Ed Feser's Aristotelian Proof of the Existence of God

[bennyboy]

And I agree, but they need to learn to make this distinction. Its simply disingenuous not to acknowledge it. Despite all their efforts to re-frame this kind of debate, in the end, they are still simply presenting a "reality + something else" view and this “+something else” rightly needs justification – if it is true – so that all of us who are stuck in “just reality” can then move forward and expand our “just reality” to include their ideas and we can be all one happy agreeable humanity. But the onus remains theirs alone to bear, right?

Yes, that's right. Theists bear the burden of demonstrating that theism in general, or their specific flavor of theism, represents reality-- or even just a useful idea.

That being said, my argument with you isn't about the merits of theism-- only about whether all ideas need to be supported by empirical evidence. In my opinion, many do not, in particular philosophical questions where we not only don't have the means to make empirical observations, but have no reason to think we ever will.

The tools that we use to define our shared reality – empiricism, induction, deduction, logic, math, science, etc. – go a long way to addressing the bullshit issue. Philosophy and empirical science both, in fact, are not about discovering truth (its merely a side product of their processes), but rather about finding and eliminating bullshit when its encountered. Both are good tools for dissecting someone else's claims.

The tools you mentioned are extremely useful, but are context specific, that context being the spacetime framework in which math always works, and in which objects and the forces on them are known to be consistent: in other words, the normal framework in which we function as human beings.

When it comes to cosmogony, or why sentience exists rather than not, or things like that, then we are establishing a new context. We have to show the tools still function meaningfully-- and for the most part, we cannot. It may be that inside a black Hole or at the creation of the universe, for example, none of the intellectual tools we normally use really apply.

My point is that if we can acknowledge we're talking about a context that reaches beyond our normal frame of reference, appeals to evidence come with a caveat: that the person making the appeal also shares some burden-- of showing that evidence means anything in the context being talked about.

I agree, and that is how science-minded people tend to leave it too. In my experience, its merely the theological arguments that leap to conclusions ahead of their time.

That's true. It depends how the arguments are worded, and whether the surety of the conclusion is appropriate to the argument. The main problem is that theists are exclusively backward-tracing thinkers, i.e. that they already "know" the truth, and are looking for logical steps that arrive at it. Therefore their level of surety is invariabe, and this is seen as intellectual dishonesty by non-theists.

I think that logical extension of philosophical ideas used in our everyday context can and should be used to generate philosophical ideas for other contexts (again, like cosmogony). For example, I'd argue that a kind of deism is possible simply because mind exists in this universe-- and if "like makes like," then if the universe was ever created, whatever created it may also be sentient or at least partly so. To me, that is a perfectly viable candidate for cosmogony. But throwing an idea "out there" for the joy of speculation, and saying ". . . therefore definitely God" are very different.

[HopOnPop]

My argument with you is...about whether all ideas need to be supported by empirical evidence. In my opinion, many do not, in particular philosophical questions where we not only don't have the means to make empirical observations, but have no reason to think we ever will.

Let's focus on this point alone, because to address everything point by point will make this exchange way too frustrating to read (and to write. I know I tried for several hours):

Turn around this idea for a moment. Lets just say some non-empirical effect is inundating our reality right now, bathing us all in some undetectible energy. If it is not emprically detectible in any way how would this "fact" matter in anyway to anyone or anything?

Another way to make this same point is to ask: what's the difference between a completely fictional idea and "a particular philosophical questions where we not only don't have the means to make empirical observations, but have no reason to think we ever will"?

By eliminating empiricism as a possible methodology, one has de facto eliminated any potential consequence, effect, benefit, harm...anything...for that said philosophical notion too, have they not?

[Chas]

That would take too much effort. Your post is such a confused mess that it isn't even wrong. You do not even know that deduction and inference are synonyms, both being the process whereby one uses sound reasoning to gain knowledge of what one does not know from things that are already known. We can know many things from the senses and experience of which we can be certain without submitting them to empirical testing. We know that things exist and we know that they change. From these two fundamental facts, we can deduce, or infer, certain knowledge of various types of cause, potential and actuality, etc., substantial form, etc.

Not everything of which people know can, or needs to be, tested empirically which is what I believe you are claiming. For those that are truly interested, the meat of the Feser's lecture is around 30 min.

Deduction and inference are most certainly not synonyms.
The rest of your post is equally laughable.

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Rather, as an alternative, try something novel -- merely start from the biggest special plea that there is -- namely, that we both accept, from the start, that there is a fundamental shared reality that we both preceive and exist within. Is that a possible starting reference point that you might consider instead?

