Let me try and distill this down to the fundamentals (it might help me see if I'm wrong):
-The usual explanation for God's allowance of evil in the world is [libertarian] free will. The apparent reason for this is because apologists typically claim that only with libertarian free will can one be capable of morally good actions. Otherwise, they claim we would simply be automata simply following the deterministic process.
-But the capacity for morally good actions also entails the capacity for morally evil actions, otherwise one is still not free, and thus not actually capable of moral goodness.
-If God is not truly capable of choosing to do evil, how can we say he is free in any moral sense relevant here?
Am I just missing something obvious here?
-The usual explanation for God's allowance of evil in the world is [libertarian] free will. The apparent reason for this is because apologists typically claim that only with libertarian free will can one be capable of morally good actions. Otherwise, they claim we would simply be automata simply following the deterministic process.
-But the capacity for morally good actions also entails the capacity for morally evil actions, otherwise one is still not free, and thus not actually capable of moral goodness.
-If God is not truly capable of choosing to do evil, how can we say he is free in any moral sense relevant here?
Am I just missing something obvious here?
