Justification for Foundational Belief

[Angrboda]

I missed this point on my first pass, which was a bonehead move on my part, but I'll correct that error now. And this objection is more fundamental to the claim that consciousness exists is an objective fact. We don't have any objective evidence pertaining to consciousness. Consciousness, as a material, natural process, has never been observed, measured, quantified, mapped, diagrammed or otherwise demonstrated in any objective way. All that we know about consciousness, mostly, comes from its own self-reports, analogy and metaphor, and inferences based on correlation between subjective experience and objective brain events and conditions. Nobody has closed the loop between the two. We have no "third person account" of what consciousness actually is. We have no process level description of consciousness. What we have is a big black box, a black box which we believe, with some justification is inside the larger box known as the brain, but exactly what, where and how, we have surprisingly little knowledge of. So to assert that "consciousness exists" or "conscious thought exists" as an objective fact, either reflects a naive and ignorant view of cognitive science, or in a worst case scenario, a balls to the wall absurdity. At minimum, it is a weak bluff. I call your bluff. Show me, objectively, what consciousness is.

(**) Oh, and a clarification. I believe I stated that I would "readily argue that neither is objectively true" of the claims that "existence exists" and "conscious thought exists", or something similar. That was a misstatement on my part. What I should have stated is that there is no conclusive and reliable justification for believing that either are necessarily, objectively true. They may be true, and depending on definitions, it may be most reasonable to accept them as true without rigorous justification. However, that bar is far below the bar of knowing these propositions to be objectively true; that bar, the lower bar, reduces belief in existence and consciousness to little more than articles of faith. And that's neither knowledge, nor is it objective.

[Angrboda]

Oh, and as long as I'm here at the moment, I'll address one more point. You make reference at the end of your post about me basing my conclusions on some basic assumption and such, basically accusing me of the fallacy of the stolen concept. However, since I am not the one making positive claims here, I can borrow them all the doo dah day long and not incur a fallacy so long as I demonstrate that using assumptions common to us both results in an absurdity when combined properly with your claim. This is simply applied reductio ad absurdum, and your complaint of duplicity is thereby groundless and irrelevant.

[Perhaps]

First, if your objection is true, then.... nothing. Since there is the opposite of nothing... I'm correct.

Secondly, I continue to find it amusing that you assert statements as being true or false, or even logical, based on a preconceived notion of understanding - namely that evidence verifies the truth value of claims. Objectively, the only things which can be asserted as being fundamentally true - without any form of assumption - are the facts that a conscious thought exists (the one which is occurring right now), and that the property of existence exists. You can specify which aspects of the concepts may hold further truth values, but the concepts themselves are fundamental and objective. If the thought exists independently of anything else, or is the only thing which does exist then that's fine - it still exists in the truest sense of the concept. In order for the thought to exist, which it does because it is right now, then the property of existence must necessarily exist as well.

Past these two claims, all things are basic assumptions or are derived from basic assumptions.

Edit: By the way, this is what i'm talking about when referring to your assertions of knowledge:

However, we know from experiments concerning Bell's inequalities, that this view is likely false.

Could you explain to me, on which fundamental beliefs you are asserting this as knowledge, and perhaps more importantly, truth? If you are going to discount my points as false on the grounds of being critically non-true (false), then please provide a proper explanation as to why your evidence can withstand the same tests to which you are holding my objective statements.

[Angrboda]

First, if your objection is true, then.... nothing. Since there is the opposite of nothing... I'm correct.

The opposite of nothing, at minimum isn't something. That's like saying that the opposite of zero is infinity. Negation is always negation of some-thing. Even if the negation of nothing actually had a meaningful answer, it's far from clear that your answer is it. I could just as easily assert that the opposite of nothing is negative nothing, just as nonsensically and just as unjustifiably.

