Remembering Roger Boisjoly: He Tried To Stop Shuttle Challenger Launch

[orogenicman]

http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012...ger-launch

We all knew what the implication was without actually coming out and saying it," a tearful Boisjoly told Zwerdling in 1986. "We all knew if the seals failed the shuttle would blow up."

Armed with the data that described that possibility, Boisjoly and his colleagues argued persistently and vigorously for hours. At first, Thiokol managers agreed with them and formally recommended a launch delay. But NASA officials on a conference call challenged that recommendation.

"I am appalled," said NASA's George Hardy, according to Boisjoly and our other source in the room. "I am appalled by your recommendation."

Another shuttle program manager, Lawrence Mulloy, didn't hide his disdain. "My God, Thiokol," he said. "When do you want me to launch — next April?"

One wonders why those responsible for allowing the launch to continue despite the dire warnings from people in the know weren't prosecuted.

[popeyespappy]

I worked at the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) located at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center from April 87 through May 99. Among other things that go on at the HOSC it used to be the facility where the engineers responsible for both the SSME and SRB components sat on console for launch operations. You might be interested in chapter nine and chapter ten from the Book Power To Explore: History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960-1990. Chapter nine is about the Challenger accident and chapter ten talks about the investigation and the return to flight. Chapter nine might surprise you with just how much NASA knew about problems with the SRB seals well before Challenger. Some of the people discussed in the book were sitting in the HOSC when Challenger blew up.

[orogenicman]

I worked at the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) located at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center from April 87 through May 99. Among other things that go on at the HOSC it used to be the facility where the engineers responsible for both the SSME and SRB components sat on console for launch operations. You might be interested in chapter nine and chapter ten from the Book Power To Explore: History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960-1990. Chapter nine is about the Challenger accident and chapter ten talks about the investigation and the return to flight. Chapter nine might surprise you with just how much NASA knew about problems with the SRB seals well before Challenger. Some of the people discussed in the book were sitting in the HOSC when Challenger blew up.

It wouldn't surprise me at all, like it doesn't surprise me how much they knew about the foam issue prior to the Columbia disaster.