Moral Argument for God's Existence

[MindForgedManacle]

Oh yeah, midterms in the first two weeks of October. Please tell me what school you attend. It's not that I don't believe you, just odd.

I attend UT Dallas. Oh and you're correct. My post was supposed to say "studying for midterms". :p

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Is it odd? My semesters used to be from late-July to early-December and we used to have mid-terms in late-September/early-October. I was under the impression that most schools followed this pattern.

Most I've attended (3 so far) here in the southern US do so between mid to late October.

[bennyboy]

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This should be interesting.

"From my perspective, it still stands as an objective measure... I can't sensibly redefine it."


Make a good note of this statement. Either you didn't mean to make such a statement and would wish to retract it or if you meant it, it contradicts your own arguments and ends up showing that P1 is false and P2 is true.

When you are considering the question of morality, then you are the subject of consideration (one who considers) and morality is the object of consideration (that which is considered). And your argument is pretty straightforward - if morality is independent of the subject (you) then it is objective and if it is dependent on the subject, it is subjective. So, I'll go ahead and accept these definitions of subjective and objective for this post.

I think the WLC premise that God is required for an objective morality holds. True, you can say it's subjective for God, but that argument doesn't work. The cubic centimeter was arbitrarily made by others than me, but from my perspective, it still stands as an objective measure of volume. I can't sensibly redefine it. And if God is real and right, then you couldn't really sensibly redefine morality.

So, according to you, since a bunch of people arbitrarily came up with a measure for volume - the cubic centimeter - one which you cannot redefine, then that is objective. So, if a bunch of people come up with a measure for actions - which would be their morality - and you cannot redefine it, then you should also regard it as objective. Which means, god is not required for objective morality.

You see, Craig's argument is not that if god existed, his given morality would be objective, his argument is that god is necessarily required for the existence of objective morals. But if we go by your definition of "objective", then, obviously, god is not required - thus defeating P1.

I think it is P2 that totally fails. I don't think there is any moral that is truly objective, EVEN IF there is some kind of Deity. What we have are instincts that we place in a bell curve and say, "normal, therefore objective." But some people probably think killing babies, or raping little boys, or stealing, are perfectly moral, due to a world view of twisted justifications.

But, going by your definitions, there are objective moral values out there. There are a whole bunch of moral theories, like Contractarianism, Utilitarianism, Ethical Egoism, Kantian Ethics, Virtue Ethics etc. none of which you can sensibly redefine. The fact that all of them are different from each-other is irrelevant. After all, you have a whole bunch of standards for measuring volume other than the cubic centimeter - such as gallons, quarts, teaspoons, bushels, cubic inches etc. - and all of them are regarded as objective. Which means P2 has been proven as true - there are objective moral values out there.

Interestingly, does this argument mean that Biblical morality is objective as well? After all, those morals are written down in a book, so it shouldn't be possible for the subject to sensibly redefine them. I'd be inclined to say yes - IF the subjects didn't actually keep redefining it. In my experience, the subject considering Biblical morality goes about picking and choosing - this doesn't apply today, this is metaphorical, this is an allegory, this doesn't mean what it says it means but something completely different, but THIS part is to be taken literally. Which is why I'd regard Christian morality as subjective.


So, now that you've made an argument that contradicts both of your stated positions, do you care to reconsider how you define the terms objective and subjective?

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You've argued well. I think I have to revise my position.

Whether P1 or P2 must be discarded depends on your view on the word "objective," which ironically is subjective. If you think something objective must exist outside ANY subjective determination, by any entity, then if God decided on our moral code, P2 fails because He made a subjective determination.

If you accept that a subjective entity can create an objective system of morality (for example, if an Earthwide code of laws could be established that were so complete you'd know whether each and every action should be judged moral or immoral), then P1 does indeed fail, as you say, since under that definition, God is not required.

So however you define the word "objective," ONE of the two premises must fail to that definition, but not necessarily both.


The only way to reconcile this is to say that there is no subjective decision in God's morality. For example, you could argue that God's morality is not an idea, but the human-behavioral expression of the nature of God. I think this is where the Christian argument has arrived. However, something is still fishy, here: if WHATEVER good behavior we can do is defined as an expression of the nature of God, and goodness in people is used as evidence of God, we have a super-nasty begging of the question going on.

[genkaus]

Whether P1 or P2 must be discarded depends on your view on the word "objective," which ironically is subjective. If you think something objective must exist outside ANY subjective determination, by any entity, then if God decided on our moral code, P2 fails because He made a subjective determination.

