The Problem of Natural Evil

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Most of the discussions here regarding evil as an argument for or against the existence of God have focused on moral evil, i.e. evil acts committed by moral agents (in this case, human beings). I propose to show that natural evil (evil committed without the participation of a human moral agent) can be an effective argument against the existence of God, commonly defined.

Firstly, we should be clear on what is meant by the term 'natural evil'. As mentioned above, natural evil is that which involves no human agent - there are no perpetrators of this this sort of evil, only victims. When, for example, a tsunami destroys a fishing village, or an otherwise healthy person is diagnosed with terminal cancer, there is no discernible human action which resulted in the outcome.

Some of the properties commonly ascribed to the God of Abraham are omnipotence, omniscience, and justice. If true, these properties would give God the ability to prevent natural evil: he would have known (omniscience) when the tsunami would occur; he could have prevented it (omnipotence); and he would not have allowed the suffering of the undeserving villagers (justice). Thus, if the village is destroyed by a tsunami, God does not have the requisite qualities which make him God and thus does not exist as defined.

The only readily apparent objection to this regards the quality of justice. It is possible, one could argue, that everyone in the village was deserving of death, so God acted justly. Frankly, this seems pretty farfetched. The notion that everyone in a particular village is evil enough to warrant death beggars belief.

The 'justice' objection is even more fraught with problems if we look at the cancer example. Suppose Jane, who lives a healthy lifestyle (she eats well, exercises regularly, doesn't smoke or drink) is diagnosed with inoperable, terminal cancer. Yes, Jane could quite possibly be evil enough to deserve death, but what about her family and friends? Surely, they are going to suffer greatly as they see Jane waste away in (probably) great pain. Is it reasonable to believe that Jane's husband, children, co-workers and friends are so evil that they deserve to be put through something like this?

Perhaps the most stunning (and to me, the most convincing) example of natural evil as an argument against the existence of God is birth defects. While it is clear that some birth defects are the result of the mother's behavior during pregnancy, a significant number are genetic - the defects would have occurred irrespective of the mother's care. Babies born without brains, or eyes, or atrophied limbs, or with foetal ichthyosis. If you believe in a God who is just, how on earth can you explain the death or disfigurement of a child who - literally - could not have had the time to do anything to displease God enough to merit punishment?

So, it seems that the existence of evil - moral or natural - may not disprove the existence of the God of Abraham, but it certainly calls for either a re-defining of this God, or a cogent explanation of why evil occurs.

Boru

[John V]

The only readily apparent objection to this regards the quality of justice. It is possible, one could argue, that everyone in the village was deserving of death, so God acted justly. Frankly, this seems pretty farfetched. The notion that everyone in a particular village is evil enough to warrant death beggars belief.

So, this argument boils down to your personal incredulity.

[Chas]

The only readily apparent objection to this regards the quality of justice. It is possible, one could argue, that everyone in the village was deserving of death, so God acted justly. Frankly, this seems pretty farfetched. The notion that everyone in a particular village is evil enough to warrant death beggars belief.

So, this argument boils down to your personal incredulity.

No, it boils down to the disparity between definition of a god versus the observed reality.

There is not only no evidence for a loving, powerful, just god, the evidence stacks up heavily against the existence of one.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

So, this argument boils down to your personal incredulity.

You're looking at the incredulity argument backwards. My stance is that the chance of every one of the few hundred people in a coastal fishing village would merit death via tsunami is vanishingly small. The stance of those who believe in divine retribution would be that of the one million+ people killed in the China floods of the 1930s, ALL of them would have had to have been monstrously evil enough to deserve to die, the unpalatable option being that God is willing to take out thousands of good people to kill a few baddies.

Who is being more incredulous?

Boru

[John V]

You're looking at the incredulity argument backwards. My stance is that the chance of every one of the few hundred people in a coastal fishing village would merit death via tsunami is vanishingly small. The stance of those who believe in divine retribution would be that of the one million+ people killed in the China floods of the 1930s, ALL of them would have had to have been monstrously evil enough to deserve to die, the unpalatable option being that God is willing to take out thousands of good people to kill a few baddies.

Who is being more incredulous?

Boru

It doesn't matter if I'm being more incredulous, as I'm not making an argument from my personal incredulity, as you are.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

It doesn't matter if I'm being more incredulous, as I'm not making an argument from my personal incredulity, as you are.

Again, you're looking at this back-to-front. Personal incredulity is the position that something must be wrong because the denier and the denier alone has stated the s/he cannot and will not believe it. What I posited in the argument above is might be termed 'the reasonableness of disbelief'. In other words, it is possible that the everyone in the village is a murderer or a rapist or a blasphemer of truly epic proportions. It is possible, but is it reasonable to believe that such is the case? This is, in fact, what the term 'beggars belief' means.

But we can try with a more recent, real-world event. A little less than four years ago, Haiti was devastated by an earthquake. Reasonable, trustworthy estimates put the death toll at around 160 000, the majority in the Port-au-Prince metro area. Is it reasonable to assume that all of these people (mostly Christians, a significant number of infants and children) deserved to die? It is not. But this position doesn't mean I'm being incredulous. It is people who would state something like, 'Well, God wouldn't have allowed all those people to die unless they deserved it' who are succumbing to personal incredulity over the reasonableness of belief.

Boru

[Drich]

Why do you assume the idea of complete protection falls on God?

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Why do you assume the idea of complete protection falls on God?

Because the protection of humans by humans is well-nigh impossible. If - as your lot always claim - God loves us as his children, then the duty of protection of the innocent necessarily falls to God.

I don't generally car for the God-as-father analogy, but it seems to apply here. Suppose you have a gaggle of kids of your own: who is responsible for their protection - you, or children their own age?

Boru

[John V]

Again, you're looking at this back-to-front. Personal incredulity is the position that something must be wrong because the denier and the denier alone has stated the s/he cannot and will not believe it. What I posited in the argument above is might be termed 'the reasonableness of disbelief'. In other words, it is possible that the everyone in the village is a murderer or a rapist or a blasphemer of truly epic proportions. It is possible, but is it reasonable to believe that such is the case? This is, in fact, what the term 'beggars belief' means.

But we can try with a more recent, real-world event. A little less than four years ago, Haiti was devastated by an earthquake. Reasonable, trustworthy estimates put the death toll at around 160 000, the majority in the Port-au-Prince metro area. Is it reasonable to assume that all of these people (mostly Christians, a significant number of infants and children) deserved to die? It is not. But this position doesn't mean I'm being incredulous. It is people who would state something like, 'Well, God wouldn't have allowed all those people to die unless they deserved it' who are succumbing to personal incredulity over the reasonableness of belief.

Boru

OK, now you're trying to replace an argument from personal incredulity with argumentum ad populum.

Biblically, god judges based on thoughts as well as actions. Jesus compares thinking poorly of someone with murdering them. Personally I accept that, but I don't argue from my acceptance that you should, too. That's up to each individual.

[Drich]

Why do you assume the idea of complete protection falls on God?

Because the protection of humans by humans is well-nigh impossible. If - as your lot always claim - God loves us as his children, then the duty of protection of the innocent necessarily falls to God.

I don't generally car for the God-as-father analogy, but it seems to apply here. Suppose you have a gaggle of kids of your own: who is responsible for their protection - you, or children their own age?

Boru

What makes you think that everyone here is a child of God? There are several parables that Christ tells that has Him clearly separating those who belong to God and those who do not.

So again why should this responsiablity fall onto God when clearly not all are His Children?

Do you put the interest of other peoples children above your own?