Except that is an assumption, not a special pleading. It is an excellent assumption.

A special pleading would be "There is a fundamental shared reality that we both perceive and exist within except God exists outside of it.

[bennyboy]

My argument with you is...about whether all ideas need to be supported by empirical evidence. In my opinion, many do not, in particular philosophical questions where we not only don't have the means to make empirical observations, but have no reason to think we ever will.

Let's focus on this point alone, because to address everything point by point will make this exchange way too frustrating to read (and to write. I know I tried for several hours):

Turn around this idea for a moment. Lets just say some non-empirical effect is inundating our reality right now, bathing us all in some undetectible energy. If it is not emprically detectible in any way how would this "fact" matter in anyway to anyone or anything?

Another way to make this same point is to ask: what's the difference between a completely fictional idea and "a particular philosophical questions where we not only don't have the means to make empirical observations, but have no reason to think we ever will"?

By eliminating empiricism as a possible methodology, one has de facto eliminated any potential consequence, effect, benefit, harm...anything...for that said philosophical notion too, have they not?

Okay, let's take cosmogony-- the fact of existence, rather than non-existence, of the universe and everything in it. Now let's take psychogony (afaik I'm coining it but I think it works okay); I would argue, for example, that the capacity of the universe to include at least some subjective experience must be ingrained in whatever quantity "X" allows for the existence of the universe, or created it, or whatever. I think that's a fairly reasonable argument, since we generally consider that like creates like.

Now, asking me to provide empirical evidence for this would be a bit silly. Obviously, I'm not able to collect information about what actually caused the universe to exist, or to know if it is partly or fully sentient. But I'm using fairly reasonable ideas about what is known to hazard an educated guess into a context which is unknown and probably unknowable to us.

---

Rather, as an alternative, try something novel -- merely start from the biggest special plea that there is -- namely, that we both accept, from the start, that there is a fundamental shared reality that we both preceive and exist within. Is that a possible starting reference point that you might consider instead?

Except that is an assumption, not a special pleading. It is an excellent assumption.

It's special pleading only in the context of a couple pages ago, where we were talking about the need to validate ideas with empirical evidence. To say that we are using empirical evidence to PROVE the existence of a shared objective world doesn't make sense, because it's only empirical evidence if we already know it to come from a shared objective world. Circles are a no-no.

[The Grand Nudger]

That being said, my argument with you isn't about the merits of theism-- only about whether all ideas need to be supported by empirical evidence. In my opinion, many do not, in particular philosophical questions where we not only don't have the means to make empirical observations, but have no reason to think we ever will.

Then we have no knowledge of such a thing. Full stop. No amount of "pure argument" will change that. Being unable to determine whether or not an argument is sound does not excuse that argument from the requirement.

My point is that if we can acknowledge we're talking about a context that reaches beyond our normal frame of reference, appeals to evidence come with a caveat: that the person making the appeal also shares some burden-- of showing that evidence means anything in the context being talked about.

There's no point in appealing to logic in that context either. Demonstrate that it applies, and then demonstrate that it's useful without any way of determining that it is sound.

I think that logical extension of philosophical ideas used in our everyday context can and should be used to generate philosophical ideas for other contexts (again, like cosmogony).

Why? You want to throw empiricism out based out context but retain logic? LOL...of course you do.....Because what you're about to -propose- is silly. It's not silly to ask for evidence of some mind that created this place. Or why you think that like creates like applies (and aren't you appealing to empiricism now.....). You're trying to cut off one of logics legs because it's giving you shit relative to some claim you'd like to call reasonable - but I don't think that you can actually do so....because you're still going to invoke that leg in any argument you make. Logic is now and has always been an exercise in evidence and the relationships between things in evidence in the first place. It's how the universe appears to behave, it's descriptive - and this will invariably be based in some empirical claim.

It bothers me that I even have to say this.....but you're calling a gap argument reasonable........

[bennyboy]

Then we have no knowledge of such a thing. Full stop. No amount of "pure argument" will change that. Being unable to determine whether or not an argument is sound does not excuse that argument from the requirement.

This sounds circular. You seem to be insisting that a sound argument must be empirically provable. This axiom is necessarily false.

There's no point in appealing to logic in that context either. Demonstrate that it applies, and then demonstrate that it's useful without any way of determining that it is sound.

Without empirical observations to be made from which one can infer ideas, there are only three options left: 1) draw inferences using other means (i.e. using logical extensions); 2) wait (probably longer than your lifetime) until new empirical means are available; 3) just walk away.

I think that logical extension of philosophical ideas used in our everyday context can and should be used to generate philosophical ideas for other contexts (again, like cosmogony).