If you accept that a subjective entity can create an objective system of morality (for example, if an Earthwide code of laws could be established that were so complete you'd know whether each and every action should be judged moral or immoral), then P1 does indeed fail, as you say, since under that definition, God is not required.

So however you define the word "objective," ONE of the two premises must fail to that definition, but not necessarily both.

This should be an interesting mental exercise for any theist:

"Define the word objective in such a way that both P1 and P2 can be shown to be simultaneously true."

However, the thing is, I do not think that the meaning of the word "objective" is upto anyone's subjective interpretation. Words having an established meaning that cannot be arbitrarily changed, redefined or creatively reinterpreted is the cornerstone for any communication. I cannot start a discussion by saying "anything made by gos is objective" and then use that definition as evidence that anything you regard as objective is therefore made by god and thus, evidence for god.

Here, I'd say that you have defined the word correctly, you are just a little off on its application. This, ofcourse, relates to the question of whether or not a subjective entity can create an objective system. What we generally regard as objective (rules of logic, science) or subjective (beauty, art) goes a long way in clarifying the application of the principle.

When an object X (which maybe a physical object or a concept) is being considered by the subject Y (any subject - not necessarily just you), then, if the question "what is X" can be answered without a reference to the subject's will or desire, then X is objective, otherwise subjective. So, for example, while all ideas and concepts in existence are created by subjective entities, if the nature of those concepts are determined by things other than those creative subjects, then those concepts are considered objective. For example, the rules of logic, while developed by humans, are about how reality works in an abstract sense - which is why they are considered objective. The laws of nature as determined by science are about actual physical phenomena within reality - therefore objective. Whereas, the question of beauty is about what the subject would find attractive - which is why it is subjective. Similarly, the units of measurement may have been chosen arbitrarily - but they are defined according to some independent physical phenomena (swing of a pendulum for time or a specific rod being kept somewhere) - and given that fact, they are no longer dependent on the subject and thus are considered objective. On the other hand, the units of measurement that do depend upon the subject - such as a pinch, a fistful, an arm's length - are, correctly, regarded as subjective.

Now, let's step into murkier waters - where the object is not obviously dependent on something physical. But then, for something to be objective, it need not necessarily depend on something physical. Take the rules for engaging in scientific inquiry. Are those rules subjective? Science is about determining facts regarding how nature works - this much, while established arbitrarily, is a conceptual fact. That purpose is inherent within the concept of science. Thus, what we need to do in order to determine those facts in not up to subject. Those rules are determined by rational consideration of how nature works and that is why they are objective. On the other hand, consider language. Language is informing you about what is in my mind. In order for the communication to work, we know that ideas must be expressed in specific forms and with specific words that cannot be changed arbitrarily. That would be the one objective rule of language. However, this tells you nothing about what those forms or words should be - which is why, the rest of the rules are subjective. So, according to this, we can establish that subjective entities can come up with objective standards if the goal of those standards is inherent to the object they apply to.

Which brings us to morality. The problem here is that we do not know of any inherent goals applicable to human actions. For morality to be objective, it needs an end that can be determined by the nature of morality itself. And while different philosophers have come up with different ideas about this purpose, they usually end up regarding their chosen purpose as self-evident and do not bother to justify it. For example, "morality is about minimizing harm", "it is about greatest happiness to greatest numbers", "it is about getting closer to god" - these are all claims regarding the purpose of morality and if any of them could be justified as being a derivative of the concept of morality itself, then that moral system would be objective. But, as long as that is not established, all we can do is assume that the goal is set according to the law-givers subjective wish - whether that law-giver be a philosopher or a god - which makes it subjective as well.

[bennyboy]

Another good post, and I agree with all of it.

Okay, so we are left with the third and final option: absolute morality was never created by a subjective entity (i.e. God didn't sit around and think "Hmmmm how should my creations act?"). Instead, morality would be the behavioral expression of God's nature, or of human nature, or of something else. We can imagine an archetypal Moral Man, who would always choose the action which most accurately represented that underlying quanity X.

We should also examine the idea of a singular "morality," as an entity. Whatever God is/isn't, or mankind is/isn't, the word morality is itself just a word. So given any specific definition of morality, we will have a different Moral Man who behaves optimally. If we choose to define morality as maximizing the pleasure-to-suffering ratio over all organisms over all time, then presumably there is a theoretical "best action" that will achieve that, and Moral Man will do that action consistently. Similarly, if we choose a different definition, that maximal Moral Man will behave differently, but still be a perfect expression of whatever idea we are trying to express. So I would say we don't even GET to the stage of establishing mores before we fall afoul of subjectivity. Most behaviors are probably both moral and immoral, with that status being not an existential reality, but just the outcome of an arbitrary algorithm.

