Anti-Utilitarianism

[Edwardo Piet]

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Because we've simply selected two antithesis that are important to us and used them as the negative and positive of the scale. It's precisely the mistake Sam Harris made with flourishing, he can't in any way argue for flourishing or the lack there of being the source of value, he simply uses an argument from intuition and appeal to emotion to make his case, where he says "Imagine a state of affairs where everyone is suffering as much as possible" which is the worst state of affairs in many evaluative methods, in terms of pain/pleasure, preferences, desire fulfilment, and the abilities of desires on other desires, it's not so much as an argument for his evaluation as it is a statement of fact about the worst conceivable state of affairs, so his conclusion is a non sequitur.

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And how is appealing to desires not equally an appeal to intuition?

It's an arbitrary constraint. If desires are the source of all value then pain and suffering are only two subsets of value.

Why appeal to desires?

I agree that it is worse, but why do you think it is worse? I can give you a comprehensive case for why, you've so far not presented anything as far as the method for evaluating is concerned.

I start from the premise that suffering is bad and that saving the worst suffering/worst sufferers is the priority. The evaluation is about figuring out who suffers most and prioritizing them.

You have a choice:

You can cut 2 toes off one person, suffering value 2 per person.

You can cut 1 toe off 100,000 people, suffering value 1 per person.

That's a very powerful example and intuitively I'm inclined to agree with you (and save the 100,000). But starting from the premise that suffering is bad, and the worst suffering is what needs to be saved, I can't agree based on that rationale.

What do you do?

Intuitively speaking I say, cut off two toes off the one person. OBVIOUSLY. And furthermore, the 'ABSURD' conclusion that I agreed to earlier when I chose to save the man rather than the many raped women, I also would intutively choose to save the women. But it depends if I'm going by my intuition of disgust or if I'm going by the rationale to save those who suffer most (which is also intuitively based, but isn't merely my moral disgust, it's a conclusion drawn from my moral premise that suffering is bad and those that suffer most are the priority to be saved).

What virtue ethics would you use?

I'm not sure. Virtue ethics just appeals to me.

1. The suffering does exist
2. The suffering is being experienced

Only separately.

The total suffering is an evaluation of two different scenarios with quantitative and qualitative values.

But why is it accurate to aggregate those suffering separately when they only ever suffer separately?

You seem to treat suffering in pain like some magical thing, almost in a dualist way, yet you wouldn't say we can't evaluate like and dislike without experiencing the total like and dislike ourselves would you? Why should one emergent property of the brain be excluded and one allowed?

I consider the question "What do you like?" and "What do you dislike?" as the premises to start with. You consider "What do you desire?" and "what do you not desire?" as the premises to start with. Am I correct?

Why choose your premises over mine?

And? You're lacking one hell of a lot.

I don't get what this statement referred to. I'm lacking what?

That not only doesn't make sense

It makes sense to me

it's not the way that anyone I'm familiar with looks at things.

Yeah, I'll grant you that actually.

I would be fair to say that given no other information that the group of 10 women likely has one suffering more than the group of 3, simply from statistical probabilities, however what if you were told that group 3 had one woman who was experiencing more pain from her rape? Would you forgo the 10 to save the 3?

Intuitively, based on my moral disgust, I say no, save the 10.

Based on my intuitive premise that suffering is bad and those who suffer the most need to be saved first, I'd say yes, save the group containing the sufferer that suffers most.

Say you can only chose 1 group. You chose the 10 for the numbers now? Based on what? Suddenly it seems like the quantitative value has impact does it not?

It's merely intuition, there's no argument there. It doesn't matter how it seems without argument to back it up.

You can save 1 person from having 2 toes cut off.

You can save everybody else on earth from having one toe cut off.

You should be required to chose the former from what you've said so far, is that correct?

Intuitively, based on my moral disgust I say save everyone on earth.

Based on my intuitive premise that suffering is bad and those who suffer the most need to be saved first, I'd say save the person who suffers the most pain in the long run as a result of it. That could be the person who loses two toes simply because he loses an extra toe so twice the trouble, but given the numbers of the people on earth it's possible that someone losing one toe copes less well than the man who suffers two, so I'd probably also still save everyone else based on that.

That's if I analyse it, otherwise I'd just go by the rationale that the person who loses two toes is worse off so I prioritize them to be saved.