(October 13, 2015 at 4:31 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:(October 13, 2015 at 3:48 pm)Pyrrho Wrote: By the circumstances, Aristotle means the part of the situation that is not the agent.
Speaking of introducing undefined terms, I think one of the weak points of compatibilism is this whole notion of an agent or self. To some, the agent includes the body and mind of the thing that wills. But this is making a rather arbitrary distinction. Is my hand a part of the agent? Under many conceptions, yes, but if I lose my hand am I less of a complete agent? Suppose that we in reality are just brains in vats. In that case, what I mean by my hand is just a part of a model in my brain that represents me as having a hand. So is the agent the brain? If I indeed have no hand then the model of the world I have in my mind is the circumstance to which I must comport myself. But if the model in my brain is the reality towards which I must comport myself, clearly not all of the brain is the agent; some of the brain is the circumstance which we are compelled to comport ourselves with. So part of the brain doesn't qualify as agent but rather is circumstance. But which part of brain is the agent then? You seem to have drawn an arbitrary line between some part of body and brain and declared that things to one side are circumstance, and things to the other side of the line are agent. Depending on where and how I draw this line, different sets of acts will be viewed as voluntary and compulsory. If the notion of free will depends on the arbitrary drawing of a line in the sand, it's not a rational conception and is just a case of defining something into existence.
What is an agent?
It is no more a part of compatibilism than it is of the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible. In all of the discussions of free will, there is something that is described as having free will, or not having free will, depending on the position taken.
If one takes the position that there is no self, no will, then there is nothing being discussed that can be said to be free, nor that can be said to be not free.
If you are not, then it would be incorrect to say that you are free, and equally incorrect to say that you are not free. If there is no you, then neither "you are free" nor "you are not free" would be about anything.
"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence."
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Part I.
