(August 29, 2013 at 4:42 am)Maelstrom Wrote:

(August 28, 2013 at 9:37 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: The scientific method is only one means for securing knowledge.

Of course, but if the knowledge is unverifiable, then it is useless and considered unreasonable. One can have all the personal knowledge he wishes in regards to unicorns, but it does not mean that unicorns exists.

I have personal knowledge of what red looks like to me. This knowledge is neither useless nor unreasonable. I also have personal knowledge of the existence of my mind-- something you cannot have, unless you want to define mind in purely physical terms (i.e. brain function).

(August 29, 2013 at 11:15 pm)bennyboy Wrote:

(August 29, 2013 at 4:42 am)Maelstrom Wrote: Of course, but if the knowledge is unverifiable, then it is useless and considered unreasonable. One can have all the personal knowledge he wishes in regards to unicorns, but it does not mean that unicorns exists.

I have personal knowledge of what red looks like to me. This knowledge is neither useless nor unreasonable. I also have personal knowledge of the existence of my mind-- something you cannot have, unless you want to define mind in purely physical terms (i.e. brain function).

You're picking at nits here.

(August 29, 2013 at 9:36 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: That's a bit presumptious, especiallly since that would not be my objection. I agree that alterations in the brain produce changes in consciousness. That does not exclude the possibility that changes in mind produce changes in the brain.

How is that an objection?

Using the oft-repeated comparison - hardware generates software. Changes made in hardware effect alterations in software. Changes made in software also result in changes in hardware. That does not mean that software has an independent existence and hardware states are simply representative of the software. The fact that hardware generates software remains unchanged. So, you see, the possibility that changes in mind produce changes in brain has not been excluded, it is very much a part of it.

(August 29, 2013 at 9:36 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: True. I believe that some problems are beyond the reach of scientific inquiry. For example, determining whether a number is irrational or not. The mind-body problem falls into that category.

I've seen this fallacy being employed incidentally, but never stated explicitly. This is called poisoning the well - you start by the assumption that the mind-body problem is beyond the reach of scientific inquiry and then you can reject any scientific explanation given on that basis.

(August 29, 2013 at 9:36 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: You're confusing essential properties with accidental properties. Anything that exists has both. A particular person can be standing still or running, happy or sad, and still be the same person. The mind is not different in this regard. It's contents can vary and it can operate on the brain in various capacities and still be the same mind. Nevertheless consciousness (which is itself only one particular state of mind) does have a specific nature: intentionality. While the contents of consciousness vary, this feature of consciousness is always present.

Actually, I made no such distinction. Even the essential property of a mind finds expression through brain and the change in expression of intentionality would indicate a change in consciousness itself. And if that change can be effected through the brain, then it indicates that consciousness itself is dependent on the brain - not just expressed through it.

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(August 29, 2013 at 11:15 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I also have personal knowledge of the existence of my mind-- something you cannot have, unless you want to define mind in purely physical terms (i.e. brain function).

The only way you can have personal knowledge of the existence of your own mind is if you define it in physical terms. To put it another way, unless you define mind in physical terms, all you'd have is a strong belief in the existence of your own mind - a belief that is not justified and therefore cannot be regarded as knowledge.

(August 30, 2013 at 1:36 am)genkaus Wrote: Using the oft-repeated comparison - hardware generates software. Changes made in hardware effect alterations in software. Changes made in software also result in changes in hardware. That does not mean that software has an independent existence and hardware states are simply representative of the software.

I agree with all of this, except the last sentence. In the case of software, it does have an independence of the hardware running it. You could scrap all the code for Windows, recode it based purely on your idea of it, and still have Windows. Without that 3rd party observer/creator, that "software" has no existential reality (as opposed, maybe, to a tree).

(August 28, 2013 at 11:06 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: "The beauty of Bach's music is unfalsifiable and therefore useless."

The notion that what does not fit your little box of logical positivism is worthless demonstrates that your view of reality is very limited.

The notion that your interpretation of music defines the objective quality of that music demonstrates that your view of reality is inherently poisoned by your inability to tell apart its subjective and objective properties. ronedee had this same problem when he called me a liar for describing how his behaviors have defined my perception of his character. It's a flaw inherent (though admittedly, not exclusive) to anyone with religious beliefs.

(August 30, 2013 at 9:44 am)bennyboy Wrote: I agree with all of this, except the last sentence. In the case of software, it does have an independence of the hardware running it. You could scrap all the code for Windows, recode it based purely on your idea of it, and still have Windows. Without that 3rd party observer/creator, that "software" has no existential reality (as opposed, maybe, to a tree).

If I may presume, I would think that his assertion is that software cannot exist in a functioning state independent of hardware. Perfect code may exist in virtually any conceivable form but it does nothing until some suitable piece of physical computing hardware executes it (with one conceivable exception, I guess).

(August 30, 2013 at 10:05 am)Ryantology Wrote: If I may presume, I would think that his assertion is that software cannot exist in a functioning state independent of hardware. Perfect code may exist in virtually any conceivable form but it does nothing until some suitable piece of physical computing hardware executes it (with one conceivable exception, I guess).

I'd actually go one step further; the software exists as an expression or function of the storage device it's attached to, nothing more. After all, how can you have computer code without a disc or drive to store it on? It has no presence on its own and, in fact, ceases to exist if you don't save it somewhere.

Pretty good analogy to the mind, all's told.

@Ryantology, Esquilax:

All fine and well. However, given any physical structure (like a collection of rocks in infinite space, or just a lowly brain), how would you be able to infer that it experiences? How could you prove, to someone not willing just to accept it at face value, that YOU are actually experiencing your environment, rather than just seeming to. Sure, you can DEFINE mind in terms of rocks, or brains, but that misses the point: only the structure itself can have knowledge of its own subjective experience (if it has any).

