Free Will

[Pyrrho]

This accords well with the ordinary definition of "free" quoted in the opening post.  It requires no metaphysical nonsense.

But the metaphysical nonsense is the interesting part of free will!  We want to know whether we really are determined in our choices, like a puppet on a string, and whether we are truly free, with no strings dictating our actions.

I disagree.  What typically happens is that the people who want to talk about some metaphysical nonsense never bother to explain what the hell they mean by "free will."  They then make various pronouncements about it, and argue with other people who likewise fail to properly define their terms.  They then have pointless arguments with each other, with no real hope of any progress whatsoever, because neither really knows what the other is talking about.  Typically, such discussions degenerate into insults, as other people make statements that are "obviously false" according to some person's idea of "free will," and they in turn make statements that are "obviously false" according to other's ideas of "free will."  But since they stupidly never told the other people what, precisely, they meant, they are often not talking about the same things at all, and just imagine that the other people are stupid for not agreeing with what is "perfectly obvious" to themselves.  (There are numerous examples one can find online in various forums in which the discussion is about "free will," though I will not presently provide any links, both because those running this forum may not like links to other forums, and because I do not wish to deal with people complaining about me pointing out that they have failed to explain what they mean and are consequently wasting everyone's time in their thread.)

What seems to be the most common alternative, people define "free will" in such a way that it is obviously ridiculous nonsense, that no person of sense would ever accept as true.  (We know, for example, that people commonly do not like sticking their hands in fires, and we know this due to the fact that there is generally great pain associated with that activity.  And we also know that people did not choose to have a hand in the first place, so that the fact that people generally will to not stick their hands in fires is largely due to things that they did not choose.  Consequently, any definition of "free will" that requires that everything pertaining to the choice made be due only to the previous choices of the person is obviously not something people [or anything else] actually has.)

Sometimes, the above is somewhat obscured by the fact that something may be presented as a definition, but that something is inadequate to explain the meaning.

   But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (e.g. if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one's parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', must be used with reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such act in itself.

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicoma...3.iii.html

Aristotle gives the example of throwing goods overboard to save one's ship if one gets caught in a storm.  In that case, there are strong incentives to ditch the cargo.  One does not truly have an opportunity to preserve the cargo.  But what of in lesser circumstances?  Let's suppose the ship is at sea in calm weather.  The captain can choose to continue sailing to his destination port, where he can sell his cargo, or turn around and return home, where there is no market for his goods.  If he were to return home, he would face the same loss as the captain in a storm in that the value of the cargo would be lost.  He does not have the opportunity to preserve the value of the cargo and return home.  Is his choice not then also in a mixed state, being partially voluntary and involuntary?  Do the opportunities open to him not determine what it is that he wills, if he is of sound mind and body, and aware of his choices?  Let's take the hypothetical another step further and suppose the ship is moored at harbor in the home port, having just been filled with cargo.  The captain may choose to sail or not.  If he chooses not to sail, he loses the value of the cargo just the same as in the previous case.  He isn't free to take the opportunity to remain in port if he values the profit from the sale of his cargo.  His choice is once again both voluntary and involuntary in a sense.  Now let's suppose, instead, that I am a ship captain, yet have no billet of goods.  I can choose to load up with cargo for sale in a foreign port, or choose not to do so.  Again, the same cost to me is that I will not benefit from the sale of the cargo.  If I value the profit from the sale of cargo, I do not have a free opportunity to remain in port with my ship empty.  And so it goes, each decision we make prior to the sale of goods in that foreign port determines whether we will ultimately profit from the sale of our cargo.  At no point in the chain of events is our will not a mixture of voluntary and involuntary parts.  We do not voluntarily choose the conditions under which we will profit, nor determine which opportunities are closed to us.  It is in this sense that we worry whether or not our actions are in any sense truly voluntary.  And the answer to that question is of great interest to us.

I think, if I have some liberty here, we could speak of free choices in which we have the opportunity to preserve what is of value to us through multiple courses of action.  But as in the dialog MTL pasted, there will always be one opportunity that has less cost than the others.  Being of sound mind and body, and apprised of the cost of the different choices, we have no opportunity to choose that but which to our mind is the most profitable.  Thus, none of our choices are voluntary.  They are all involuntary in that the opportunities which present themselves will fully determine which choice we make.

The being "of sound mind and body," as you put it, is important to what the person does.  That is, what the person is, contributes to what the person does.  So it is not merely the circumstances in which the person exists.  If it were purely a matter of circumstances, everyone would act the same in the same circumstances, but we know that different people, being different, do different things.  Some men, when given too much change from a cashier at a store, pocket the money, as they are dishonest, but some others will point out the error and return the excess, because they are honest.  That is, the difference in the conduct is due to a difference in the persons.  The situation described is the same.

Now, it may be that they are caused to be different by preceding conditions, but whether they were caused to be different, or are different due to pure random chance or whatever, makes no difference for the fact that they are different and therefore behave differently.

As for Aristotle, his idea of "voluntary" is understood in contrast to his definition of "involuntary" and actions that are "compulsory" (that is, he does the opposite of what one would expect, and instead of defining "voluntary" and then saying that "involuntary is what is not voluntary," he reverses this and defines "involuntary" and then says that "voluntary is what is not involuntary").  Here is a bit more from Aristotle, a few paragraphs into Book III:

What sort of acts, then, should be called compulsory? We answer that without qualification actions are so when the cause is in the external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing.

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicoma...3.iii.html

Basically, Aristotle is saying that the action is voluntary if the primary cause of the action is the agent, rather than the circumstances.  I am stating this in an overly crude way, but it is the gist of it.  (To refine it, we would need to restrict the primary cause to being in the mind of the agent, and not due to a mere twitch in the leg or other non-chosen action, and, for Aristotle, we would also need to further refine things as he does not regard actions done from ignorance as purely voluntary, etc.  But I am not presently interested in the details that interest Aristotle in his preliminary discussion leading up to his view of ethics.)  And it aligns with what I am saying it means when someone is "free."  Note that Aristotle's conception is perfectly compatible with the person being totally caused to be as he is from previous circumstances, or, in other words, this particular bit of Aristotle is compatible with determinism.

Of course, Aristotle is interested in "mixed" cases, where the cause of the action is partially the agent and partially the circumstances, but I am not overly interested in pursuing that presently.

The point is, the "free" action has its primary source in the agent.  How the agent came to be whatever the agent is, is irrelevant to whether the action is "free" or not, and thus this is not incompatible with determinism.


When I choose to keep my hand out of a fire, I do that primarily due to what I am.  It is an act of will on my part.  And so it is "free."  It makes no difference for this if my will was caused to be what it is purely due to preceding conditions, was fully causally determined, or not.  In such an instance with my hand and a fire, I act as I do because of what I am, not primarily due to the circumstances.