What God is to the Universe is what your mind is to your body

[The Grand Nudger]

Okay, I call it a composition fallacy because if quantum interchanges, like the absorption of a photon into an atom, represent the minimal element of mind, then a camera is full of mind, or rather of mental events.  That does not mean that it itself HAS a mind, in the same way that people do-- and much for the reasons everyone here talks about-- the complex integration of brain function into the sense of coordinated experience in a subjective agent.

Why would a camera be full of mind (mindful?...lol) but not have a mind, whereas a human being is full of mind , but -does- have a mind?  The structure of the brain appears to be at least -capable- of operating in the same way that the digital circuits of the camera do, and that may be what they are actually doing.  You are, in effect, only objecting to the camera having a human mind, or of having as robust a mind, not objecting to it having a mind.  Perhaps it doesn't see red as you see red (different underlying structure)...but neither do I...and I hope you allow that I see red.  

The thing that some don't get is that I agree with VERY much of what people are saying in this thread-- the interest in how neurology affects our qualitative experience, for example.  However, everything that happens in the brain happens elsewhere, though in differing degrees and on different scales.

Then it seems reasonable to at least suggest that one of those elsewheres -could- be a camera, and that such a suggestion is wholly compatible with your comments in that regard.  Making it an objection that comes out of left field.  It;s a logical consequence of the proposition -you- presented (that it is "spark of mind" that allows for this)..and referencing -my- proposition (that it's the structure of the brain rather than some spark of mind) won't salvage that. The camera has spark, -and- it has potentially structural analogs. Whatever the camera is doing is intelligible to us, which is to say that the indformation is transferable between the systems...and this would seem to suggest some sort of compatibility. If it doesn't have a mind, despite being filled with those sparks and arranged as an information processor.......then what we call mind is vastly divorced from whatever it is that you call -spark of mind-. In this context, is your spark of mind qualitatively different from my "ability of matter to interact"? If something can be filled with mind but not have it, and require a structure of a specific function to present itsef -as- a mind....in what way is that different from a material monist, brain centric, computational theory of mind?

Now, I consider your hypothesis (I believe you most favor IIT right?) a serious contender for reality.  But I do not have sufficient evidence to be confident that it is right, and I do not believe we have the capacity to collect evidence without making philosophical assumptions that beg the question anyway.

If my hypothesis (not really mine, lol..and you know that) is a serious contender for reality, then you -must- see it as sufficient....unless you consider an insufficient hypothesis adequate as a contender for reality - at which point wtf?  I'm only trying to get you to stop saying -that-...not trying to get you to agree that I, or anyone, knows the true status of mind in this regard. To acknowledge that a hypothesis can be sufficient., without meeting the (scientific) bar for a theory, a full or robust description that;s been through the whole process in the same way that the ToE has, for example. Darwin's hypothesis was sufficient, before it ever became a theory. So too are current hypotheses regarding mind. This, in itself, makes the "but it can;t explain this or that" objections empty. Yes, it -can-. Does it...we don;t know, yet. This, applied to my comment above, directly answers another ojection of yours...and a bit of an issue concerning the spark of mind proposition. If something can be full of this spark stuff, but not have a mind...and in fact require a brain structure or brain analog.....then it's the brain analog which allows for the mind which we are attempting to explain. Rocks (and cameras) are full of spark, but this does not allow for them to have a mind. Now..we might say that if this spark weren't present then a brain analog wouldn't have a mind....but we've just explored the sufficiency of the brain structure-sans-spark as a hypothesis.

This is why I prefer my proposition to yours. Your's positively -requires- that mine be true, mine does not require that yours be true. Yours requires a heretofore undiscovered force or quality, mine does not. This makes any claim that your theory requires -less- of something......a misleading statement. It requires a great deal more, and assumes the truth of the contrapositive, while explaining less...if anything at all, on it's own merits. Ultimately, yours may be true...but we'd know no more on account of that knowledge about why the structure of the brain does what it does to this spark (which isn't necessary in the first place)..and we'd still have to defer to the structure of the brain to provide an explanation for mind...rather than just spark of mind - which is something that cameras are full of too and not at all what we're referring to when either of us refer to our minds.

More academically to philsophy..if -your- explanation of mind refers to outr brain structure as a necessity with regards to what we are referring to, and it does, and seeing as how the brain structure is -sufficient-...which it is, then the explanation that brain..just brain, allows for mind is both sufficient and necessary. What more could you ask for out of a proposition as a tool for making a valid inference? OFC it;s a serious contender for reality, but that betrays alot of what you've said about it...and what you consistently refer to it -as-.