Secondly, I continue to find it amusing that you assert statements as being true or false, or even logical, based on a preconceived notion of understanding - namely that evidence verifies the truth value of claims. Objectively, the only things which can be asserted as being fundamentally true - without any form of assumption - are the facts that a conscious thought exists (the one which is occurring right now), and that the property of existence exists.

Handled below. And you completely ignore my point about the dependence of inferences about existence being drawn from beliefs about existence which in turn form the basis for those very beliefs and inferences. That's begging the question, petitio principi proper, and unless you handle the objection, I'm just going to ignore you.

You can specify which aspects of the concepts may hold further truth values, but the concepts themselves are fundamental and objective. If the thought exists independently of anything else, or is the only thing which does exist then that's fine - it still exists in the truest sense of the concept.

I already noted this is equivocation. That you would assert it nonetheless, knowing it to be fallacious, well, it astounds me.

In order for the thought to exist, which it does because it is right now, then the property of existence must necessarily exist as well.

Again, you're simply ignoring my points and blathering on with your own, completely heedless of what I have said. It is as if you believe that repeating the same claims, perhaps in all caps with multiple exclamation points, will persuade me of the truth when simple statement will not.

I know of no result that clearly shows that a conscious thought occurs and is right now. From Joseph LeDoux's work to Dennett's arguments and work referenced in Consciousness Explained, his responses to LeDoux and the similar, it's highly unclear that there is any "now" for consciousness, other than that which it manufactures for itself. Again, it depends on your meaning, as noted — which I took great pains to point out to you, but which you chose to ignore, only to assert something which seems contraindicated by the neuroscience. Where are you getting the evidence for your views on consciousness from and what exactly are they? (Aside from the belief that consciousness has a "now" that is right now. I wish I could put that 'is' in bold, cycling rainbow colors, flashing on and off, as that verb appears to be attempting to carry the entire weight of your argument.)

Past these two claims, all things are basic assumptions or are derived from basic assumptions.

Well, that pretty much covers the field, don't it. "It's either this thing, or it's not this thing." Duh.

Beyond the fact that you haven't demonstrated these two things, even if you were to somehow demonstrate the two, existence exists and conscious thought exists, as axioms or basic beliefs, they don't lead to any useful results as the two combined are simply not powerful enough to cover the set of truths which any decent foundationalism will be called upon to cover. Now, if you actually have additional basic concepts you believe you can adequately defend, I suggest you reveal them so that we can inspect them, else your version of foundationalism is dead in the water, impotent in its fury.

Edit: By the way, this is what i'm talking about when referring to your assertions of knowledge:

However, we know from experiments concerning Bell's inequalities, that this view is likely false.

Could you explain to me, on which fundamental beliefs you are asserting this as knowledge, and perhaps more importantly, truth? If you are going to discount my points as false on the grounds of being critically non-true (false), then please provide a proper explanation as to why your evidence can withstand the same tests to which you are holding my objective statements.

What part of Bell's inequalities do you not understand? The experiments take the common assumptions about physics, and specifically a small subset of assumptions which differ between two sets of theories, and determines what the expected observation based on those assumptions in either case would be, and then observes. The result being that one set of assumptions yields an inconsistency which that set of assumptions implies should not exist. Again, this is basically reductio ad absurdum in practice. What exactly is your question here? You again are attempting to sustain a charge of the fallacy of the stolen concept completely disregarding my explaining to you how such a charge itself was fallacious.

[genkaus]

I'm not going to respond to your points, Genkaus, part because I didn't see that you had any, but more because I wish not to tarry here unnecessarily. Miles to go before I sleep.

I would like a response to the following two points, if you don't mind:
1. The question I would ask here is which theory of truth would be meaningful if the premises of evidentialism are vacated?
2. How do you address the argument of inescapable premises in support of foundationalism?

