(December 23, 2016 at 5:08 am)bennyboy Wrote: See, that's a plausible theory-- but how would you demonstrate it to represent truth?
Hi Benny. I'm sorry I didn't reply to this but at the time I wanted a break, but things have changed now since I've just enrolled on an open study A Level in Philosophy. I haven't been sent the course materials yet but I have started avidly reading the recommended textbook for the first year of the course and the first section of the course is about epistemology and seems to deal with the sorts of questions being raised in this thread.
So far it's up to direct realism vs indirect realism vs idealism, but I haven't yet got onto the definition of knowledge. I'm not entirely certain of my position... because there are a lot more arguments on all sides than I was previously aware of (which is fascinating in itself, and why I can hardly put this book down... how often can you say that about a textbook?
) but I lean towards indirect realism... direct realism seems to have an answer for everything but it just looks like wordplay to me; I'm having trouble conceptualising that position; which is (I think) ultimately the same problem I had ealier in the thread; whether my views on the mind re neuroscience were compatible with an 'objective' view of the world. But my position could change on that as I understand the arguments more over the course of the next few months. But from the three main philosophers so far discussed relating to this, I find myself agreeing most with Russell, and to some extent Berkeley, but much less with Locke.Also, the book starts with a thorough chapter on logic and reasoning to be referred back to throughout the course; how to understand, formulate, and evaluate arguments in terms of premises, claims/conclusions, fallacies etc. Up to this point on this site I haven't done that very much... I present my arguments but without any particular awareness or understanding of their form in that respect, or of the logical methodology that should be used to evaluate them. But that needs to change, both for the sake of my course (which is all about doing that) and for clarity. For instance I know that any arguments I've made thus far will include premises and conclusions by definition, but this course and this methodology will help me identify them and thus allow me to reduce my thoughts/theories into a much more concise and logical form that is less open to (mis)interpretation/semantic difficulties (eg conflation of terms/equivocation (by me or others)) and is more clear to understand and analyse in terms of strengths and weaknesses. So I'm really looking forward to this because I want to put my own theories under proper logical scrutiny, by myself and others, to identify their strengths and weaknesses, and that can only in turn increase my confidence in them if they prove sound. And I think this site will be a great aid for practicing/revising these skills, so expect to see me getting much more involved in that side of things from now on
Another thing I've realised based on this is that since it is my firm conviction that in terms of the mind, phenomenal representations+dynamics and neural representations+dynamics are equivalent... two sides of the same coin... that each informs and predicts the other, it therefore follows that I should be able to use them interchangeably (and if I can't, it suggests a problem with the theory). Therefore in the interests of clarity all round I think it makes more sense to only speak of phenomenal representations/dynamics in any premises/conclusions that rely on them, by finding common sense examples that everyone can agree on of the phenomenal/NN dynamics I have in mind. In other words, I should never need to mention neurons again... which only serve to confuse an issue... because talking about phenomena is talking about the same thing under my view.
Anyway, onto your question; I make no claims (as yet) as to whether it represents truth. Ultimately I agree with you that we can't know if we're in the Matrix (or suchlike) or not so perhaps a good starting point is to refer to the external world as the environment we find ourselves in regardless of what's outside of that, if anything? As such it appears to me that any claims about 'truth' can only be in reference to that environment... anything outside of that has to be a position of 'scepticism' ie we can't know. So if 'absolute' truth is defined as including outside of the environment, then I don't believe it can be known. If it's not defined like that, and only refers to the environment, then I think the question is open to debate, probably coming down to the difference between direct and indirect realism. Does that answer your question, or at least start to? As I said, I'm not entirely sure of my position yet, because I'm essentially just being introduced to the material, but I would expect my stance to develop more strongly over the coming months as I study epistemology.
