razor, as it has nothing to do with such a subject, and my original point still stands. Either the universe is fabricated in our minds (complexities inherent) or the universe exists objectively and we are a part of it (complexities also inherent, but to a lesser degree). Regardless of whether we can know it.

The point I have raised is that postulating the reality and world of our qualitative, subjective sense experience to be an actually ontologically independently existing reality outside of your mind is something far more complex and far more extensive than not doing so.

I never concluded that "there is no objective world", only that proposing such a world outside of your mind, is proposing more complexity, not less, than proposing only your conscious experience (and nothing more).

The question is whether we positively claim that experience to be an experience of an actually ontologically independently existing reality outside of your mind, or whether we reduce it to be an experience confined to your own mind. There is more complexity in the former case, and less complexity and more simplicity in the latter case.

It's stuff like this which I have been driven to disagree with ^ and was mistaken into thinking this was a part of solipsist thinking.

Either way, regardless of whether or not we can know the universe, I still find my point valid. A universe which exists objectively with us contained within it contains far less complexity than any other hypothesis. Solipsism has no role to play in this debate, for as you have said, it posits nothing of where the sense data comes from and in such a case, it cannot be used to demonstrate how an objective universe is more complex than an imaginary one. We can't know anything further than our minds, nor feel anything further than our bodies, but that doesn't mean an imaginary universe is the plausible conclusion (in terms of complexity). These are separate arguments and I'm puzzled as to how they became merged during the discourse. Perhaps that was my fault.