In response to Skepsis' question about foundationalism, it would seem that foundationalism faces a difficult dilemma. As far as I can see, it can assert that certain concepts are basic and acceptable without proof by virtue of their having certain properties or existing in certain relationships or whatnot (such as being "self-evident," or perhaps "being capable of being asserted without contradiction" [Kant?]). However, this ultimately appeals to the notion that some ideas, concepts or beliefs are properly basic to us — that what appears as properly basic is what appears to our mind as properly basic. However, what appears as properly basic, to us, in one view, is simply a result of the stochastic process of evolution, which, on theory and ex hypothesi, did not necessarily give those concept or beliefs the appearance that they were properly basic because they are properly basic, but rather because they fit in some evolutionary process like a key to a lock. The specifics of which concepts and beliefs appear properly basic to us, are actually not properly basic, both because they are dependent on an even more fundamental process, and, because evolution didn't select their appearance of being properly basic on account of the truth of their being properly basic, but more than likely because of some instrumental utility involved. Thus, depending on their appearance to us is both ill founded and neglectful of the larger picture in which, our basic concepts, are essentially arbitrary whims of nature, and fundamentally without meaning "as basic concepts".

The other horn of the dilemma is even less inviting. The alternative is to appeal to the notion that the basic concepts and such are properly basic in the sense that they are objectively properly basic, and not dependent on the vagueries of the specific type of mind and its origins in biology. Ignoring for a moment the somewhat questionable notion of a basic concept existing independent of a mind — concepts are mind stuff, they exist nowhere else — it seems this approach is fundamentally just a variant of Platonism, in which certain ideas or forms exist in a realm independent of reality, yet somehow accessible to, and influential upon that reality. The two major problems there would be, first, that it is essentially a form of dualism, complete with all the philosophical problems or hurdles faced by any form of dualism. And second, even aside from the problems, nominalism appears to be the front runner in the war of ideas, and likely for good reason.

If there's an alternative that I am neglecting here, please point it out. However, failing a more attractive alternative, I'd say this dilemma is a foundering point for foundationalism.


(Somewhere in there, I was going to insert a comment on , as it essentially captures the question of foundationalism in compact form, but I don't remember what I wanted to say about it. I would recommend reading the Wikipedia article on it if you are not already familiar with the Trilemma.)

I disagree with your explanation of the second horn. Why wouldn't it be possible for a concept to be objectively properly basic while remaining independent of the vagaries of specific type of mind and its origins and requiring the existence of a thing such as a mind? I agree that concepts would not exist without the existence of a mind - but dependence on mind and dependence on a particular type of mind are two different things.

For example, the sense of sight is basically perception of a particular range of the electromagnetic spectrum. While the origins and biology and subsequent vagaries might grant different ranges to different beings, the basis behind it remains the same. Similarly, these concepts can be properly basic even if they depend upon the existence of a mind since they remain independent of specific types of minds.

[Angrboda]

Correction, it wasn't LeDoux's work I was think of, but Benjamin Libet. Sorry.

Oh, and Genkaus, I notice you had a question or two. To both you and Perhaps, I am going to be rather busy through at least Wednesday, so you might want to carry on without me, as I'm not sure when or whether I might resume. (And I have a small research project into various aspects of Buddhism which I promised a friend on another forum, which, likely will take priority.)

[Perhaps]

Fair enough, you would like an in depth description of my understanding of my claims. Here we go...

I'll first dispense with the "existence exists" claim, which will in some way mirror my reply to the other. What one means by "exists" is pivotal, and imo, damning. Take for example the notion of a local reality, that underneath the observations of quantum mechanical experiments, there is an underlying reality that is "causing" these events. (I'm being sloppy to avoid research, but I can fully support my point here.) However, we know from experiments concerning Bell's inequalities, that this view is likely false. So if this notion of an "underlying reality" is what one means by "exists," then not only are they possibly wrong, but there is good objective evidence that they likely are wrong.

What I mean by exists is the purest form of the concept and nothing more. To exist is to be. You may make assumptive leaps from this statement such as the need for a location to 'be' in, or a time in which to 'be'. But I simply mean to be.