Why? You want to throw empiricism out based out context but retain logic? LOL...of course you do.....Because what you're about to -propose- is silly. It's not silly to ask for evidence of some mind that created this place.

If you are going to be insulting, at least have the courtesy to be correct. When you are considering candidate models for things which are currently a mystery, you don't have to prove or disprove them-- you only have to show that your idea is connected logically to something we DO know about.

Now, if I'm making a positive assertion about the nature of the universe, and I want you to believe me, then I'll have to meet whatever criteria you have for changing your beliefs. But that's not the conversation we're having right now.

Or why you think that like creates like applies (and aren't you appealing to empiricism now.....). You're trying to cut off one of logics legs because it's giving you shit relative to some claim you'd like to call reasonable - but I don't think that you can actually do so....because you're still going to invoke that leg in any argument you make. Logic is now and has always been an exercise in evidence and the relationships between things in evidence in the first place. It's how the universe appears to behave, it's descriptive - and this will invariably be based in some empirical claim.

Fine. Show me your empirical claim for cosmogony-- why things exist rather than not existing.

And while you spend 20,000 years developing the technology-- maybe-- to do that, I will sit here and enjoy the process of wondering about things.

It bothers me that I even have to say this.....but you're calling a gap argument reasonable........

To exactly what argument are you referring? None of mine, I believe.

[The Grand Nudger]

This sounds circular. You seem to be insisting that a sound argument must be empirically provable. This axiom is necessarily false.

You must have a method of determining that the parts are sound.

Without empirical observations to be made from which one can infer ideas, there are only three options left: 1) draw inferences using other means (i.e. using logical extensions); 2) wait (probably longer than your lifetime) until new empirical means are available; 3) just walk away.

1.)Why would a logical extension mean anything in territory where empiricism does not? And what power does logic have without empirical means of determining that which is sound? Nada. You can generate a bunch of guesses that are no more right or wrong than any other, and could have been gained by throwing darts at a wall as easily as by using logic....and they would still be just as right or wrong in that vacuum.
2.)Yup.
3.)Sure, though I'd wonder if anyone has ever plumbed the bottom of the well with regards to any particular claim or statement, but in the end, faced with the unknowable unknown walking away is an option, and probably the only option...if there were other options..it wouldn't be an unknowable unknown.

If you are going to be insulting, at least have the courtesy to be correct. When you are considering candidate models for things which are currently a mystery, you don't have to prove or disprove them-- you only have to show that your idea is connected logically to something we DO know about.

-and how do you know whatever that connecting thing is? Bet you're appealing to empiricism.

Fine. Show me your empirical claim for cosmogony-- why things exist rather than not existing.

I don't have one - I don't know. I could bullshit you, I could make it "sound reasonable"....but I'd be bullshitting you (and myself). -But...why should I have to have one? Why would this be an appropriate response to my comments in the first place?

And while you spend 20,000 years developing the technology-- maybe-- to do that, I will sit here and enjoy the process of wondering about things.

Wonder and imagine all you like. I do it to. I'd just prefer that we don't pretend that we're being reasonable when we do those things. If you'd like to state that something is in the category of unknown and probably unknowable - is there a problem with leaving it as an unknown? If so, why put it in that box in the absence of that knowledge in the first place?

To exactly what argument are you referring? None of mine, I believe.

Yes, yours.

"I would argue, for example, that the capacity of the universe to include at least some subjective experience must be ingrained in whatever quantity "X" allows for the existence of the universe, or created it, or whatever. I think that's a fairly reasonable argument, since we generally consider that like creates like."

You're extending logic into an area where the rules may not apply. Invoking an empirical claim in the process, as I've mentioned (and that's ignoring what one might call the empirical nature of logic).


"Now, asking me to provide empirical evidence for this would be a bit silly. Obviously, I'm not able to collect information about what actually caused the universe to exist, or to know if it is partly or fully sentient. But I'm using fairly reasonable ideas about what is known to hazard an educated guess into a context which is unknown and probably unknowable to us."

Bolded bits are the operatives. "Here's this gap, Imma fill it with speculation and then claim that I don't need evidence to come up with something reasonable (though I'll appeal to it anyway), and that it would be silly to ask me for it." Perhaps it didn't hit you, but your format here is precisely the same as every god of the gaps arguments that has ever been dropped on this board. If you're convinced of your argument for some creative mind you ought to be convinced of Christ and Krishna for the same reasons. Whether or not it's true (the mind bit) is irrelevant to either of us for the purpose of this convo, obviously. I'm trying to help you realize that you're not being reasonable...and that you -are- appealing to empiricism....not that there wasn't some creative mind.
(but if you'd like to have that conversation I might be able to explain why you're off the rails by reference to apple pie: bet I could make you giggle)

[HopOnPop]

Let's focus on this point alone, because to address everything point by point will make this exchange way too frustrating to read (and to write. I know I tried for several hours):

Turn around this idea for a moment. Lets just say some non-empirical effect is inundating our reality right now, bathing us all in some undetectible energy. If it is not emprically detectible in any way how would this "fact" matter in anyway to anyone or anything?