I know for sure that I actually have those experiences, rather than just seeming to. You cannot validate this fact without making assumptions which beg the question; and yet obviously I won't entertain seriously the idea that my knowledge that I actually experience is invalid.

(August 30, 2013 at 6:18 pm)bennyboy Wrote: ...given any physical structure (like a collection of rocks in infinite space, or just a lowly brain), how would you be able to infer that it experiences?

You can infer but you cannot prove.

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The hardware/software analogy contains a red herring. The analogy fails to distinguish between physical signs and their signified meaning. We write code in such a way that preserves meaning while the hardware operates, indifferent to the instructions it has been given. Then when a computer displays a particular arrangement of nine lit LEDs, it doesn't 'know' that the output means 34. It makes no difference that the computer is vastly less complex than a human brain. The unique relationship between physical signs and their subjective significance holds without regard to scale.

(August 30, 2013 at 9:44 am)bennyboy Wrote: I agree with all of this, except the last sentence. In the case of software, it does have an independence of the hardware running it. You could scrap all the code for Windows, recode it based purely on your idea of it, and still have Windows. Without that 3rd party observer/creator, that "software" has no existential reality (as opposed, maybe, to a tree).

If I scrap all the code for windows, the software no loner exists. The code may exist - the software doesn't. Once I recode it, the software comes into existence once again. At no point does it have an existence independent of the hardware. And once created, it no longer requires the 3rd party observer/creator to sustain its existence.

(August 30, 2013 at 6:18 pm)bennyboy Wrote: All fine and well. However, given any physical structure (like a collection of rocks in infinite space, or just a lowly brain), how would you be able to infer that it experiences? How could you prove, to someone not willing just to accept it at face value, that YOU are actually experiencing your environment, rather than just seeming to. Sure, you can DEFINE mind in terms of rocks, or brains, but that misses the point: only the structure itself can have knowledge of its own subjective experience (if it has any).

I see your philosophical zombie and raise you a brain in a vat.

These two thought-experiments are conceptually opposite. The p-zombie is based on the fact that people can fake experience (pretend to feel pain when they actually don't) and thus an entity can conceivably exist where none of the external indicators of experience indicate actual experience. The brain-in-the-vat is the opposite - we assume that the brain does experience without showing any external indications of it. The solution to both is the same - existence and use of a mechanism for subjective experience.

Consider other biological entities seemingly capable of experience. The sunflower that turns to face the sun. The touch-me-not plant that folds up when disturbed. The venus flytrap that 'senses' the insect and eats it. In these cases we posit the existence of elaborate stimulus-response mechanisms, but exclude actual experiential capacity. That's because, due to the absence of a central nervous system, we do not see there being a possible mechanism which could facilitate experience. In humans, that mechanism is present in the brain. And as we continue to study it in depth, we keep finding different parts responsible for different kinds of experience.

The difference between an elaborate data-processing and actual experience is simple - experience is data-processing of that data-processing. For example, if you prick a person's toe he twitches - the data of the pin-prick is received by the pain receptors and processed to provide a response of twitching. If the person is conscious at the time, he'd be aware of this whole process taking place and this awareness is the sensation of pain. In other words experience. Another example - when a light is shined on your eyes, your pupils contract. This is an unconscious process that does not require any actual experience on your part. The light falls - the brain processes this - and sends out the signal for pupils to contract. But, your brain also becomes aware of the reception of this information and that is experience. And this experience can result in additional responses like blinking, squinting or shielding your eyes.

So, while one may not be directly able to observe the existence of someone else's experience, we can certainly infer - nay, prove - its existence by identifying the mechanisms required for that experience and establishing that they are functional.

(August 30, 2013 at 6:18 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I know for sure that I actually have those experiences, rather than just seeming to. You cannot validate this fact without making assumptions which beg the question; and yet obviously I won't entertain seriously the idea that my knowledge that I actually experience is invalid.

Its not begging the question if the hypothesis is both testable and falsifiable. If your dualist hypothesis was correct then any alteration in the experience itself by altering the brain chemistry would've been impossible. That was the first indicator that in all likelihood, even experience is a specific function of the brain.

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(August 30, 2013 at 7:44 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: You can infer but you cannot prove.

Give us time.

(August 30, 2013 at 7:44 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: The hardware/software analogy contains a red herring. The analogy fails to distinguish between physical signs and their signified meaning. We write code in such a way that preserves meaning while the hardware operates, indifferent to the instructions it has been given. Then when a computer displays a particular arrangement of nine lit LEDs, it doesn't 'know' that the output means 34. It makes no difference that the computer is vastly less complex than a human brain. The unique relationship between physical signs and their subjective significance holds without regard to scale.

Actually, the crux of that comparison is that the complexity makes all the difference in the world. The types and levels of functions increase exponentially with the level of complexity.

My brain, my computer and an abacus are all different types of machines. All three receive inputs, process them and give outputs. But given vastly different complexities, both the input and the level of processing are worlds apart. The only input the abacus is capable of receiving and processing is position of beads. My computer can receive many more types of inputs, process them and then give results - and then use those results as inputs for even more processing and so on and on and on. My brain takes it one step further - it takes the event of data-processing itself as an input and processes that to generate experience. That part of my software - one which results in subjective experience - occurs naturally. But once we figure out its algorithm, we can create a similar program for my computer - Sentience 1.0. The only reason my computer doesn't 'know' that the answer is 34 or feel that its battery is running low or experience 'pain' when I over-exert it is because this software hasn't been installed in it yet.