Necessity is not evidence

[Rampant.A.I.]

Yes it is. It simply uses more floral descriptors, but relies on the same appeal to ignorance.

You really don't know what you're talking about here. They're no "floral descriptors", just an attempt at a deductive argument.

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It is no more logical to confabulate an entity, then state that entity must necessarily exist by virtue of the properties of the description, than it is to confabulate an entity around some natural process, then insist that entity must exist because it explains a natural process you've included in the entity's description.

That really just depends on one's metaphysical views, and their are coherent metaphysical positions - such as modal realism - that allow for that.

That's really great; Plantinga is profoundly intellectually dishonest, especially considering his field, and his modal argument is presumptive and circular, just like the KCA.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-ne...y-being/#1

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Plantinga's ontological argument is not circular unless you consider ALL deductive arguments to be circular. And I very much doubt you want to get into a debate regarding the nature of argumentation.

I'm not sure why you've resorted to idle threats, but since you fancy yourself an expert yet still fail to understand the objection:

Although presented as a deductive argument, Plantinga's modal argument presupposes <God exists> and relies on that presupposition to "deduct" the conclusion.

One general criticism of ontological arguments which have appeared hitherto is this: none of them is persuasive, i.e., none of them provides those who do not already accept the conclusion that God exists

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—and who are reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc.—with either a pro tanto reason or an all-things-considered reason to accept that conclusion. Any reading of any ontological argument which has been produced so far which is sufficiently clearly stated to admit of evaluation yields a result which is invalid, or possesses a set of premises which it is clear in advance that no reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc. non-theists will accept, or has a benign conclusion which has

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no religious significance, or else falls prey to more than one of the above failings.

I can only assume, as an expert, you're already aware of these failings; so it seems you're attempting to force acceptance of the premises and conclusion, when I've already stated the premises require the presupposition of to lead to the related conclusion, and as such do not reasonably follow.

Plainly enough, non-theists and necessitarian theists disagree about the layout of logical space, i.e., the space of possible worlds. The sample argument consists, in effect, of two premises: one which says that God exists in at least one possible world; and one which says that God exists in all possible worlds if God exists in any. It is perfectly obvious that no non-theist can accept this pair of premises. Of course, a non-theist can allow—if they wish—that there are possible worlds in which there are contingent Gods. However, it is quite clear that no rational, reflective, etc. non-theist will accept the pair of premises in the sample argument.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontolo...arguments/

This modal argument begins with several presupposed premises: other deductive arguments that do not begin with presupposed premises. Which is the objection I initially raised.

Plantinga himself states:

“Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm's argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion” (Plantinga 1974, 221).

That's his opinion. The only thing holding up Plantinga's modal ontological argument is an agreement that the central premise is rational, I.e. by extension the argument is in effect:
Presupposing: <it is possible God Exists>
To conclude: Therefore <God Exists>
By Plantinga's own admission.

Or, more directly stated: If we presuppose: <God Exists>
We can reasonably conclude: <God Exists>

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontolo...#PlaOntArg