Soft Determinism, Hard Determinism, Necessitarianism, Fatalism...Huh?

[Mudhammam]

So as an atheist, it seems that I am logically committed to naturalism/materialism. As a materialist, I must be committed to some form of determinism. On these points I think many atheists (especially today's science popularizers- Krauss, Dawkins, Dennett, Harris, etc.) would find agreement. The difficulty I am finding is understanding the discernible difference between the following philosophies, the finer points atheists seem to disagree upon from time to time. For those perhaps not fully acquainted with each view, I've provided brief Wiki definitions. Can someone please explain to me how soft determinism is not logically reducible to necessaritism (or fatalism)? It seems like a slippery slope to me...is there a stop-gap somewhere that doesn't appeal to some mysterious agency or hidden variable? If the principle of causality is essential to our Universe (as a logical principle, an algorithm, of matter in motion), could the Universe actually have been any other way (down to me presently writing this)?
Soft determinism (compatiblism)- "The belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent."
Hard determinsm- "A view on free will which holds that determinism is true, and that it is incompatible with free will, and, therefore, that free will does not exist."
Necessitarianism- "A metaphysical principle that denies all mere possibility; there is exactly one way for the world to be."
Fatalism- "A philosophical doctrine stressing the subjugation of all events or actions to fate."

[Angrboda]

Off the top of my head, Dennett's compatibilism makes use of Lewis' style counterfactuals and distinctions about "could have done otherwise," neither of which appears consistent with necessitarianism as stated.

And no, I won't explain compatibilism as I find the position largely incoherent.

[Mudhammam]

After I finish reading "Darwin's Dangerous Idea," I think I will delve into "Elbow Room" by Dennett. I also don't see how it is logically coherent, though I confess I would very much like it to be!

[Angrboda]

After I finish reading "Darwin's Dangerous Idea," I think I will delve into "Elbow Room" by Dennett. I also don't see how it is logically coherent, though I confess I would very much like it to be!

"Elbow Room" is dense and difficult reading. I suggest taking a detour through the essay he coauthored with Taylor first.

[Mudhammam]

Well I recently finished a book called Quantum Physics for Poets.. and it was way over my head but nonetheless I found it moderately enjoyable and enlightening... Elbow Room couldn't be worse than quantum physics, could it?!?

[Angrboda]

Well I recently finished a book called Quantum Physics for Poets.. and it was way over my head but nonetheless I found it moderately enjoyable and enlightening... Elbow Room couldn't be worse than quantum physics, could it?!?

It's just very nuanced and very closely argued. I'm not trying to discourage you, just warning you in advance that it's not light reading, and some easier selections might be good warm up. (Though not "Freedom Evolves." I didn't have any difficulty with it, but my atheist book club found it tough sledding. I found it problematic because I considered his argument fatally flawed. I recommend giving it a miss.)

[bennyboy]

Compatibilism is horseshit, because it includes embedded in it a total redefinition of what "free will" means. I hate it when people do that: they make an operational definition for the lab, or a skewed definition that fits a physical monist view, and then say, "Voila!" when their begged question inevitably provides the "answer" they knew was there all along.

[MindForgedManacle]

Compatibilism is horseshit, because it includes embedded in it a total redefinition of what "free will" means. I hate it when people do that: they make an operational definition for the lab, or a skewed definition that fits a physical monist view, and then say, "Voila!" when their begged question inevitably provides the "answer" they knew was there all along.

The problem is that the usual idea of free will (i.e libertarian free will) is itself incoherent. The standard argument and regress problem just leave it in tatters. So no, it (compatibilism) isn't question-begging in the slightest.
And redefining things is basically a staple of philosophy. I guess we better chuck out, I dunno, the coherentist theory of truth. After all, it redefines truth...


As for the OP, fatalism is logically fallacious, and is not the same thing as determinism. Determinism sees events as fixed due to causality, while fatalism sees events as not being fixed because of causailty (at least not alone), but fixed ultimately because of fate, hence the name. You see this with concepts like the "bullet with your name on it" and such.


@Rasetsu I tend to find the short and sweet definition of compatibilism being the position that "one can act on their determined desires" to be decent.

[bennyboy]

The problem is that the usual idea of free will (i.e libertarian free will) is itself incoherent. The standard argument and regress problem just leave it in tatters. So no, it (compatibilism) isn't question-begging in the slightest.

When you need a definition of "free will" that no longer uses traditional definitions of "free" or of "will," then it's time just to say "free will doesn't exist." OR "free will is a mal-formed concept."

To spend chapters redefining free will in neurological terms, and then say it is compatible with determinism, is really just to say that neurology is deterministic. The whole process of equivocating on free will to arrive at that obvious conclusion is a bit derp.

[MindForgedManacle]

When you need a definition of "free will" that no longer uses traditional definitions of "free" or of "will," then it's time just to say "free will doesn't exist." OR "free will is a mal-formed concept."

I'm sorry, but even the idea of free will being that one's will is free doesn't make sense, as the will is clearly not free. The will is obviously subject to certain inclinations and desires, which even libertarians admit is the case, so long as you aren't saying that those inclinations necessitate some action. So, a better phrase here would be "free choice", as the question is whether or not your choices are necessitated. Given that, I don't think your criticism works because then compatibilism becomes quite viable. It shows that the usual idea of free will is at best incomplete.

To spend chapters redefining free will in neurological terms, and then say it is compatible with determinism, is really just to say that neurology is deterministic. The whole process of equivocating on free will to arrive at that obvious conclusion is a bit derp.

The same misformed criticism could be labelled towards ANY idea of free will. After all, libertarians will try to "describe free will in incompatibilistic terms is really just to say that free will is indeterministic to arrive at that obvious conclusion is a bit derp."