Another way to make this same point is to ask: what's the difference between a completely fictional idea and "a particular philosophical questions where we not only don't have the means to make empirical observations, but have no reason to think we ever will"?

By eliminating empiricism as a possible methodology, one has de facto eliminated any potential consequence, effect, benefit, harm...anything...for that said philosophical notion too, have they not?

Okay, let's take cosmogony-- the fact of existence, rather than non-existence, of the universe and everything in it. Now let's take psychogony (afaik I'm coining it but I think it works okay); I would argue, for example, that the capacity of the universe to include at least some subjective experience must be ingrained in whatever quantity "X" allows for the existence of the universe, or created it, or whatever. I think that's a fairly reasonable argument, since we generally consider that like creates like.

That may be a possibility, but the question still remains, what practical purpose (beyond one's love for entertainment value) does making that kind of distinction -- if we can never ever remotely know it -- mean to us? In your example, we agree that we can only have the subjective experience itself, regardless of what there may or may not be connected to it "outside" our empirical view that defines our reality. So to rework my question to address your concern:

How can we then distinguish between simple subjective experience from "some subjective experience...ingrained in whatever quantity "X" [that] allows for the existence of the universe, or created it, or whatever"?

We are still stuck with the same problem here. You are merely proposing that something here has components 'elsewhere' beyond any ability for us to ever detect, so what is the purpose of making this kind of distinction?


btw, in your response to Rhythm, I noted you said this: "Now, if I'm making a positive assertion about the nature of the universe, and I want you to believe me, then I'll have to meet whatever criteria you have for changing your beliefs..."

Forgive me for perhaps not making my original point clearer, but my own comment that initially urged you to initially comment in this thread (I believe my original point was regarding the difference between a merely sound argument (which is only speculative -- as in the case of the Cosmological argument)), and the idea of a sound AND valid argument (which requires an empirical demonstration to make it valid)) was essentially making this very point you just stated. I certainly never meant to imply that any idea one wants to simply entertain requires empiricism. That wouldn't make any sense -- I mean to believe that would be to demand a fiction writer entertain empiricism, and that would be absurd, and also miss the entire reason people read fiction). My point was, rather, that if one wants their idea to bridge the gap from "what is possible" to "what is true" (i.e. as you say: make "a positive assertion about the nature of the universe"), then you have to provide an empirical reason to justify why anyone would also accept that positive assertion. A merely logically valid arguement, though, is nothing more than a mere speculation, and thus remains indisinguishable from an equally logically valid complete fiction -- which is entertaining, but means that one who simply resorts to logical arguments (as so many philosophers of religion do), without the empirical demonstration too, the discussion doesn't amount to anything useful or informative (outside of the entertainment value), do you not agree?

I think we are essentially in agreement here, in any regard to the need or role of re: empiricism, are we not?

[bennyboy]

1.)Why would a logical extension mean anything in territory where empiricism does not?

Because even when empirical observation is impossible, we still like to form ideas about things.

And while you spend 20,000 years developing the technology-- maybe-- to do that, I will sit here and enjoy the process of wondering about things.

Wonder and imagine all you like. I do it to. I'd just prefer that we don't pretend that we're being reasonable when we do those things. If you'd like to state that something is in the category of unknown and probably unknowable - is there a problem with leaving it as an unknown? If so, why put it in that box in the absence of that knowledge in the first place?

Because it is by a combination of logical speculation and empirical observation that we learn what things in life ARE mysteries, and identify ideas which we should consider more deeply.

[quote]
"I would argue, for example, that the capacity of the universe to include at least some subjective experience must be ingrained in whatever quantity "X" allows for the existence of the universe, or created it, or whatever. I think that's a fairly reasonable argument, since we generally consider that like creates like."

You're extending logic into an area where the rules may not apply. Invoking an empirical claim in the process, as I've mentioned (and that's ignoring what one might call the empirical nature of logic).

Yes, I'm doing that, and I specifically claimed I was doing that. I'm extending ideas about what is knowable into a context in which things are not knowable.

