Another Free-will poll, please bear with me!

[Pyrrho]

umm can I get a list of available terms and definitions?

Sure.

For the purposes of this poll,
Determinism would mean lack of meaning free-will.  Hard or soft, quantum randomness can included in this one. Your actions are determined by factors outside your control.
Libertarian free-will would mean free-will without any constraints, you may chose anything regardless of things like genetics or social situations.
Compatibilism would be free will constrained by the things that determine your choices. 

These are over simplified, but work for a layman's definitions I think.  I'm sure one of our local philosophy majors could explain them better

Edited to add this paragraph:  Soft determinism is a form of compatibilism.  See:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_determinism

There is no need to try to come up with a new explanation; this should be adequate for present purposes:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will

Here are a few quotes from that:

There are many different positions on the problem, broadly divided into two types. Incompatibilists hold that free will is not compatible with determinism. The two main incompatibilist positions are metaphysical libertarianism, the claim that determinism is false and thus free will is at least possible; and hard determinism, the claim that determinism is true and thus free will is not possible.[3] Compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with determinism. Some compatibilists even hold that determinism is necessary for free will, arguing that choice involves preference for one course of action over another, requiring a sense of howchoices will turn out.[4][5] 

Determinism is a broad term with a variety of meanings.[56] Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem for free will.[57] Hard determinism is the claim that determinism is true, and that it is incompatible with free will, so free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to nomological determinism (see causal determinism below), it can include all forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety.[58] Relevant forms of determinism include:

• Causal determinism— the idea that everything is caused by prior conditions, making it impossible for anything else to happen.[59] In its most common form, nomological (or scientific) determinism, future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the thought experiment of Laplace's demon. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. If the laws of nature were determinate, then such an entity would be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail.[60][61]
  
  
• Logical determinism—the notion that all propositions, whether about the past, present or future, are either true or false. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or false in the present.[57]
  
  
• Theological determinism—the idea that the future is already determined, either by a creator deity decreeing or knowing its outcome in advance.[51][62]The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how our actions can be free if there is a being who has determined them for us in advance, or if they are already set in time.
  
  

Metaphysical libertarianism is one philosophical view point under that of incompatibilism. Libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires that the agent be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances.

Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, which requires that the world is not closed under physics. This includes interactionist dualism, which claims that some non-physical mind, will, or soul overrides physical causality. Physical determinism implies there is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will. As consequent of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarian explanations that do not involve dispensing with physicalism require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior – theory unknown to many of the early writers on free will. Incompatibilist theories can be categorised based on the type of indeterminism they require; uncaused events, non-deterministically caused events, and agent/substance-caused events.[64]

Compatibilists maintain that determinism is compatible with free will. It may, however, be more accurate to say that compatibilists define "free will" in a way that allows it to co-exist with determinism (in the same way that incompatibilists define "free will" such that it cannot). Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in a situation for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics. For instance, courts of law make judgments about whether individuals are acting under their own free will under certain circumstances without bringing in metaphysics. Similarly, political liberty is a non-metaphysical concept.[citation needed] Likewise, compatibilists define free will as freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals. So for example Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics,[112] and the Stoic Chrysippus.[113] In contrast, the incompatibilist positions are concerned with a sort of "metaphysically free will", which compatibilists claim has never been coherently defined. Compatibilists argue that determinism does not matter; what matters is that individuals' wills are the result of their own desires and are not overridden by some external force.[114][115] To be a compatibilist, one need not endorse any particular conception of free will, but only deny that determinism is at odds with free will.[116]

Although there are various impediments to exercising one's choices, free will does not imply freedom of action. Freedom of choice (freedom to select one's will) is logically separate from freedom to implement that choice (freedom to enact one's will), although not all writers observe this distinction.[26]Nonetheless, some philosophers have defined free will as the absence of various impediments. Some "modern compatibilists", such as Harry Frankfurt and Daniel Dennett, argue free will is simply freely choosing to do what constraints allow one to do. In other words, a coerced agent's choices can still be free if such coercion coincides with the agent's personal intentions and desires.[40][117]


Free will as lack of physical restraint[edit]


Most "classical compatibilists", such as Thomas Hobbes, claim that a person is acting on the person's own will only when it is the desire of that person to do the act, and also possible for the person to be able to do otherwise, if the person had decided to. Hobbes sometimes attributes such compatibilist freedom to each individual and not to some abstract notion of will, asserting, for example, that "no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [sic]."[115] In articulating this crucial proviso, David Hume writes, "this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains."[114] Similarly, Voltaire, in his Dictionnaire philosophique, claimed that "Liberty then is only and can be only the power to do what one will." He asked, "would you have everything at the pleasure of a million blind caprices?" For him, free will or liberty is "only the power of acting, what is this power? It is the effect of the constitution and present state of our organs."

---

I believe that the only variable is quantum randomness, if indeed it is random. If it's not, then things are purely predictable. Does that count as determinism under your definition? Deterministic but not fatalistic.

That only excludes libertarian free will (unless you try to extract your "free will" from that quantum randomness).  You could be either a determinist or a compatibilist with what you have stated.  (Or both, as being a compatibilist means that one regards free will as being compatible with determinism; a compatibilist may be a determinist.)  Which of those will be most appropriate for you depends on how you define the phrase "free will."  See post 11.