So in what sense COULD morality be called objective? We have to remove the ambiguity that comes from viewing one behavior through multiple definitions. We need a single definition, which humans are never going to be able/willing to arrive at. I think that points again to a God being the only possible source of an objective morality. And since we've already agreed it can't be a MADE morality (because therefore subjective), it must be the expression of God or part of God's nature.

But now we are hopelessly backward, because to be moral, we have to attempt to be manifestations of God or an aspect of God. We're into hippie territory: "God is love. BE God."

[genkaus]

We should also examine the idea of a singular "morality," as an entity. Whatever God is/isn't, or mankind is/isn't, the word morality is itself just a word. So given any specific definition of morality, we will have a different Moral Man who behaves optimally. If we choose to define morality as maximizing the pleasure-to-suffering ratio over all organisms over all time, then presumably there is a theoretical "best action" that will achieve that, and Moral Man will do that action consistently. Similarly, if we choose a different definition, that maximal Moral Man will behave differently, but still be a perfect expression of whatever idea we are trying to express. So I would say we don't even GET to the stage of establishing mores before we fall afoul of subjectivity. Most behaviors are probably both moral and immoral, with that status being not an existential reality, but just the outcome of an arbitrary algorithm.

So in what sense COULD morality be called objective? We have to remove the ambiguity that comes from viewing one behavior through multiple definitions. We need a single definition, which humans are never going to be able/willing to arrive at.

If universal human agreement was required fro anything to have a singular definition, then there wouldn't be any singular definitions. The fact that different philosophers disagree on what morality means does not preclude it from having a singular definition, nor does is preclude us from figuring out what that singular definition is.

The one thing that all the ideas and definitions about morality have in common is that they are all about "what a person should do" or "how a person should act". Common sense says that if there is going to be an objective, specific and singular definition of morality, that would be it - "morality is a conceptual guide regarding how a person should act". The subjective part comes in when different philosophers add on different addendums such as "how a person should act in order to maximize pleasure/pain ratio" or "how a person should act in order to achieve certain virtues". Without such additions, the given definition fits the description of all ideas regarding morality known to us regardless of any subject's will. So, if there is going to be an objective meaning to the word morality, that would be it.

Thus, any actions or principles which can be rationally derived from this definition would be a part of objective morality. That is, given this definition, your hypothetical, ideal "moral man" would act consistently with any "best actions" you can figure out from it.

I think that points again to a God being the only possible source of an objective morality. And since we've already agreed it can't be a MADE morality (because therefore subjective), it must be the expression of God or part of God's nature.

So, if humans can't agree on a specific definition, you need a god to provide one? That sounds like classic god-of-the-gaps to me.

[bennyboy]

If universal human agreement was required fro anything to have a singular definition, then there wouldn't be any singular definitions. The fact that different philosophers disagree on what morality means does not preclude it from having a singular definition, nor does is preclude us from figuring out what that singular definition is.

The one thing that all the ideas and definitions about morality have in common is that they are all about "what a person should do" or "how a person should act". Common sense says that if there is going to be an objective, specific and singular definition of morality, that would be it - "morality is a conceptual guide regarding how a person should act". The subjective part comes in when different philosophers add on different addendums such as "how a person should act in order to maximize pleasure/pain ratio" or "how a person should act in order to achieve certain virtues". Without such additions, the given definition fits the description of all ideas regarding morality known to us regardless of any subject's will. So, if there is going to be an objective meaning to the word morality, that would be it.

Fair enough. We all agree that morality is a guidline for how people should act. But "should" implies some kind of goal, and since people have different goals, there can be no consensus about what constitutes actual moral behavior (though there are some very common goals, like the mutual aversion to death and pain).

So, if humans can't agree on a specific definition, you need a god to provide one? That sounds like classic god-of-the-gaps to me.

Agreed. I think the "objective morality" argument really is a god-of-the-gaps argument, but of morality rather than physical inquiry. "IF there is a single morality, it must be objective, and if there is an objective single morality, it cannot come from people" can be reworded to "people cannot possibly know the maximal best way to behave in many situations, therefore that theoretical Moral Man is not human at all, therefore God."