Bolded bits are the operatives. "Here's this gap, Imma fill it with speculation and then claim that I don't need evidence to come up with something reasonable (though I'll appeal to it anyway), and that it would be silly to ask me for it."

You've repeatedly said that I'm doing this, and I've repeatedly pointed out the difference between forming speculative ideas based on what is currently known/believed, and making a positive assertion for which I must carry the burden of proof. No ideas about cosmogony, for example, can meet the burdern of empirical proof. How would you collect observations about a time when there was no time? You can't-- you have to speculate. Now, that doesn't mean all speculation is bullshit, or that those with better empirical observations in this context can't come up with better/more interesting speculations. I'd take Stephen Hawking's logically-extended speculations with much more interest than a Catholic taxi driver's, for example.

I'm trying to help you realize that you're not being reasonable...and that you -are- appealing to empiricism....not that there wasn't some creative mind.

Making a logical extension of what we know through observation is not itself an empirical process. For example, I've observed that at least 1 mind exists (my own). I extend this idea into other people, and arrive at the philosophical position that other minds also exist. Now, I cannot empirically observe what it's like to be you, or prove there is such a thing as "being like you," but the idea of non-solipsism anyway turns out to be highly useful and interesting to me.

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How can we then distinguish between simple subjective experience from "some subjective experience...ingrained in whatever quantity "X" [that] allows for the existence of the universe, or created it, or whatever"?

I think we are at different points of a diversion in this thread, here.

The latter idea I'm giving as an idea of logical extension-- that a framework that includes mind might originate with/in/from a creative quantity which also includes mind. But I didn't mean to imply that this mind (I guess it's a Deity) could be part of one's own personal experience. I also (just to be crystal clear) didn't mean to imply that this particular logical extension represents a truthful statement about the universe and its origins-- only that it conforms to a sensible way of generating ideas, even though it is not empirically provable/disprovable.

My point was, rather, that if one wants their idea to bridge the gap from "what is possible" to "what is true" (i.e. as you say: make "a positive assertion about the nature of the universe"), then you have to provide an empirical reason to justify why anyone would also accept that positive assertion. A merely logically valid arguement, though, is nothing more than a mere speculation, and thus remains indisinguishable from an equally logically valid complete fiction -- which is entertaining, but means that one who simply resorts to logical arguments (as so many philosophers of religion do), without the empirical demonstration too, the discussion doesn't amount to anything useful or informative (outside of the entertainment value), do you not agree?

This all sounds on point to me.

[HopOnPop]

This all sounds on point to me.

Whew...glad to see the issue with empiricism is over (or, rather, never actually existed...just a product of online cross- or mis-communication). I thought all along this all must be something like that. It was such a "philosophy 101" kind of discussion, if you know what I mean (the only people that I find who fight this point usually just haven't been exposed to formal philosophy before....which clearly didn't apply to you, so I was rather baffled by the debate over it).

The latter idea I'm giving as an idea of logical extension-- that a framework that includes mind might originate with/in/from a creative quantity which also includes mind.

I believe we are still on the same page here. My previous socratic exercise wasn't really dependent upon me actually acknowledging what specific idea you were actually discussing at the time, but merely that you were using an example that suggested "something (anything)" bridged this divide between 'here' and 'not here' in some way.

BTW, I believe this specific notion you now described above, in my experience, has been a fairly common staple explanation made by panentheists regarding consciousness/mind origins in their worldview. Are you perhaps an agnostic who is more apt to entertain notions blowing in from that realm?

And since we are talking of the notion that mind-may-be-a-product-of-another-'beyond-our-ken'-kind-of-agent (i.e. a god), don't you find an overwhelming impulse to yank out Occam's razor when you contemplate ideas like that? A superficial list of contingent premises alone (i.e. another kind of thinking being, being able to possibly make another universe, having the ability to tran-locate in two different contexts that are likely wholly unrelated, make the mind-being connection to a being in another context, the existence of a beyond-our-ken locality itself, just to name a few) seems almost hyper-complex. Isn't it a rather a tall order to casually attribute this complex of an idea to be merely a "logical extension"? I realize you haven't said or even suggested this notion of "psychogony" as you coined it, is something that you take all that seriously, but this conversation does make one wonder how seriously you might weight this kind of thing when weighing out the possibilities in your own head.

Isn't it far more compelling to you to listen to what neuro-science today is largely seeing in their work -- that the mind very likely merely originates with/in/from the brain itself, simply as an emergent property that arrises out of the brain functions themselves (not unlike, say the way the programs we "experience" on our computer which are an emergent property of the selective flow of electricity across various computer hardware components)?

Just curious how you tip that scale.