The Ontological Argument - valid or debunked?

[Esquilax]

While it is not directly related to the topic, it is related to your objection.   That existence is not greater than non-existence.  This begs the question, of why you would make the choice.  If you reflect on that, then I think that you have the answer to your objection.  I think that it also answers you second objection as well.

I would make that choice based on a subjective desire for my own safety. This has nothing to do with whether an extant lion is greater than a non-existent one, but if it did, you'd need to rewrite your hypothetical to actually reflect the objection I made. Because you're missing out a key component of what I said, and if we add that back in, then the hypothetical actually goes like this: would I prefer to be in a cage with an extant lion, or with a non-existent lion with all of the same properties as the former, bearing in mind that the non-extant lion would still be able to maul me. You know, the maximally great non-existent being I was positing was still able to do the things that your extant maximally great being could do, so the non-existent lion would also need to do that: in that scenario my choice of which lion to face leads to functionally identical outcomes.

Wow.... is that really the way you think.... at this point, I'm wondering if no argument is greater than any argument.

Scoffing is not a rebuttal.

[RoadRunner79]

While it is not directly related to the topic, it is related to your objection.   That existence is not greater than non-existence.  This begs the question, of why you would make the choice.  If you reflect on that, then I think that you have the answer to your objection.  I think that it also answers you second objection as well.

I would make that choice based on a subjective desire for my own safety. This has nothing to do with whether an extant lion is greater than a non-existent one, but if it did, you'd need to rewrite your hypothetical to actually reflect the objection I made. Because you're missing out a key component of what I said, and if we add that back in, then the hypothetical actually goes like this: would I prefer to be in a cage with an extant lion, or with a non-existent lion with all of the same properties as the former, bearing in mind that the non-extant lion would still be able to maul me. You know, the maximally great non-existent being I was positing was still able to do the things that your extant maximally great being could do, so the non-existent lion would also need to do that: in that scenario my choice of which lion to face leads to functionally identical outcomes.

At this point, I am questioning if you are using an uncommon definition of "exist", and would ask you define it. Do most atheist use it this way? I think it may give new light, to when you say that God does not exist... if you are consistent.

In Merriam Webster and a few other dictionaries, "being" and "exist" are somewhat circular (referencing each other), so I would say that according those definitions your reference to a non-existing being; is incoherent.

Wow.... is that really the way you think.... at this point, I'm wondering if no argument is greater than any argument.

Scoffing is not a rebuttal.

Somewhat.... and I agree. But according to what I am learning here, apparently I can have a non-existing argument; declare victory, and that is greater than having an actual argument. Would you disagree?

[SteveII]

I'm sorry, but it makes no sense that this defeats the argument. What is the difference between Premise 1 and Premise 1'?

Premise 1: It's possible that a 'maximally great being' exists.
Premise 1': It's possible that a 'maximally great being' does not exist. 

So the real difference is in P4' (P2' and P3' are definitionally true). 

Premise 4: If a maximally great being exists every possible world, then it exists in the actual world. 
Premise 4: If a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world, then it does not exist in the actual world. 

When you apply the modal logic "if something is necessary in one possible world then it is necessary in all possible worlds" to a negative such as P4', you are saying it is necessary that something does not exist. Isn't that saying the same thing as a maximally great being is logically impossible? So to support P4', you are back to having to show that a greatest conceivable being is not logically possible--which was the original challenge of the original argument. 

wiploc's argument shows that it can work both ways, that's the point. As you have yet to provide an argument that establishes the logical possibility of a maximally great being, then this argument is pretty much vacant at this point.

No. It does not work both ways because the meaning of P4' is very different from P4 because you cannot rely on modal logic of "necessary" as the original argument does.

[GrandizerII]

wiploc's argument shows that it can work both ways, that's the point. As you have yet to provide an argument that establishes the logical possibility of a maximally great being, then this argument is pretty much vacant at this point.

No. It does not work both ways because the meaning of P4' is very different from P4 because you cannot rely on modal logic of "necessary" as the original argument does.

So? Still valid argument, with conclusion following logically from the premises.

Even William Lane Craig acknowledges this:

Now you're absolutely correct, Randy, in noting that if we alter the first premiss to read
1′. It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist,
then the conclusion follows that
6′. Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist.
There's no fallacy here. The whole question is, which do you think is more plausibly true: (1) or (1′)?

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/necessary-existence-and-the-ontological-argument#ixzz4CoByxm58

[Esquilax]

At this point, I am questioning if you are using an uncommon definition of "exist", and would ask you define it.    Do most atheist use it this way?   I think it may give new light, to when you say that God does not exist... if you are consistent.  

In Merriam Webster and a few other dictionaries, "being" and "exist" are somewhat circular (referencing each other), so I would say that according those definitions your reference to a non-existing being; is incoherent.

It's only incoherent when framed in reality, which we've already kind of abandoned to talk in the purely philosophical terms that the ontological argument requires. "Maximally great being," is an incoherent concept being deployed with no set definition, the idea that possible existence could lead inexorably to necessary existence is similarly incoherent, and yet we're being asked to countenance them. The fact that my rebuttal doesn't work in the real world is simply an outgrowth of the fact that the ontological argument doesn't work in the real world.

