(January 24, 2016 at 11:28 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: My views are similar to Rhythm's, but I feel perhaps I've done a disservice to them. Chad originally claimed that objects cannot have intentionality — that they do not refer in the way thoughts do in a human mind.
Well, I'm kind of in the middle on the semantics in this case. I think you've made a pretty good case for your definition of intentionality; I can definitely see someone saying, "Look! That Google car plans to turn left, but it's stopped at the stop light." However, I also agree with Chad that intentionality is usually a word related to the agency of a conscious organism.
My problem with your definition is that it represents a slippery slope: specifically that if I accept your (and Rhythm's) definitions of words that have traditionally referred to the human experience (what it's like to be a human) rather than to the function of the human organism (the behaviors that are "output"), then what words will I use when I want to express MY views of how things work?
