The Problem of Evil (XXVII)

[wiploc]

Probability doesn't come into it.  It's all terminology and deductive logic.  An omnipotent god (one who can do anything except violate logic) can achieve any three goals that do not logically contradict each other.  Knowing a god, having free will, and being happy are not logically contradictory.  Therefore, an omnipotent god could do all three.  An omniscient god would know how to do all three.  An omnibenevolent god (assuming we define those three things as good) would choose to achieve all three.  Therefore, in any world in which these three things are not achieved, tri-omni gods do not exist.  

Feel free to show me where I injected statistics and probability into that.  




I deny and repudiate that argument.  By now you know that it is a misrepresentation.  I do not see gods as obligated in any way. 

Okay, so I am not clear on something. My amended understanding of your argument that you are making has three underlying assumptions: 

1. If God is omnipotent, then he can create any world he desires,

True.  

Well, it's not really true, but it's a good approximate short answer.  He can't create impossible worlds (with, say, square circles).  And he can't create worlds that aren't created by gods.  Those are possible worlds (I believe the actual world is one of them) that god can't create.  

Happy, free-willed worlds are among the possible worlds.  Many of these are god-created.  God could have actualized one of these. 

So, though this statement isn't quite technically true, it's pretty darned close.  

2. If God is omnibenevolent then he must actualize a world without suffering,

Say I like strawberry ice cream better than chocolate.  I always choose strawberry over chocolate.  Does that mean I must do so, or that I ought to do so?  No, I choose to do so.  

No ought.  No must.  

If god were omnibenevolent, he would have actualized a world without suffering. That would have been his preference, so that's what he would have done.  

and 
3. If God is omniscient then he would know how. 

My misunderstanding centers around 2. I think if your position is as I wrote it, it contradicts 1.

So we'll put them the other way around:

A strong enough god could make any world it wanted to make.  
A good enough god would want to make a world in which everyone is happy.  (Or in which everyone knows god, etc.)  
A god both strong enough and good enough would actually make a world in which everyone is happy.  

It wouldn't have to do this.  It wouldn't be obligated to do this.  But, if it desired good, then it would choose to do good.  

I then assumed (incorrectly) that then you were making the weaker claim (a probabilistic argument) that given the tri-omni properties we should see a world without suffering (you used phrases like "would choose").

Perhaps you're referring to the the subjunctive mood, describing conterfactual situations:  If a benevolent god existed, then it would choose good.  Because that's what benevolence is.

So, what exactly do you mean? Does omnibenevolence entail that God must choose no suffering (logical route)? Or are you okay with the weaker claim "should" choose no suffering (probabilistic route)?

Neither of those.  A benevolent god would choose no suffering.  It wouldn't have to, and it wouldn't necessarily be obligated to, but it would want to.  

As a meat-eating vegetarian is a contradiction in terms, so an benevolent go who prefers evil is a contradiction in terms. 

Vegetarians aren't required to avoid meat, and they aren't obligated to avoid meat.  They choose to avoid meat. 

If you eat meat, you aren't a vegetarian. 
If you choose evil, you aren't omnibenevolent. 

Does that help?