Because all I'm doing is working according to the criteria of that argument, you know.

Somewhat.... and I agree.  But according to what I am learning here, apparently I can have a non-existing argument; declare victory, and that is greater than having an actual argument.   Would you disagree?

If that non-existent argument were somehow persuasive and effective at accomplishing the goal of granting you victory in the debate, then yes, it would be greater, given that it doesn't have a limitation that an actually existing argument would have. But this isn't so, mostly because in the real world arguments need to be expressed in order to be communicated; you are aware that when you change the noun in an argument, you're actually changing the argument to a degree that reductio ad absurdum no longer applies, yes? You can't change what I'm actually asserting as much as you have, and then still act like you're making my position look ridiculous.

But let's simplify, then: do you agree that limitations are counter to the quality of greatness? That the more limitations a thing has, the less great it is in comparison to identical objects with less limitations? Like, if I had two watches of identical make, but one had a battery that lasted two hours, and the other had a battery that lasted ten, the one with the more limited battery life is the less great watch, yes?

[SteveII]

No. It does not work both ways because the meaning of P4' is very different from P4 because you cannot rely on modal logic of "necessary" as the original argument does.

So? Still valid argument, with conclusion following logically from the premises.

Even William Lane Craig acknowledges this:

Now you're absolutely correct, Randy, in noting that if we alter the first premiss to read
1′. It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist,
then the conclusion follows that
6′. Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist.
There's no fallacy here. The whole question is, which do you think is more plausibly true: (1) or (1′)?

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/necessary-existence-and-the-ontological-argument#ixzz4CoByxm58

WLC was asked if the argument was fallacious. It is not (otherwise that would have been my response). You still have to deal with the fact that the argument does not argue the both that God exists and God does not exist with the same logic because P4' is not equivalent to P4 as it relates to modal logic and "necessary".

[GrandizerII]

So? Still valid argument, with conclusion following logically from the premises.

Even William Lane Craig acknowledges this:




Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/necessary-existence-and-the-ontological-argument#ixzz4CoByxm58

WLC was asked if the argument was fallacious. It is not (otherwise that would have been my response). You still have to deal with the fact that the argument does not argue the both that God exists and God does not exist with the same logic because P4' is not equivalent to P4 as it relates to modal logic and "necessary".

If a necessary being cannot possibly exist, then it doesn't actually exist. That's it.

[RoadRunner79]

At this point, I am questioning if you are using an uncommon definition of "exist", and would ask you define it.    Do most atheist use it this way?   I think it may give new light, to when you say that God does not exist... if you are consistent.  

In Merriam Webster and a few other dictionaries, "being" and "exist" are somewhat circular (referencing each other), so I would say that according those definitions your reference to a non-existing being; is incoherent.

It's only incoherent when framed in reality, which we've already kind of abandoned to talk in the purely philosophical terms that the ontological argument requires. "Maximally great being," is an incoherent concept being deployed with no set definition, the idea that possible existence could lead inexorably to necessary existence is similarly incoherent, and yet we're being asked to countenance them. The fact that my rebuttal doesn't work in the real world is simply an outgrowth of the fact that the ontological argument doesn't work in the real world.

Because all I'm doing is working according to the criteria of that argument, you know.

How is it incoherent when framed in reality?  Previously I asked, what your definition was of "exist", because in it's common usage, a non-existant being is contradictory by definition (like a square circle).  I don't understand what your reference to "in reality" means here.  I am also confused, because on one hand, you say there is no set definition but it is incoherent.  I take this to mean, you don't know what it is, but it is incoherent;  could you clarify this?  You had said that " the idea that possible existence could lead inexorably to necessary existence is similarly incoherent".  This is what the argument is about, and it lays it out in the logic.   If you don't understand, then perhaps you should ask, or do some research.  If you think there is a mistake, then you should present your case for that.  The argument is dependent on the definition, and doesn't work with just anything.

Somewhat.... and I agree.  But according to what I am learning here, apparently I can have a non-existing argument; declare victory, and that is greater than having an actual argument.   Would you disagree?

But let's simplify, then: do you agree that limitations are counter to the quality of greatness? That the more limitations a thing has, the less great it is in comparison to identical objects with less limitations? Like, if I had two watches of identical make, but one had a battery that lasted two hours, and the other had a battery that lasted ten, the one with the more limited battery life is the less great watch, yes?

It would depend on what you are calling a limitation, and in what context.  In your example of the watch, I would agree (all other things being equal).

[Edwardo Piet]

In Merriam Webster and a few other dictionaries, "being" and "exist" are somewhat circular (referencing each other), so I would say that according those definitions your reference to a non-existing being; is incoherent.

Equivocation fallacy again. You're equivocating "being" like existence and a being as in a living entity.

(The equivocation fallacy pisses off my O.C.D. so much I know when I see it).


As for the rest of what you said: Take it away Esq!

[Edwardo Piet]

Woah you already did like yester-fucking-day and I totally missed it. Sorry Esq lol my post is worthless now.

#tryingtohelpjustalittlebitbutfuckedup