[genkaus]

Fair enough. We all agree that morality is a guidline for how people should act. But "should" implies some kind of goal, and since people have different goals, there can be no consensus about what constitutes actual moral behavior (though there are some very common goals, like the mutual aversion to death and pain).

Given that we are mostly in agreement here, the only thing remaining for me is to show that an objective moral system is possible for humans. If I can establish that there could be something regarded as an "objective" goal or purpose to morality, then, atleast the possibility of objective morality without god can be established. But remember, my failure to do so would not prove that objective morality requires a god. However, if I go there, this thread would become a discussion about objective morality and not about the moral argument for god. But that argument is a piece of turd anyway, so let's flush it away.

We agree that morality is a guideline about how people should act. But this statement is not made in a philosophical vacuum. Before this idea of morality applies, certain pre-conditions have to be met, such as whether the person could act according to conceptual principles (this is the big difference between human and animal morality). For morality to even apply to an entity, it must be capable of having thoughts, setting goals, acting with reference to his desires - the qualities of what we call a moral agent. Whether he does so or not, he should be capable of it.

This gives us a little idea about the goals of morality - if morality is to be rational (a condition required for it to be objective) then those goals cannot be contradictory to those pre-conditions. But that doesn't say much about those goals apart from telling us which those goals could or could not be.

Which brings me to my final point. In order for morality, as a whole, to be objective, the goals it is supposed to achieve should be objective as well. Which means, the goals should be determined not by the particular philosopher's ideas or opinions but by the moral agent's - meaning, the human being's nature itself. For example, here you talk about having common goals - avoiding death and pain - but is that the result of a lot of people having similar subjective desires or are those desires themselves the result of being a human?

To elaborate: suppose you set out to create your hypothetical moral man. You create a sentient being, with all the principles of logic and rationality pre-programed in its brain, but without any emotional baggage or desires. Before this moral man asks himself the question "what should I do?", he'd need to ask "what do I want?". Now, given that you haven't factored in any prior motivations to affect this answer, the reply here would represent a properly basic desire. Maybe that desire is programmed into his genetic structure. Or maybe it is the result of being a thinking, feeling entity. Either way, it does not depend upon "what he thinks or believes", it depends on "what he is" - therefore objective, instead of subjective. Now, suppose that basic desire is "I want to live and I want to be happy and fulfilled" - then the other that would give him a list of other things he needs to achieve in order to fulfill that. So, as a result of that basic objective desire, you have a whole list of other objective desires which would serve as a goal for morality and that morality can be properly regarded as objective.

Now, I'm not saying that the motivation I've presented here is a fact or that any such motivation would necessarily exist. But studies into human psychology do suggest something like that. So, morality developed by taking the basic facts of human nature into consideration would be objective without any need for a god.

[bennyboy]

You could argue that an individual's goals, or world view, or ideal world, or whatever stem from something objective-- the deterministic variables that have made the person who he is. You could argue that the net result of all the individuals' influence on the memes in a population are objective as well for the same reason. However, there is still a problem-- that subsets of that whole population will often have different goals, instincts, desires, or whatever, and therefore different mores.

I'd argue (as you know) that in a naturalist (read: determinist) perspective, ALL is actually objective, and "subjective" is just another term for the variability in the objective mores of a collection of individuals. There are also systemic variations, for example between women and men, or between young people and their elders. So the "what one is" that defines objective morality is variable across individuals.

What then of archetypal morality, of a Moral Man who represents the whole population? A man by nature usually wishes to mate with many females. Is it moral for him to do this? Is it moral for his wife to prevent him if she can? Is it moral to rape another if he can? Is it moral for a father to avenge the rape of his daughter with murder? Is it moral to commit suicide, when the "what one is" of one's parents, and their desire for happiness that involves the continuing existence of a loved one, is also objective?

How do you go from individual objective moralities to a group objective morality? If we can't do that, we basically have "people are different, and they do stuff that affects others." It may be true, but it leads to a kind of metamoralistic question: is it moral for any subset of a population to establish (still through their deterministic therefore objective processes) a moral code? If the answer to that is "no," then we're in Koolay-land.

[Zazzy]

How do you go from individual objective moralities to a group objective morality? If we can't do that, we basically have "people are different, and they do stuff that affects others."

Guys, I have loved reading your back and forth on this. Since this above quote appears to be how the world actually is, how does that fit into the framework you're constructing?

It may be true, but it leads to a kind of metamoralistic question: is it moral for any subset of a population to establish (still through their deterministic therefore objective processes) a moral code? If the answer to that is "no," then we're in Koolay-land.