Moreover, if we are mere ideas in the mind of God, to suggest that we are still "existing" in some sense would have to be viewed as rank equivocation of the meaning of the term "exists". More than that, I would argue that our notions of necessity are all based on our beliefs about the nature of our experience; if that experience is not what it seems, all notions of necessity and entailment based on them are essentially invalid. This guts the core of your claim. If what we are claiming is that, "existence exists, which I know because of what I know about existence," your claim has become circular and vacuous.

Usually when I speak, I mean what I say. Thus, if I made the claim that the self-evident truth is objective it would then follow that it requires no subjective experience to bring it to be or to validate itself. Existence exists not because I know it does, but simply because there is something. You've made the mistake earlier of using a horrible analogy ("the opposite of zero is not infinity"); the opposite of zero (although that is very awkwardly worded) is simply non-zero or the absence of zero. Similarly, the opposite of nothing isn't infinity or 'everything', but rather it is merely non-nothing (usually referred to as something).

The second, regarding consciousness, and a "conscious thought existing", again, is a devil in the details problem. I would say that, "perhaps" consciousness and conscious thought exists, but only certain kinds of processes which we loosely refer to by the term consciousness exist, and, ceterus paribus, the properties those processes have form an overlapping but not proper subset of those properties which many — and most who argue as you do — claim that the thing known as consciousness possesses. In sum, what you mean by "consciousness" and what I, as an eliminative materialist, term consciousness, are likely two entirely different creatures; yours, I suspect, possessing magical, supernatural properties which I would doubt, if not outright deny. Recently in a discussion of free will, when asked by one of the participants with which I was at odds, asked me if I denied the existence of consciousness, and upon starting my explanation of my view, he disingenuously paraphrased me as denying that consciousness exists. I don't know from this rather brief exchange what your meaning is, but judging on the odds of prior experience, I likely suspect that, while consciousness exists, that thing which you think consciousness is does not itself exist. So dependent on what you mean by "consciousness exists"(*) in the particular, your statement could range from true, but unremarkable, to wildly and unsupportably false. It all depends on specifically what you think "consciousness" is.

By conscious I meant simply something ascribed as a property of thought. More specifically, Dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum. I cannot assert the existence of an 'I', merely the existence of a doubt (categorized earlier as a conscious thought).

[mralstoner]

Truth is an ungraspable goal. The brain is geared to seek reliability, not truth. We can never be certain of anything at all. Nothing. Zip. Nada.
So you are fighting your brain in a losing game.
There are, however, foundational values. They're called feelings. Feelings are our motivational drive and we form beliefs in pursuit of those emotional goals.
So seek reliable beliefs in pursuit of emotional goals. That's all we humans can do.

[Skepsis]

By conscious I meant simply something ascribed as a property of thought. More specifically, Dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum. I cannot assert the existence of an 'I', merely the existence of a doubt (categorized earlier as a conscious thought).

Does this mean the Cartesian cogito fails to prove the existence of an "I"?
It wouldn't prove, as you have noted, a temporal or physical area for an "I" to exist in. Doesn't the existence of a conscious thought prove that there had to be something thinking it?
"The thought proves the thought, and nothing more" seems to be what you are saying.

[genkaus]

Truth is an ungraspable goal. The brain is geared to seek reliability, not truth. We can never be certain of anything at all. Nothing. Zip. Nada.
So you are fighting your brain in a losing game.
There are, however, foundational values. They're called feelings. Feelings are our motivational drive and we form beliefs in pursuit of those emotional goals.
So seek reliable beliefs in pursuit of emotional goals. That's all we humans can do.

And that is exactly what leads us astray. Our emotions and feelings are not tools of cognition. They do not provide us knowledge. Any beliefs gained by pursuing emotional goals would, by their nature, be unreliable. Truth may be an ungraspable goal but it is only in pursuit of truth that reliable beliefs can be acquired. Notice the distinction - pursuit of emotions such as comfort and security lead us to religion, whereas, pursuit of truth lead us to science. If feelings are our foundational values, then its time to change some foundations.