RE: Is the statement "Claims demand evidence" always true?
January 17, 2017 at 8:49 am
(This post was last modified: January 17, 2017 at 10:44 am by emjay.)
(January 17, 2017 at 6:45 am)bennyboy Wrote:(January 16, 2017 at 4:40 pm)Khemikal Wrote: Sure there are.Great news! Please produce
Quote:Meh, we work with what we've got. If there's something behind the mirror, hidden from us, then there's something behind the mirror...hidden from us.
I'd like to outline a thought experiment, and you can tell me how you would classify some of the statements, if you don't mind.
I'd look to a worm, and say, "That worm cannot know some things because of its limitations." I can see what it cannot because I don't have those limitations. I can kind of understand what a bat is doing because of a basic understanding of sonar, but I cannot know what it's LIKE to be a bat using sonar; this is due to my limitations.
So I'd take this and extend it into the unknown-- I'd say there must be some things which can be experienced, but not by me, since I do not believe I am a maximally complete organism. Those things are not so much metaphysical as inscrutable.
But what if Bob walks into the room and says, "Show me the evidence"? Would you categorize my understandings of worms and bats as evidence for my proposition? What if I start talking about all possible beings and their capacities to experience? Would you say that there must be infinite ways in which an organism could experience truth which we cannot?
Oh that's what you mean Interesting question. It seems to me that the answer will come down to whether sub-contexts of a larger context are sub-truths of that larger context or conflicting truths. For instance in my ABCD vs JKLM post, if those are considered sub-contexts of a larger uber-context, are B or K still true - ie stable - in the case of the uber-context? In other words do they represent truths at different levels of scrutiny (constrained by different levels and configurations of sensory access to features of that uber-reality), or do they conflict entirely... ie would a maximally perfect organism - capable of sensing everything in the environment and using the same neural process to create a model of it's stable features - detect those same patterns... in the model would it represent the B and K as stable features as well as the the uber-patterns, or does the particular configuration of senses extract different patterns than would apply to the whole. I don't know but I think the question might be possible to investigate (at a lower scale obviously) in a neural network model or maybe even just with reason.