You would have to rely on utilitarianism here, since you would have already determined that objective morals don't exist past the individual.

Thanks for having this discussion- it's fascinating.

[genkaus]

You could argue that an individual's goals, or world view, or ideal world, or whatever stem from something objective-- the deterministic variables that have made the person who he is. You could argue that the net result of all the individuals' influence on the memes in a population are objective as well for the same reason. However, there is still a problem-- that subsets of that whole population will often have different goals, instincts, desires, or whatever, and therefore different mores.

I'd argue (as you know) that in a naturalist (read: determinist) perspective, ALL is actually objective, and "subjective" is just another term for the variability in the objective mores of a collection of individuals. There are also systemic variations, for example between women and men, or between young people and their elders. So the "what one is" that defines objective morality is variable across individuals.

What then of archetypal morality, of a Moral Man who represents the whole population? A man by nature usually wishes to mate with many females. Is it moral for him to do this? Is it moral for his wife to prevent him if she can? Is it moral to rape another if he can? Is it moral for a father to avenge the rape of his daughter with murder? Is it moral to commit suicide, when the "what one is" of one's parents, and their desire for happiness that involves the continuing existence of a loved one, is also objective?

How do you go from individual objective moralities to a group objective morality? If we can't do that, we basically have "people are different, and they do stuff that affects others." It may be true, but it leads to a kind of metamoralistic question: is it moral for any subset of a population to establish (still through their deterministic therefore objective processes) a moral code? If the answer to that is "no," then we're in Koolay-land.

That's a good argument and the answer to it can be found in the creation of the hypothetical moral man.

But first things first. Your contention here is that the things we regard as subjective - a person's beliefs, desires, motivations, ideas etc. - are, in fact, derivative of objective facts, events and experiences he has had. And since they spring from something objective, they can be properly regarded as objective - thus rendering the objective/subjective distinction moot. This argument is the response to my own proposition regarding certain objective desires.

The error here is the assumption "if something stems from something objective, then it is objective as well". That was not part of my argument. Here, I left the part "with no subjective determination involved" as unsaid, because I thought it was a obvious, given the prior discussion on differences between objective and subjective.

You are a conscious entity who already has gone through a unique set of events and experiences that have made you who you are. That these events themselves are objective is irrelevant - the consciousness they've shaped is unique and the determinations of that consciousness - as it pertains how it was shaped - are subjective. But, there is another part of your mind that is capable of objective determinations. The part that has the process of rational thinking installed in it. These rules of logical thought are not produced in your mind as a result of unique experiences, rather your mind must identify and conform to them. And while, in our daily lives, these two interact so extensively that it is not possible to determine exactly how much of a determination is subjective, we do, however, go by the general rule that if we do not find any element of subjectivity in it, then it is objective.

Which brings us to the creation of the hypothetical moral man. As indicated, you created him without any experience, desires, motivations, ideas, beliefs etc. Only the capacity to think rationally - which humans have to learn - comes factory installed. We've created him with the most generic "human" template. The idea here is to avoid all the complications life long experiences would cause in his ability to think rationally - to remove the subjective element - and to see if any desires or motivations are left once that is done. The hypothetical desire "I want to live and be happy and fulfilled" is not the result of reflection on his 2 seconds of life. This is the big difference between the "objective desire" of the hypothetical moral man and the other desires you see in every human you meet.



Now, here is something you might find interesting - I don't regard the objective morality this moral man would develop as an exhaustive guide to anyone's life - let alone his. Assuming he has that desire and we can show it to be objective - it would tell him a few things about what he should do. Since he wants to live, he must secure food and shelter, ensure survival and all the basic stuff. But what should he eat or where should he live are still things dictated by the subjective experiences he undergoes as he starts living his life. Any systemic variations are accounted for here as well.


Finally, about individual morality vs group morality. As is indicated by most of my arguments, I regard morality as more of a private concern than a public concern. Here is the basic quality of a moral agent that I've not stated before - he must be free to act with reference to his thoughts and motivations. If a person is not free to do so, then he cannot be regarded as a moral agent. Which means that in absence of such freedom, no morality - whether objective or subjective - is relevant to him. Which means, in a society, even the smallest subset - an individual - should be allowed to develop his own moral code and live by it. But here's the catch to this - in ensuring that every individual has the freedom to develop his own moral code, you've automatically set the limit to that freedom - to wit - that his moral code cannot be imposed upon any other individual. This is a rather simplistic view regarding group morality and many other factors come in play, but this is the basic principle I start with.