Free Will

[Pyrrho]

It actually makes only a minor difference as to whether or not determinism holds either.  If hard determinism holds, we don't have it, but if determinism (hard or soft) doesn't hold...we can't confidently proclaim the opposite.  Even if it were all random, if it was -possible- to know a future state in that random universe, if a future state had a set truth value as a matter of fact divorced from any previous circumstance or condition.....we still don't have it (fatalism, ofc).  

Fatalism -must be- true if determinism is true, but fatalism -can be- true even if determinism is false.  In either case, there's no free will, but the universes that could be described with either term might be night and day different from each other.  The breadth of the field -against- free will is very, very wide.  The path through that field, leading to an actualized free will, is narrow. A universe which contains free will would be an excruciatingly specific universe, it would be a universe in which a future state was -actually unknowable-.  If our will were free, we could not know an outcome until after the fact.  Any prior knowledge of a future state's truth value is a clear and inarguable indication of a limit on the "freedom" of will.  Our ability to predict human behavior and decision-making, even to coerce it overtly, covertly, systematically, and repeatedly... shows us that while our will may be actualized (whatever it may be made of), it's freedom is not.  If free will exists, it's demonstrably ineffective, and that's as generous as I can be, personally, regarding the conjecture.

You need to explain what, exactly, you mean by "free will."  Free will, as described in the opening post, is perfectly compatible with determinism.


Additionally (though this is getting us off topic), the ability to predict something is not at all the same as causing it.  I can predict that the "sun will rise" tomorrow, but my knowledge of that future event is not in any way causing that future event.

(Of course, by the "sun will rise," I mean that it will seem so, due to the rotation of the earth, not that the sun will literally rise.)

I can also predict that my wife will never cheat on me.  My prediction is based on my knowledge of her character.  I do not cause her to act as she does.

I also predict that you will not willfully stick your hand into a fire and hold it there until it is completely burned off, so that you just have a stump at the end of your arm.  My prediction on that is based on knowing a bit about human nature, and, obviously, I am not causing you to refrain from doing such a thing.  Yet I am extremely confident that you will not do that.  In the ordinary sense of the word, I know you will not do that.  It is not a belief that is unsupported by evidence, or in other words, it is not a mere bit of faith.  My belief on that point is based on evidence.  It is a justified true belief.  (Go ahead, prove me wrong!  I dare you!)

There are countless other such examples, but the point is, the ability to predict something does not entail that one is in any way causing the event, nor does it rely on a specific idea of whether determinism holds or not.  Whether determinism is true or false, I make all of the above assertions with extreme confidence, and they are supported by evidence, and are not merely examples of faith.


Also, if it is going to be discussed, it would be good for you to explain precisely what you mean by "fatalism," as your claim that fatalism must be true if determinism is true is not correct for all common uses of the term "fatalism" (though it may be for others).  See:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatalism

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/